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Tennessee Hospitals DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Fire Station DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Police Station DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Emergency Operation Center DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Schools DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Airport Facility DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Highway Bridge DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Major River Crossings DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
0 40 8020
Miles
Legend
Impacted Counties Boundary
0 100 20050
Miles
Major Cities by Population
" 51,000 - 60,000
" 60,001 - 170,000
" 170,001 - 615,000
Roads
US Routes
Interstates
Major River Crossings Damage (Surface)
Unlikely Damaged
Likely Damaged
"
"
£¤45w
£¤45
£¤412
§¨¦40
£¤79
£¤64
£¤51
SHELBY
DYER
HENRYOBION
FAYETTE
GIBSON
HARDIN
CARROLL
TIPTON
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
HARDEMAN
BENTON
HAYWOOD
HENDERSON
LAUDERDALE
DECATUR
LAKE
WAYNE
PERRY
CHESTER
CROCKETT
STEWART
HUMPHREYS
HOUSTON
TIPTON
Memphis
Major River Crossings Damage in Critical Area (Points)
Unlikely Damaged
Likely Damaged
I
""
"
"
"
"
"
"
§¨¦40
§¨¦75£¤79
§¨¦65
£¤64
£¤411
£¤70
£¤27
£¤231
£¤51
§¨¦24
§¨¦81
WAYNE GILESSHELBY
DYER KNOX
HENRYOBION
SEVIER
POLK
GIBSON
MARION
TIPTON
MAURY
FAYETTE
SCOTT
HARDIN
GREENEWILSON
MONROEBLOUNT
HICKMAN
LINCOLN
SUMNER
CARROLL
PERRY
COCKE
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
WHITE
HARDEMAN
MORGAN
RHEA
FRANKLIN HAMILTON
LAWRENCE
ROANE
DICKSON
HAWKINS
COFFEE MCMINN
BENTON
SMITH
HAYWOOD
DAVIDSON
STEWART
CUMBERLAND
WARREN
CLAY
BEDFORD
FENTRESS
PUTNAM
WILLIAMSON
CAMPBELL
RUTHERFORD
OVERTON
HUMPHREYS
SULLIVAN
LEWIS BLEDSOE
CARTER
HENDERSON
GRUNDY
MACON
DEKALB
ROBERTSONMONTGOMERY CLAIBORNEUNION
LAUDERDALE DECATUR
LAKE
BRADLEY
MARSHALL
MEIGS
JOHNSON
ANDERSONCANNON
CHESTER
GRAINGER
LOUDON
CHEATHAM JEFFERSON UNICOI
CROCKETT VAN BUREN
HANCOCK
HOUSTON
PICKETT
MOORE
TROUSDALE
TIPTON
Memphis
Clarksville
Tennessee Railway Bridge DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
0 40 8020
Miles
Legend
Impacted Counties Boundary
0 100 20050
Miles
Major Cities by Population
" 51,000 - 60,000
" 60,001 - 170,000
" 170,001 - 615,000
Roads
US Routes
Interstates
Railway Bridge Damage (Surface)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
No Inventory
"
"
£¤45w
£¤45
£¤412
§¨¦40
£¤79
£¤64
£¤51
SHELBY
DYER
HENRYOBION
FAYETTE
GIBSON
HARDIN
CARROLL
TIPTON
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
HARDEMAN
BENTON
HAYWOOD
HENDERSON
LAUDERDALE
DECATUR
LAKE
WAYNE
PERRY
CHESTER
CROCKETT
STEWART
HUMPHREYS
HOUSTON
TIPTON
Memphis
Jackson
Railway Bridge Damage of Critical Area (Points)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
I
""
"
"
"
"
"
"
§¨¦40
§¨¦75£¤79
§¨¦65
£¤64
£¤411
£¤70
£¤27
£¤231
£¤51
§¨¦24
§¨¦81
WAYNE GILESSHELBY
DYER KNOX
HENRYOBION
SEVIER
POLK
GIBSON
MARION
TIPTON
MAURY
FAYETTE
SCOTT
HARDIN
GREENEWILSON
MONROEBLOUNT
HICKMAN
LINCOLN
SUMNER
CARROLL
PERRY
COCKE
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
WHITE
HARDEMAN
MORGAN
RHEA
FRANKLIN HAMILTON
LAWRENCE
ROANE
DICKSON
HAWKINS
COFFEE MCMINN
BENTON
SMITH
HAYWOOD
DAVIDSON
STEWART
CUMBERLAND
WARREN
CLAY
BEDFORD
FENTRESS
PUTNAM
WILLIAMSON
CAMPBELL
RUTHERFORD
OVERTON
HUMPHREYS
SULLIVAN
LEWIS BLEDSOE
CARTER
HENDERSON
GRUNDY
MACON
DEKALB
ROBERTSONMONTGOMERY CLAIBORNEUNION
LAUDERDALE DECATUR
LAKE
BRADLEY
MARSHALL
MEIGS
JOHNSON
ANDERSONCANNON
CHESTER
GRAINGER
LOUDON
CHEATHAM JEFFERSON UNICOI
CROCKETT VAN BUREN
HANCOCK
HOUSTON
PICKETT
MOORE
TROUSDALE
TIPTON
Memphis
Clarksville
Tennessee Railway Facility DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
0 40 8020
Miles
Legend
Impacted Counties Boundary
0 100 20050
Miles
Major Cities by Population
" 51,000 - 60,000
" 60,001 - 170,000
" 170,001 - 615,000
Roads
US Routes
Interstates
Railway Facility Damage (Surface)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
"
"
£¤45w
£¤45
£¤412
§¨¦40
£¤79
£¤64
£¤51
SHELBY
DYER
HENRYOBION
FAYETTE
GIBSON
HARDIN
CARROLL
TIPTON
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
HARDEMAN
BENTON
HAYWOOD
HENDERSON
LAUDERDALE
DECATUR
LAKE
WAYNE
PERRY
CHESTER
CROCKETT
STEWART
HUMPHREYS
HOUSTON
TIPTON
Memphis
Railway Facility Damage of Critical Area (Points)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
I
""
"
"
"
"
"
"
§¨¦40
§¨¦75£¤79
§¨¦65
£¤64
£¤411
£¤70
£¤27
£¤231
£¤51
§¨¦24
§¨¦81
WAYNE GILESSHELBY
DYER KNOX
HENRYOBION
SEVIER
POLK
GIBSON
MARION
TIPTON
MAURY
FAYETTE
SCOTT
HARDIN
GREENEWILSON
MONROEBLOUNT
HICKMAN
LINCOLN
SUMNER
CARROLL
PERRY
COCKE
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
WHITE
HARDEMAN
MORGAN
RHEA
FRANKLIN HAMILTON
LAWRENCE
ROANE
DICKSON
HAWKINS
COFFEE MCMINN
BENTON
SMITH
HAYWOOD
DAVIDSON
STEWART
CUMBERLAND
WARREN
CLAY
BEDFORD
FENTRESS
PUTNAM
WILLIAMSON
CAMPBELL
RUTHERFORD
OVERTON
HUMPHREYS
SULLIVAN
LEWIS BLEDSOE
CARTER
HENDERSON
GRUNDY
MACON
DEKALB
ROBERTSONMONTGOMERY CLAIBORNEUNION
LAUDERDALE DECATUR
LAKE
BRADLEY
MARSHALL
MEIGS
JOHNSON
ANDERSONCANNON
CHESTER
GRAINGER
LOUDON
CHEATHAM JEFFERSON UNICOI
CROCKETT VAN BUREN
HANCOCK
HOUSTON
PICKETT
MOORE
TROUSDALE
TIPTON
Memphis
Clarksville
Tennessee Railway Tunnel DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
0 40 8020
Miles
Legend
Impacted Counties Boundary
0 100 20050
Miles
Major Cities by Population
" 51,000 - 60,000
" 60,001 - 170,000
" 170,001 - 615,000
Roads
US Routes
Interstates
Railway Tunnel Damage (Surface)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
No Inventory
"
"
£¤45w
£¤45
£¤412
§¨¦40
£¤79
£¤64
£¤51
SHELBY
DYER
HENRYOBION
FAYETTE
GIBSON
HARDIN
CARROLL
TIPTON
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
HARDEMAN
BENTON
HAYWOOD
HENDERSON
LAUDERDALE
DECATUR
LAKE
WAYNE
PERRY
CHESTER
CROCKETT
STEWART
HUMPHREYS
HOUSTON
TIPTON
Memphis
Railway Tunnel Damage of Critical Area (Points)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
I
""
"
"
"
"
"
"
§¨¦40
§¨¦75£¤79
§¨¦65
£¤64
£¤411
£¤70
£¤27
£¤231
£¤51
§¨¦24
§¨¦81
WAYNE GILESSHELBY
DYER KNOX
HENRYOBION
SEVIER
POLK
GIBSON
MARION
TIPTON
MAURY
FAYETTE
SCOTT
HARDIN
GREENEWILSON
MONROEBLOUNT
HICKMAN
LINCOLN
SUMNER
CARROLL
PERRY
COCKE
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
WHITE
HARDEMAN
MORGAN
RHEA
FRANKLIN HAMILTON
LAWRENCE
ROANE
DICKSON
HAWKINS
COFFEE MCMINN
BENTON
SMITH
HAYWOOD
DAVIDSON
STEWART
CUMBERLAND
WARREN
CLAY
BEDFORD
FENTRESS
PUTNAM
WILLIAMSON
CAMPBELL
RUTHERFORD
OVERTON
HUMPHREYS
SULLIVAN
LEWIS BLEDSOE
CARTER
HENDERSON
GRUNDY
MACON
DEKALB
ROBERTSONMONTGOMERY CLAIBORNEUNION
LAUDERDALE DECATUR
LAKE
BRADLEY
MARSHALL
MEIGS
JOHNSON
ANDERSON
CANNON
CHESTER
GRAINGER
LOUDON
CHEATHAM UNICOI
CROCKETT VAN BUREN
HANCOCK
HOUSTON
PICKETT
MOORE
TROUSDALE
TIPTON
Memphis
Clarksville
Tennessee Bus Facility DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
0 40 8020
Miles
Legend
Impacted Counties Boundary
0 100 20050
Miles
Major Cities by Population
" 51,000 - 60,000
" 60,001 - 170,000
" 170,001 - 615,000
Roads
US Routes
Interstates
Bus Facility Damage (Surface)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
No Inventory
"
"
£¤45w
£¤45
£¤412
§¨¦40
£¤79
£¤64
£¤51
SHELBY
DYER
HENRYOBION
FAYETTE
GIBSON
HARDIN
CARROLL
TIPTON
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
HARDEMAN
BENTON
HAYWOOD
HENDERSON
LAUDERDALE
DECATUR
LAKE
WAYNE
PERRY
CHESTER
CROCKETT
STEWART
HUMPHREYS
HOUSTON
TIPTON
Memphis
Bus Facility Damage of Critical Area (Points)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
I
""
"
"
"
"
"
"
§¨¦40
§¨¦75£¤79
§¨¦65
£¤64
£¤411
£¤70
£¤27
£¤231
£¤51
§¨¦24
§¨¦81
WAYNE GILESSHELBY
DYER KNOX
HENRYOBION
SEVIER
POLK
GIBSON
MARION
TIPTON
MAURY
FAYETTE
SCOTT
HARDIN
GREENEWILSON
MONROEBLOUNT
HICKMAN
LINCOLN
SUMNER
CARROLL
PERRY
COCKE
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
WHITE
HARDEMAN
MORGAN
RHEA
FRANKLIN HAMILTON
LAWRENCE
ROANE
DICKSON
HAWKINS
COFFEE MCMINN
BENTON
SMITH
HAYWOOD
DAVIDSON
STEWART
CUMBERLAND
WARREN
CLAY
BEDFORD
FENTRESS
PUTNAM
WILLIAMSON
CAMPBELL
RUTHERFORD
OVERTON
HUMPHREYS
SULLIVAN
LEWIS BLEDSOE
CARTER
HENDERSON
GRUNDY
MACON
DEKALB
ROBERTSONMONTGOMERY CLAIBORNEUNION
LAUDERDALE DECATUR
LAKE
BRADLEY
MARSHALL
MEIGS
JOHNSON
ANDERSONCANNON
CHESTER
GRAINGER
LOUDON
CHEATHAM JEFFERSON UNICOI
CROCKETT VAN BUREN
HANCOCK
HOUSTON
PICKETT
MOORE
TROUSDALE
TIPTON
Memphis
Clarksville
Tennessee Port Facility DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
0 40 8020
Miles
Legend
Impacted Counties Boundary
0 100 20050
Miles
Major Cities by Population
" 51,000 - 60,000
" 60,001 - 170,000
" 170,001 - 615,000
Roads
US Routes
Interstates
Port Facility Damage (Surface)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
"
"
£¤45w
£¤45
£¤412
§¨¦40
£¤79
£¤64
£¤51
SHELBY
DYER
HENRYOBION
FAYETTE
GIBSON
HARDIN
CARROLL
TIPTON
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
HARDEMAN
BENTON
HAYWOOD
HENDERSON
LAUDERDALE
DECATUR
LAKE
WAYNE
PERRY
CHESTER
CROCKETT
STEWART
HUMPHREYS
HOUSTON
TIPTON
Memphis
Port Facility Damage of Critical Area (Points)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
I
""
"
"
"
"
"
"
§¨¦40
§¨¦75£¤79
§¨¦65
£¤64
£¤411
£¤70
£¤27
£¤231
£¤51
§¨¦24
§¨¦81
WAYNE GILESSHELBY
DYER KNOX
HENRYOBION
SEVIER
POLK
GIBSON
MARION
TIPTON
MAURY
FAYETTE
SCOTT
HARDIN
GREENEWILSON
MONROEBLOUNT
HICKMAN
LINCOLN
SUMNER
CARROLL
PERRY
COCKE
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
WHITE
HARDEMAN
MORGAN
RHEA
FRANKLIN HAMILTON
LAWRENCE
ROANE
DICKSON
HAWKINS
COFFEE MCMINN
BENTON
SMITH
HAYWOOD
DAVIDSON
STEWART
CUMBERLAND
WARREN
CLAY
BEDFORD
FENTRESS
PUTNAM
WILLIAMSON
CAMPBELL
RUTHERFORD
OVERTON
HUMPHREYS
SULLIVAN
LEWIS BLEDSOE
CARTER
HENDERSON
GRUNDY
MACON
DEKALB
ROBERTSONMONTGOMERY CLAIBORNEUNION
LAUDERDALE DECATUR
LAKE
BRADLEY
MARSHALL
MEIGS
JOHNSON
ANDERSON
CANNON
CHESTER
GRAINGER
LOUDON
CHEATHAM JEFFERSON UNICOI
CROCKETT VAN BUREN
HANCOCK
HOUSTON
PICKETT
MOORE
TROUSDALE
TIPTON
Memphis Chattanooga
Clarksville
Tennessee Communication Facility DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
0 40 8020
Miles
Legend
Impacted Counties Boundary
0 100 20050
Miles
Major Cities by Population
" 51,000 - 60,000
" 60,001 - 170,000
" 170,001 - 615,000
Roads
US Routes
Interstates
Communication Facility Damage (Surface)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
"
"
£¤45w
£¤45
£¤412
§¨¦40
£¤79
£¤64
£¤51
SHELBY
DYER
HENRYOBION
FAYETTE
GIBSON
HARDIN
CARROLL
TIPTON
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
HARDEMAN
BENTON
HAYWOOD
HENDERSON
LAUDERDALE
DECATUR
LAKE
WAYNE
PERRY
CHESTER
CROCKETT
STEWART
HUMPHREYS
HOUSTON
TIPTON
Memphis
Communication Facility Damage of Critical Area (Points)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
I
""
"
"
"
"
"
"
§¨¦40
§¨¦75£¤79
§¨¦65
£¤64
£¤411
£¤70
£¤27
£¤231
£¤51
§¨¦24
§¨¦81
WAYNE GILESSHELBY
DYER KNOX
HENRYOBION
SEVIER
POLK
GIBSON
MARION
TIPTON
MAURY
FAYETTE
SCOTT
HARDIN
GREENEWILSON
MONROEBLOUNT
HICKMAN
LINCOLN
SUMNER
CARROLL
PERRY
COCKE
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
WHITE
HARDEMAN
MORGAN
RHEA
FRANKLIN HAMILTON
LAWRENCE
ROANE
DICKSON
HAWKINS
COFFEE MCMINN
BENTON
SMITH
HAYWOOD
DAVIDSON
STEWART
CUMBERLAND
WARREN
CLAY
BEDFORD
FENTRESS
PUTNAM
WILLIAMSON
CAMPBELL
RUTHERFORD
OVERTON
HUMPHREYS
SULLIVAN
LEWIS BLEDSOE
CARTER
HENDERSON
GRUNDY
MACON
DEKALB
ROBERTSONMONTGOMERY CLAIBORNEUNION
LAUDERDALE DECATUR
LAKE
BRADLEY
MARSHALL
MEIGS
JOHNSON
ANDERSON
CANNON
CHESTER
GRAINGER
LOUDON
CHEATHAM JEFFERSON UNICOI
CROCKETT VAN BUREN
HANCOCK
HOUSTON
PICKETT
MOORE
TROUSDALE
TIPTON
Memphis Chattanooga
Clarksville
Tennessee Electric Facility DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
0 40 8020
Miles
Legend
Impacted Counties Boundary
0 100 20050
Miles
Major Cities by Population
" 51,000 - 60,000
" 60,001 - 170,000
" 170,001 - 615,000
Roads
US Routes
Interstates
Electric Power Outages at Day 1(% Households w/o Service)
0% - 20%
21% - 40%
41% - 60%
61% - 80%
81% - 100%
£¤45w
£¤45
£¤412
§¨¦40
£¤79
£¤64
£¤51
SHELBY
DYER
HENRYOBION
FAYETTE
GIBSON
HARDIN
CARROLL
TIPTON
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
HARDEMAN
BENTON
HAYWOOD
HENDERSON
LAUDERDALE
DECATUR
LAKE
WAYNE
PERRY
CHESTER
CROCKETT
STEWART
HUMPHREYS
HOUSTON
TIPTON
Electric Facility Damage of Critical Area (Points)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
I
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!!!
! !
!
!!
!
!
!!
! !
!!
!!
!!!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!!
!
!!
!!
!
!
!
!!! !
!
!!
!
! !
!
!!
!!!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!!
!
!!
! !
!!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!!
!
!!
!
! !!!
! !
!!
!!
!
!!!
!!
!!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!!
!
!
!!!
!!
!
!
!!
!!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!! !!!!
!
!!
! !!!
!
!
!! !
!
!
!!!! !
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!!
!!!
!
!!
!!
!
!!
!
!
!!
!
!!
!!!
!
!
!
!!
!
!!
!!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!! !!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!!!
!
!
!!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!!
!
!
!
!! !
! !!
!
! !
!!
!
!
!
!
!!!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
! !
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! ! !
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
! !!
!
!
!
!
! !!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!! !
!
!
! !!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!!
!
!
! !
! ! !
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
§¨¦40
§¨¦75£¤79
§¨¦65
£¤64
£¤411
£¤70
£¤27
£¤231
£¤51
§¨¦24
§¨¦81
WAYNE GILESSHELBY
DYER KNOX
HENRYOBION
SEVIER
POLK
GIBSON
MARION
TIPTON
MAURY
FAYETTE
SCOTT
HARDIN
GREENEWILSON
MONROEBLOUNT
HICKMAN
LINCOLN
SUMNER
CARROLL
PERRY
COCKE
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
WHITE
HARDEMAN
MORGAN
RHEA
FRANKLIN HAMILTON
LAWRENCE
ROANE
DICKSON
HAWKINS
COFFEE MCMINN
BENTON
SMITH
HAYWOOD
DAVIDSON
STEWART
CUMBERLAND
WARREN
CLAY
BEDFORD
FENTRESS
PUTNAM
WILLIAMSON
CAMPBELL
RUTHERFORD
OVERTON
HUMPHREYS
SULLIVAN
LEWIS BLEDSOE
CARTER
HENDERSON
GRUNDY
MACON
DEKALB
ROBERTSONMONTGOMERY CLAIBORNEUNION
LAUDERDALE DECATUR
LAKE
BRADLEY
MARSHALL
MEIGS
JOHNSON
ANDERSONCANNON
CHESTER
GRAINGER
LOUDON
CHEATHAM JEFFERSON UNICOI
CROCKETT VAN BUREN
HANCOCK
HOUSTON
PICKETT
MOORE
TROUSDALE
TIPTON
Memphis
Clarksville
Tennessee Natural Gas Facility DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
0 40 8020
Miles
Legend
Impacted Counties Boundary
! ! ! Gas Pipelines
0 100 20050
Miles
Major Cities by Population
" 51,000 - 60,000
" 60,001 - 170,000
" 170,001 - 615,000
Roads
US Routes
Interstates
Natural Gas Facility Damage (Surface)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!!!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!!!
!
!!!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
! !
!!!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!!
!
! !
!!
!
! !
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!!!
!
!
! !
!
!
!!
!
!
! !!
!
!
! !
!!
!
!!!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!!
! ! !
!!
!
!
!!
!
! !!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!!!
!!!!!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!!!
!
!
!
!
!!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
! !!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
! !!
!
! !!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! ! ! !
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!! !
!
!
! !
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
"
"
£¤45w
£¤45
£¤412
§¨¦40
£¤79
£¤64
£¤51
SHELBY
DYER
HENRYOBION
FAYETTE
GIBSON
HARDIN
CARROLL
TIPTON
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
HARDEMAN
BENTON
HAYWOOD
HENDERSON
LAUDERDALE
DECATUR
LAKE
WAYNE
PERRY
CHESTER
CROCKETT
STEWART
HUMPHREYS
HOUSTON
TIPTON
Memphis
Natural Gas Facility Damage of Critical Area (Points)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
I
""
"
"
"
"
"
"
§¨¦40
§¨¦75£¤79
§¨¦65
£¤64
£¤411
£¤70
£¤27
£¤231
£¤51
§¨¦24
§¨¦81
WAYNE GILESSHELBY
DYER KNOX
HENRYOBION
SEVIER
POLK
GIBSON
MARION
TIPTON
MAURY
FAYETTE
SCOTT
HARDIN
GREENEWILSON
MONROEBLOUNT
HICKMAN
LINCOLN
SUMNER
CARROLL
PERRY
COCKE
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
WHITE
HARDEMAN
MORGAN
RHEA
FRANKLIN HAMILTON
LAWRENCE
ROANE
DICKSON
HAWKINS
COFFEE MCMINN
BENTON
SMITH
HAYWOOD
DAVIDSON
STEWART
CUMBERLAND
WARREN
CLAY
BEDFORD
FENTRESS
PUTNAM
WILLIAMSON
CAMPBELL
RUTHERFORD
OVERTON
HUMPHREYS
SULLIVAN
LEWIS BLEDSOE
CARTER
HENDERSON
GRUNDY
MACON
DEKALB
ROBERTSONMONTGOMERY CLAIBORNEUNION
LAUDERDALE DECATUR
LAKE
BRADLEY
MARSHALL
MEIGS
JOHNSON
ANDERSONCANNON
CHESTER
GRAINGER
LOUDON
CHEATHAM JEFFERSON UNICOI
CROCKETT VAN BUREN
HANCOCK
HOUSTON
PICKETT
MOORE
TROUSDALE
TIPTON
Memphis
Clarksville
Tennessee Oil Facility DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Waste Water Facility DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
0 40 8020
Miles
Legend
Imacted Counties Boundary
0 100 20050
Miles
Major Cities by Population
" 51,000 - 60,000
" 60,001 - 170,000
" 170,001 - 615,000
Roads
US Routes
Interstates
Number of Line Breaks and Leaks
0 - 150
151 - 650
651 - 2,000
2,001 - 3,100
3,101 - 6,300
"
"
£¤45w
£¤45
£¤412
§¨¦40
£¤79
£¤64
£¤51
SHELBY
DYER
HENRYOBION
FAYETTE
GIBSON
HARDIN
CARROLL
TIPTON
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
HARDEMAN
BENTON
HAYWOOD
HENDERSON
LAUDERDALE
DECATUR
LAKE
WAYNE
PERRY
CHESTER
CROCKETT
STEWART
HUMPHREYS
HOUSTON
TIPTON
Memphis
Waste Water Facility Damage of Critical Area (Points)
Highly Unlikely
Unlikely
Moderate Likelihood
Likely
Certain
I
""
"
"
"
"
"
"
§¨¦40
§¨¦75£¤79
§¨¦65
£¤64
£¤411
£¤70
£¤27
£¤231
£¤51
§¨¦24
§¨¦81
WAYNE GILESSHELBY
DYER KNOX
HENRYOBION
SEVIER
POLK
GIBSON
MARION
TIPTON
MAURY
FAYETTE
SCOTT
HARDIN
GREENEWILSON
MONROEBLOUNT
HICKMAN
LINCOLN
SUMNER
CARROLL
PERRY
COCKE
MCNAIRY
MADISON
WEAKLEY
WHITE
HARDEMAN
MORGAN
RHEA
FRANKLIN HAMILTON
LAWRENCE
ROANE
DICKSON
HAWKINS
COFFEE MCMINN
BENTON
SMITH
HAYWOOD
DAVIDSON
STEWART
CUMBERLAND
WARREN
CLAY
BEDFORD
FENTRESS
PUTNAM
WILLIAMSON
CAMPBELL
RUTHERFORD
OVERTON
HUMPHREYS
SULLIVAN
LEWIS BLEDSOE
CARTER
HENDERSON
GRUNDY
MACON
DEKALB
ROBERTSONMONTGOMERY CLAIBORNEUNION
LAUDERDALE DECATUR
LAKE
BRADLEY
MARSHALL
MEIGS
JOHNSON
ANDERSONCANNON
CHESTER
GRAINGER
LOUDON
CHEATHAM JEFFERSON UNICOI
CROCKETT VAN BUREN
HANCOCK
HOUSTON
PICKETT
MOORE
TROUSDALE
TIPTON
Memphis
Clarksville
Tennessee Potable Water Facility DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Potable Water OutagesNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Dam DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Levee DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Hazmat Facilities DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Casualties at 2:00 AMNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Building DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Building Asset Value Loss RatioNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Tennessee Liquefaction SusceptibilityNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Schools DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Airports DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Highway Bridge DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Major River Crossings DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Railway Bridges DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Waste Water Facilities DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Electric Power OutagesNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Potable Water OutagesNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Levee DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Hazmat Facilities DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Casualties at 2:00 AMNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
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Central US Building DamageNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
Major Cities by Population
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Central US Total DebrisNew Madrid Seismic Zone:  M7.7 Event
Major Cities by Population
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Appendix 8 - Flood Risk Modeling  
 
General Model Description 
 
The flood risk model utilizes the previously discussed threshold methodology to determine dam 
damage. The two categories are defined as “damaged” or “not damaged” and the threshold limit 
is based on the assumption that any dam expected to release water after an earthquake must incur 
at least a moderate level of damage which generates significant cracks for water seepage or 
substantial displacement of the structure.  
 
Once the dams are classified into the two aforementioned categories, the selected flood risk 
methodology is applied to determine areas at risk. According to the selected model, parameters 
such as dam height, elevation, and maximum storage capacity can be used to determine the 
danger zones by determining a danger reach length (relevant distance that water travels after dam 
fails) and width of the overflowing water. By combining the two, an area or surface is created to 
define potential flood risk zone. Respective elevations are then assigned to each potential flood 
risk zone created for each damaged dam, based on dam elevation information. The elevation at 
the bottom of the dam is assigned as the elevation of the respective potential flood risk zone. 
 
After the potential flood risk zones are drawn and respective elevations are assigned, the flood 
surfaces are intersected with a 3D elevation map of the study region, and a cut-fill analysis is 
performed to determine which areas are at risk. Based on the analysis results, areas from the 
elevation map that lie below the potential flood risk zone elevations are considered to be ‘at 
risk’. Once the areas that exhibit flood risk potential are identified, the infrastructure in these 
areas is identified.  
 
Procedure and Methodology 
 
Prior to determinations of flood risk, damaged infrastructure is identified via pass/fail criteria. 
Potential flood risk zones are estimated near damaged dams based on potential flood reach length 
and water overflow width. Potential flood reach length is a key parameter, since it determines 
how far downstream the flood analysis should continue, thus defining the extent of flood risk. In 
A minimum of two parameters are required to complete this analysis, namely the height and 
maximum storage capacity of the dam. The peak discharge is determined by applying the 
following equation: 
 
Qmax =  3.2 Hw2.5  
 
where, Qmax is the peak discharge (cfs) and Hw is the water depth at failure (ft). 
 
The flood risk methodology implemented in this study was adapted from information contained 
in the Soil Conservation Service TSC Engineering-UD-16, 1969 (Johnson, 1998). According to 
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the methodology, a dam is assumed to fail at maximum capacity, that is, when the water height is 
at the top of the dam. The water height, which is equal to dam height in this case, as well as the 
maximum storage capacity and 100-year flood plain valley width are utilized to approximate the 
potential flood reach length (in feet) from a pre-defined graph. The example below illustrates 
how the potential flood reach is determined. 
 
Required parameters: 
• Height of dam, H = 10 feet 
• Volume of storage = 8 acre feet 
• Average valley width (usually at the 100-year flood plain) = 400 feet 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of Danger Reach Length Estimation  
 
The second essential parameter in determining potential flood risk zones is the water width. 
Initially a breach width is determined, which is approximated as the valley width for simplistic 
assessments in river valleys. For areas outside valleys and relatively small dams, two different 
slopes are considered, depending on the local population. A 1:2 slope is used for a residential or 
heavily populated area and a 1:4 slope is applied to open areas such as roadways (Johnson, 
1998). Ultimately, the average of the two slopes is used in this study, where sloping lines 
defining the flood risk zone are extended until they meet the potential flood risk length 
requirement discussed previously.  
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The identification of the potential flood reach length and the breach width are sufficient to 
determine potential flood risk areas. These two parameters are utilized to define polygons 
signifying the potential flood risk areas on an elevation map in GIS software. Adequate elevation 
information is added to each polygon, corresponding to the elevation of the respective dam 
bottom, since it is assumed that damaged dams fail completely. Once elevation data is added to 
the polygon information, the polygons are converted to triangulated surfaces, or “tin”-s, and a 
GIS cut-fill analysis is conducted to identify potentially flooded areas. 
 
Once potentially flooded areas are separated from the general landscape, critical infrastructure 
located in the flood zone is identified. Various key inventory groups are considered including 
numerous types of essential facilities, transportation lifelines and utility lifelines. Any facilities 
potentially at risk from flooding are likely inoperable due to secondary flooding if the facility is 
not already structurally damaged by the earthquake event.  
 
Though the implemented methodology is simplistic and includes significant uncertainty, it is a 
necessary first step in the more involved process of developing a comprehensive flood risk 
model. Uncertainty is attributed to the pass/fail criteria utilized to determine dam damage and the 
method employed to determine the potential flood risk zone. Future improvements to both 
damage and flood risk procedures are recommended, though the basic estimates provided by this 
methodology are extremely useful when addressing secondary hazard in the emergency planning 
and response process.  
 
Flood Risk Modeling Results 
 
The flood risk modeling methodology used in this study determines potential flood zones and 
identifies infrastructure in those regions that are at risk. Inventory that is located inside a flooded 
region boundary, either partially or completely, is classified as potentially flooded. Analysis 
results indicate that portions of five out of the eight study region states are at risk flood from 
potential flooding. The affected states include Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and 
Tennessee. Overall, the most impacted facilities include communication facilities, fire stations, 
waste water facilities, and highway bridges. Tennessee incurs the most serious damage by a large 
margin when compared to the four other states. Table 1 presents a regional summary, while the 
regional flood potential is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
At-risk infrastructure is highlighted by state following the regional overview statistics and map. 
All at risk facilities are catalogued in tables for each state and are represented on various maps of 
potentially flooded areas in each state.  
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Table 1: Flood Risk Results – Regional Summary 
Number of Potentially Flooded Facilities Inventory 
Category Facility Type AR IL KY MO TN 
Total by 
Facility Type 
EOC 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Fire Stations 2 1 1 0 7 11 
Hospitals 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Police Stations 0 0 0 0 7 7 
Essential 
Facilities 
Schools 0 1 0 1 8 10 
        
Airports 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Bus Facilities 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Highway Bridges 25 2 23 2 132 184 
Ports 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Railway Bridges 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Transportation 
Railway Facilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Communication Facilities 0 0 4 1 59 64 
Electric Power Facilities 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Natural Gas Facilities 0 0 0 2 1 3 
Oil Facilities 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Potable Water Facilities 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Utilities 
Waste Water Facilities 0 2 3 0 15 20 
        
Total Facilities by State 27 6 31 6 239 309 
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Figure 2: Regional Flood Risk 
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Arkansas 
 
Arkansas has infrastructure moderately affected by secondary flooding. Poinsett County is the 
only county that exhibits flood potential. Table 2 summarizes results based on facility types, 
while Figure 3 thru Figure 5 represent flood risk to essential facilities, transportation, and utility 
systems, respectively. Highway bridges are the most critical infrastructure for this state with 25 
bridges at risk. Fire stations are the only essential facilities that are potentially flooded, while 
utilities likely see no damage due to dam breaches.  
 
Table 2: Arkansas Flood Risk Assessment Results 
Inventory Category Facility  Number of Potentially Flooded Facilities 
Essential Facilities EOC 0 
  Fire Stations 2 
  Hospitals 0 
  Police Stations 0 
  Schools 0 
    
Transportation Airports 0 
  Bus Facilities 0 
  Highway Bridges 25 
  Ports 0 
  Railway Bridges 0 
  Railway Facilities 0 
    
Utilities Communication Facilities 0 
  Electric Power Facilities 0 
  Natural Gas Facilities 0 
  Oil Facilities 0 
  Potable Water Facilities 0 
  Waste Water Facilities 0 
     
Total Facilities at Risk 27 
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Figure 3: Arkansas Flood Risk of Essential Facilities 
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Figure 4: Arkansas Flood Risk of Transportation Systems 
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Figure 5: Arkansas Flood Risk of Utility Systems 
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Illinois 
 
Illinois is one of the least impacted states in terms of secondary flooding. The three affected 
counties in Illinois include: 
 
• Massac 
• Pope 
• Pulaski 
 
A total of six facilities are at risk from flooding in these three counties, as shown in Table 3. Fire 
stations, schools, highway bridges, and waste water facilities are among the affected facilities. 
Additionally, Figure 6 thru Figure 8 illustrate the locations of potentially flooded areas in 
relation to critical infrastructure in Illinois. 
 
Table 3: Illinois Flood Risk Assessment Results 
Inventory Category Facility  Number of Potentially Flooded Facilities 
Essential Facilities EOC 0 
  Fire Stations 1 
  Hospitals 0 
  Police Stations 0 
  Schools 1 
    
Transportation Airports 0 
  Bus Facilities 0 
  Highway Bridges 2 
  Ports 0 
  Railway Bridges 0 
  Railway Facilities 0 
    
Utilities Communication Facilities 0 
  Electric Power Facilities 0 
  Natural Gas Facilities 0 
  Oil Facilities 0 
  Potable Water Facilities 0 
  Waste Water Facilities 2 
     
Total Facilities at Risk 6  
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Figure 6: Illinois Flood Risk of Essential Facilities 
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Figure 7: Illinois Flood Risk to Transportation Systems 
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Figure 8: Illinois Flood Risk to Utility Systems 
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Kentucky  
 
Kentucky shows moderate flood risk in the three following affected counties: 
 
• Ballard 
• Carlisle 
• Hickman 
 
Similar to the other four at risk states, highway bridges are the most common structure type at 
risk. Slight impact is observed for fire stations, communication facilities, and waste water 
facilities as shown in Table 4. Additionally, Figure 9 thru Figure 11 illustrate the locations of 
potentially flooded areas in relation to critical infrastructure in Kentucky.  
 
Table 4: Kentucky Flood Risk Assessment Results 
Inventory Category Facility  Number of Potentially Flooded Facilities 
Essential Facilities EOC 0 
  Fire Stations 1 
  Hospitals 0 
  Police Stations 0 
  Schools 0 
    
Transportation Airports 0 
  Bus Facilities 0 
  Highway Bridges 23 
  Ports 0 
  Railway Bridges 0 
  Railway Facilities 0 
    
Utilities Communication Facilities 4 
  Electric Power Facilities 0 
  Natural Gas Facilities 0 
  Oil Facilities 0 
  Potable Water Facilities 0 
  Waste Water Facilities 3 
     
Total Facilities at Risk 31 
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Figure 9: Kentucky Flood Risk to Essential Facilities 
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Figure 10: Kentucky Flood Risk to Transportation Systems 
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Figure 11: Kentucky Flood Risk to Utility Systems 
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Missouri 
 
Expected flooding is limited in the State of Missouri. The only affected county is: 
 
• Scott 
 
A total of six facilities are affected including schools, highway bridges, communication facilities, 
and natural gas facilities. Table 5 details flood risk statistics for Missouri infrastructure. 
Additionally, Figure 12 thru Figure 14 illustrate the locations of potentially flooded areas in 
relation to critical infrastructure in Missouri. 
 
Table 5: Missouri Flood Risk Assessment Results 
Inventory Category Facility  Number of Potentially Flooded Facilities 
Essential Facilities EOC 0 
  Fire Stations 0 
  Hospitals 0 
  Police Stations 0 
  Schools 1 
    
Transportation Airports 0 
  Bus Facilities 0 
  Highway Bridges 2 
  Ports 0 
  Railway Bridges 0 
  Railway Facilities 0 
    
Utilities Communication Facilities 1 
  Electric Power Facilities 0 
  Natural Gas Facilities 2 
  Oil Facilities 0 
  Potable Water Facilities 0 
  Waste Water Facilities 0 
     
Total Facilities at Risk 6 
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Figure 12: Missouri Flood Risk of Essential Facilities 
A8-20 
 
Figure 13: Missouri Flood Risk of Transportation Systems 
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Figure 14: Missouri Flood Risk of Utility Systems 
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Tennessee 
 
Tennessee is the most heavily affected state in terms of flood risk. The potential flood damage 
includes numerous types of inventory with the exception of ports, railway bridges, and railway 
facilities. The three at risk counties are: 
 
• Dyer 
• Gibson 
• Obion 
 
Numerous highway bridges, communication facilities, and waste water facilities are at risk from 
secondary flooding in Tennessee (Table 6). Approximately 240 facilities are impacted in the 
three aforementioned counties. Additionally, Figure 15 thru Figure 17 illustrate the locations of 
potentially flooded areas in relation to critical infrastructure in Tennessee. 
 
Table 6: Tennessee Flood Risk Assessment Results 
Inventory Category Facility  Number of Potentially Flooded Facilities 
Essential Facilities EOC 2 
  Fire Stations 7 
  Hospitals 1 
  Police Stations 7 
  Schools 8 
    
Transportation Airports 2 
  Bus Facilities 1 
  Highway Bridges 132 
  Ports 0 
  Railway Bridges 0 
  Railway Facilities 0 
    
Utilities Communication Facilities 59 
  Electric Power Facilities 1 
  Natural Gas Facilities 1 
  Oil Facilities 1 
  Potable Water Facilities 2 
  Waste Water Facilities 15 
     
Total Facilities at Risk 239 
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Figure 15: Tennessee Flood Risk of Essential Facilities 
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Figure 16: Tennessee Flood Risk of Transportation Systems 
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Figure 17: Tennessee Flood Risk of Utility Systems 
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Appendix 9 – Transportation Network Modeling 
 
Introduction 
 
Transportation systems are major civil infrastructure systems which are prominent 
components of modern societies (Duke, 1981). These infrastructure systems are 
susceptible to natural and man-made hazards, as evidenced by recent extreme events such 
as the 2008 catastrophic Wenchuan Earthquake in China and the 2007 tragic rush-hour 
collapse of the Minneapolis, Minnesota, I-35W highway bridge in the United States.  
 
Transportation systems also serve as escape routes for survivors of disasters and provide 
emergency transport networks for rescue workers, construction repair teams, and disaster 
relief (EERI, 1986). The physical damage and functionality loss to the transportation 
infrastructure not only hinders residential and commercial activities, but also impairs 
post-disaster response and recovery, resulting substantial socio-economic losses (Chang 
& Nojima, 1998; Basoz and Kiremidjian, 1996; Nojima, 1998). Understanding the 
disastrous impact on these infrastructure systems and evaluating their performance are 
vital for stakeholders, emergency managers, and government agencies to mitigate, 
prepare for, response to, and recovery from catastrophic impact. 
 
Transportation networks with collapsed bridges could result in system functionality loss 
and hinder post-disaster emergency response. For example, emergency rescuers are not 
able to gain access to impacted areas when transportation infrastructure collapses due to 
direct earthquake impact or secondary landslides. Thus, it is essential to ensure that when 
bridges sustain seismic impact, they also retain traffic carrying capacities so that 
emergency relief resources can be dispatched to an impacted area in a timely manner.  
 
Governmental agencies (e.g., the state Deportments of Transportation) are usually 
responsible for the operation, inspection, and maintenance of transportation infrastructure. 
These agencies must work with emergency managers to identify and evaluate the 
emergency routes to be used for ingress and egress, and make emergency response plans 
for extreme events such as earthquakes. However, it is not easy to evaluate the 
transportation system’s performance under extreme events, because transportation 
networks are often large-scale systems with thousands of components and a complex 
topology. Furthermore, stochastic damages and capacities of bridges result in the 
uncertainties of network configuration, making the problem more difficult.  
 
This report describes the components and procedures of transportation system 
performance modeling under earthquake impacts through the use of the Network Loss 
Analysis (NLA) module in MAEViz - the comprehensive risk assessment software 
package developed by the Mid-America Earthquake (MAE) Center. The road networks in 
the metropolitan areas of St. Louis, Missouri, and Memphis, Tennessee, are used as case 
studies to illustrate the application of the NLA module. The results of this study could be 
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useful to evaluate systems performance under extreme events and make preparedness 
plans for emergency responses.  
 
Target Region and Data Sources 
 
The Central United States is an important “hub” of the national transportation system. 
According to the 2002 Commodity Flow Survey by the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics (BTS), more than 968 billion ton-miles, or about 31% all US commodities 
originate, pass through, or arrive in the Central United States region (BTS, 2005).  
 
The greater metropolitan areas of Memphis and St. Louis are particularly of significance. 
With regard to freight, the Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) worldwide headquarters 
and world hub are located in Memphis. The third largest U.S. cargo facility of the United 
Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), and also the only UPS facility capable of processing both air 
and ground cargo, is located in Memphis (Hanson, 2007). The Memphis International 
Airport has been the world’s busiest airport in terms of cargo traffic volume. St. Louis is 
also the home of the nation’s second-largest inland port by trip ton-miles and the nation’s 
third-largest rail center (St. Louis RCGA, n.d.).With regard to general travel, the Central 
United States is home to millions of people, including two major population centers in 
the St. Louis and Memphis metropolitan areas. In order to determine impacts to the 
transportation network in these major urban centers the aforementioned MW7.7 scenario 
earthquake is used to estimate the damage of bridges and subsequent impact on the road 
network. 
 
Unfortunately, the Central United States is one of the most vulnerable regions to seismic 
hazards in the U.S. This is mainly due to its proximity to the New Madrid Seismic Zone 
(NMSZ), which is roughly located between St. Louis, Missouri and Memphis, Tennessee. 
The NMSZ was responsible for several devastating earthquakes in 1811-1812 which are 
the largest earthquakes ever recorded in the conterminous United States. Additionally, 
major earthquakes in the central or eastern United States generally have longer return 
periods and affect much larger areas than those of similar magnitude in the western 
United States (Schweig et al., 1995). Moreover, most structures in the NMSZ were not 
seismically designed during original construction nor retrofitted to improve performance 
during seismic activity.  
 
The likelihood of a moderate earthquake occurring in the NMSZ in the near future is also 
high and the estimated earthquake-related losses are substantial. According to a previous 
study completed by the MAE Center, a MW7.7 earthquake in the NMSZ could cause 
$200 billion direct economic loss, tens of thousands of causalities, and leave hundreds of 
thousands displaced throughout eight states in the Central US (Elnashai et al., 2008).  
 
The study discussed herein employs a deterministic MW7.7 scenario earthquake on all the 
three segments simultaneously, which is advised by the USGS as the most appropriate 
scenario for the purpose of NMSZ catastrophic earthquake planning. Four ground 
shaking maps are required, including peak ground acceleration (PGA) (see Figure 1), 
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peak ground velocity (PGV), and spectral acceleration (Sa) at 0.3 seconds and 1.0 
seconds. For more information on regional seismicity and the hazard employed in this 
study, please refer to Appendix 1.  
 
Figure 1: PGA Map of a M7.7 Earthquake on All Three New Madrid Fault Segments (g) 
 
The road network data for the two metropolitan areas, including locations of nodes and 
links, road characteristics, and travel demand are collected from the local metropolitan 
planning organizations (MPOs) (i.e., the East-West Gateway Council of Governments 
[EWGCOG] in St. Louis, Missouri, and the Memphis Urban Area MPO in Memphis, 
Tennessee). The road network databases contain over 100 fields with descriptive 
characteristics for each link that are used to estimate capacity and speed setting for traffic 
modeling.  
 
The transportation network data and travel demand information for the St. Louis area is 
collected from the EWGCOG. The EWGCOG consists of Franklin, Jefferson, St. Charles, 
and St. Louis Counties and the City of St. Louis in Missouri, as well as Madison, Monroe 
and St. Clair Counties in Illinois. The road network databases are extracted form the 2002 
loaded highway network product from the EWGCOG’s TransEval transportation model. 
Figure 2 shows the transportation network in the metropolitan area of St. Louis, Missouri. 
The 2002 St. Louis MPO network contains 17,352 nodes, 40,432 links, and 7,263,025 
origin-destination (OD) pairs.  
 
The transportation data for the Memphis area is collected from the Memphis Urban Area 
MPO. The Memphis Urban Area MPO includes Shelby County and parts of Fayette and 
Tipton Counties in Tennessee, as well as Desoto and Marshall Counties in Mississippi. 
Figure 3 shows the Memphis MPO transportation network. The road network database 
and travel demand information are both extracted from the 2004 highway network model 
obtained from the Memphis MPO. The Memphis network consists of 12,399 nodes and 
29,308 links, and travel demand of the network is represented by 1,605,289 OD pairs. 
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Figure 2: Transportation Network in St. Louis Area 
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Figure 3: Memphis MPO Transportation Network 
 
Bridge information is extracted from the 2002 National Bridge Inventory (NBI) database 
from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). The NBI is a collection of 
information which includes around 600,000 bridges on public roads in the U.S. Specific 
bridge metadata includes location, year built, geometry, material, construction, and 
conditions (FHWA, 1995). The 2002 version of the NBI database is chosen because it is 
compatible with the road network information provided by the local MPOs. From the 
database, a total number of 3,095 and 615 bridges within the MPO boundaries are filtered 
in GIS for St. Louis and Memphis MPO, respectively. 
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Methodology and Implementation 
 
This section presents the implementation of the MAEViz Network Loss Analysis (NLA) 
module for transportation network performance assessment and its application to the St. 
Louis road network. Figure 4 summarizes the major components of the overall 
methodological framework, including input data, major analysis procedures, and outputs.  
 
Hazard Definition 
(scenario earthquake with 
ground motion, liquefaction, 
landslides information)
Bridge & Network Inventory
(network configuration including link 
and bridge information)
 GIS Integration
Network Analysis of  
Transportation System
(traffic modeling)
Network 
Operations Information 
(travel demand data )
Physical Damage
(damage assessment and 
loss estimation)
Performance Evaluation & Decision Support
(functionality loss, travel delay,  retrofit prioritization, resource 
allocation, budget-effectiveness, repair cost)
  
Figure 4: Methodological Framework 
 
The baseline analyses define the seismic hazard and estimate the pre-event system 
performance as a reference point. Then, the probable damage states are determined with 
the structural vulnerabilities (or fragility curves) for bridges and input hazard information. 
Next, the post-event network states are determined by evaluating bridge functionalities 
under the given scenario earthquake with the damage-functionality relationship. The 
damage-functionality relationship, or traffic state, defines the residual traffic capacity of a 
component that is in a particular damage state. In other words, the damage-functionality 
relationship maps the structural damage states to the reduced traffic flow through 
capacities due to bridge collapse, lane or road closure, and detour, etc. Once the 
functionalities of components in the network are obtained, the time-dependent system 
functionality that corresponds to the level of serviceability or traffic carrying capacity is 
determined. Figure 5 illustrates bridge functionality at various damage states. With the 
bridge fragility curves and the damage-functionality relationship, the performance of 
bridges is linked to earthquake intensity. The residual capacities of bridges are then used 
to determine the capacities of corresponding links in the network. The post-event system 
performance with damaged bridges is assessed with traffic assignment models and 
recommendations are made based on the system functionality losses.  
 
Figure 5: Bridge Damage-Functionality Relationship (Padgett & DesRoches, 2007) 
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Traffic modeling provides essential information on traffic flow changes and travel delays 
that result from particular route closures due to excessive damage to key infrastructure 
elements, or from the reduced traffic carrying capacity because of less severe damage 
(e.g., lane closure for repair or imposed lower speed limit). The system delay (i.e. total 
system travel time) obtained via the traffic assignment model is used to measure the 
performance of transportation system.  
 
Static traffic assignment models are employed in this report because of the substantial 
amount of work required, their legitimacy in emergency planning, and the wide 
acceptance among transportation practitioners. A static traffic assignment model assumes 
the model parameters (e.g. traffic demand and travel cost) do not vary in time, that is, the 
model parameters are static. The static model gives steady state traffic flow in user 
(traveler) equilibrium (UE), in which no traveler in the network can unilaterally change 
routes and improve his/her travel time thereby (Wardrop, 1952). The Deterministic User 
Equilibrium (DUE) model assumes the driver always choose the shortest path, while the 
driver’ route choice is stochastically determined in the Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE) 
model. The DUE model’s assumption on drivers’ choice is reasonable in urban road 
networks since the driver tends to minimize his/her individual travel time. Therefore it 
has been widely used to study the driving behavior in urban area (Sheffi, 1985).  
 
The MAEViz interface and the procedural framework of NLA are given in Figure 6. The 
NLA module described previously is implemented in the latest version of MAEViz and 
demonstrated with the transportation networks in the St. Louis and Memphis 
metropolitan areas. For demonstration purposes, this section only gives the results of the 
traffic analysis of the St. Louis network before and after earthquake (day 0). Performance 
at other time frames such as days 3, 7, and 30, can be obtained by using the time-
dependent functionality restoration relationship (Padgett and DesRoches, 2007). 
 
  
(a). MAEViz Interface 
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(b). Network Loss Analysis Module 
Figure 6: MAEViz Traffic Modeling Module 
 
St. Louis MPO Results 
 
The Mw7.7 NMSZ scenario earthquake is used as the hazard input for the transportation 
modeling in the St. Louis region. Simulation results from the scenario earthquake are 
given in the following discussion, including post-earthquake bridge functionality, the 
traffic condition of road sections (level of service), and changes of travel time. 
 
Figure 7 gives the functionalities of bridges after the Mw7.7 NMSZ scenario earthquake 
(day 0). Most bridges with severe damage are located in the City of St. Louis, and 
Madison, St. Clair, and Monroe Counties in Illinois. Figure 8 gives the post-earthquake 
travel flow characteristics, i.e. the level of service (LOS), which is used to describe the 
vehicular congestion on the roadway. Most major arterials in St. Louis County and the 
City of St. Louis are estimated to experience severe congestion. Major arterials 
connecting St. Louis and the surrounding counties also experience high-density traffic or 
severe congestion. The changes in travel time (pre- vs. post- earthquake) are shown in 
Figure 9. Travel delays on segments of interstates I-44, I-55, I-170, I-64, I-70, I-255, and 
I-270 in the City of St. Louis are estimated to increase significantly after the earthquake, 
while travel delays in other regions increase moderately or slightly. Table 1 gives the 
system performance of the road network and its performance recovers to its pre-quake 
level over time. 
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Table 1: Post-Earthquake Road Network Performance (St. Louis MPO) 
Time Frame Total System Travel Time (mins) 
Performance 
(percentage of pre-earthquake) 
Pre-EQ 1,632,578,789.08 100% 
Day 0 1,639,766,034.61 99.56% 
Day 1 1,632,919,529,22 99.98% 
Day 7 1,632,670,511,82 99.99% 
  
          
Figure 7: Post-Earthquake Bridge Functionality (St. Louis MPO) 
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Figure 8: Post-Earthquake Congestion of St. Louis Road Network  
 
 
Figure 9: Post-Earthquake Changes of Travel Delay (Day 0) (St. Louis MPO) 
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Memphis MPO Results 
 
This section presents the simulation results of the Memphis region for the Mw7.7 NMSZ 
scenario earthquake, including post-earthquake bridge functionality, traffic condition of 
road sections (LOS), and changes of travel time. Figure 10 gives the functionalities of the 
bridges after the Mw7.7 NMSZ scenario earthquake (day 0). Most bridges with severe 
damage are located in Shelby County, Tennessee. Figure 11 gives the post-earthquake 
level of service of the road segments. Note that most major arterials in the Memphis 
MPO are estimated to experience minimal congestion. Only segments of I-240 and I-40 
in the City of Memphis experience high-density traffic or severe congestion. The changes 
in travel times (pre- vs. post- earthquake) are shown in Figure 12. Travel delays on the 
segments of interstates I-40 and I-240, and several major and minor arterials in the City 
of Memphis and Shelby County are estimated to increase significantly after the 
earthquake, while travel delays in other regions increase moderately or slightly. Table 2 
gives the system performance of the road network and its performance recovers to its pre-
quake level over time. 
 
 
Figure 10: Post-Earthquake Bridge Functionality (Memphis MPO) 
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Figure 11: Post-Earthquake Congestion of Memphis Road Network 
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Figure 12: Post-Earthquake Change of Travel Time (Memphis MPO) 
 
Table 2: Post-Earthquake Road Network Performance (Memphis MPO) 
Time Frame Total System Travel Time (mins) 
Performance 
(percentage of pre-earthquake) 
Pre-earthquake 8,797,742.68 100% 
Day 0 8,808,428.31 99.88% 
Day 1 8,799,506.30 99.98% 
Day 7 8,798,329.33 99.99% 
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
 
Transportation systems are major civil infrastructure systems which are prominent 
components of modern societies. In the aftermath of disasters, such as earthquakes, 
significantly heavier traffic flows occur throughout the network. Thus, it is critical to 
secure the ingress and egress transportation routes of emergency response vehicles in 
addition to avoiding excessive queues and delays.  
 
This report presents the recent developments of the MAEViz Network Loss Analysis 
module for transportation system performance modeling at the MAE Center. Current 
state-of-the-art hazard information in the NMSZ, structural fragility curves, and damage-
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functionality relationships are utilized to evaluate the damages and capacities of network 
components. Traffic assignment models are used to evaluate the performance of 
transportation systems. The NLA module is demonstrated with real-world road network 
data in the St. Louis and Memphis metropolitan areas which are both located in 
seismically vulnerable portions of the Central US. 
 
Future research is needed to evaluate the post-disaster emergency traffic and performance 
of complex transportation infrastructure with more realistic dynamic traffic simulation 
models. Dynamic traffic assignment (DTA) models provide an alternative way to address 
the unrealistic issues with the static assignment models that have been utilized in current 
study. Instead of assuming static traffic demand, the DTA models take into account the 
fluctuation of road traffic by introducing time-dependent traffic flow and route choices. 
The state-of-the-art dynamic models (i.e., Visual Interactive System for Transport 
Algorithms, VISTA), which incorporate the enhanced cell transmission model (CTM), 
and supports variable-sized cells and signalized intersections, will be employed to 
simulate the dynamic traffic flow over the network. In addition, emergency scenarios 
representing various post-event traffic demands will be designed to evaluate emergency 
response plans. The performance and congestion of emergency routes will be evaluated 
to ensure post-earthquake ingress and egress to the impacted area (e.g., disaster relief 
dispatch and evacuation).  
 
The NLA module in MAEViz is useful to evaluate system performance of transportation 
networks in the context of emergency management. The travel flow pattern and delays 
estimated by traffic modeling provides useful information for emergency managers and 
relevant government agencies to make emergency response plans for ingress and egress 
of impacted areas (e.g. disaster relief dispatch and evacuation), and to indentify 
emergency routes and evaluate their performance under extreme events. 
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Appendix 10 – Utility Network Modeling 
 
Methodology 
 
Inventory 
 
Certain inventory information must be provided in order to carry out the analysis of 
interdependent utility network systems. Those attributes are required by MAEViz either 
to match each individual object to a fragility curve, or to build topology for the 
interdependent performance analysis. All inventory items must be defined in GIS format 
with power lines and buried pipelines in polyline features; power, water, and natural gas 
network facilities in point data format. No structural analysis is performed for power lines 
though they are defined with the necessary information for topological modeling (Table 
1). Buried pipelines for water and natural gas networks (Table 2), and facilities in all 
networks (Table 3) must include all necessary attributes for both structural and 
topological modeling. 
 
Table 1: Necessary Attributes for Electric Power Lines 
Necessary Attributes Explanation 
Power Lines 
Link ID Distinct ID for each segment 
Start Node Facility ID of the starting point 
End Node Facility ID of the end point 
Flow Capacity Maximum carriage capacity of the segment 
Flow Directivity Bidirectional/Unidirectional Flow 
 
Table 2: Necessary Attributes for Buried Pipelines 
Necessary Attributes Explanation 
Buried Pipelines 
Link ID Distinct ID for each segment 
Pipe Material Steel, Cast Iron, Concrete, PVC, Polyethylene, etc. 
Joint Type Welded, Screwed, etc. 
Pipe Diameter   
Soil Corrosivity Corrosivity effect of the soil surrounding the segment 
Start Node Facility ID of the starting point 
End Node Facility ID of the end point 
Flow Capacity Maximum carriage capacity of the segment 
Flow Directivity Bidirectional/Unidirectional Flow 
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Table 3: Necessary Attributes for Natural Gas Networks 
Necessary Attributes Explanation 
Power Facilities 
Facility ID Distinct ID for each node 
Node Type Generation, Distribution, or Intermediate 
Facility Type Power Plant, Substation, Transformer, etc. 
Flow Capacity Amount of production or demand 
Water Facilities 
Facility ID Distinct ID for each node 
Node Type Generation, Distribution, or Intermediate 
Facility Type Well, Pumping Plant, Tank, etc. 
Flow Capacity Amount of production or demand 
Availability of Backup Power    
Natural Gas Facilities 
Facility ID Distinct ID for each node 
Node Type Generation, Distribution, or Intermediate 
Facility Type Gate Station, Regulator Station, etc. 
Flow Capacity Amount of production or demand 
Availability of Backup Power    
 
Fragilities 
 
Buried Pipelines 
 
Fragilities, or damage functions, for buried pipelines are utilized to estimate the number 
of repairs on a unit length of one segment. Results are presented in numbers of repairs per 
kilometer (O’Rourke and Ayala, 1993; O’Rourke and Jeon, 1999) or numbers of repairs 
per 1,000 feet (Eidinger, 2001). The number of repairs includes those caused by both 
leaks in the pipe or complete ruptures. Damage to pipelines is induced by ground shaking 
and/or ground failure due to liquefaction, landslides, fault rupture, or settlement. Ground 
shaking indicates transient deformations of soil due to seismic wave propagation and is 
defined in terms of peak ground velocity. Ground failure accounts for the permanent 
displacement of the soil profiles. These displacements occur due to settlement at 
transition zones where soil properties change, at fault rupture areas, or at liquefaction 
areas. Displacements are defined in terms of permanent ground deformation (Eidinger, 
2001). 
 
In MAEviz, each pipe segment is matched with a fragility curve from the fragility set 
during the analysis. Table 4 shows the pipeline damage functions for ground shaking in 
MAEviz. Each equation represents expected damage to certain pipe segments according 
to the pipeline inventory data from which they are derived. Fragility assignments are 
made according to pipe material, joint type, pipe diameter, and soil corrosivity, if 
specified. Coefficients of Eidinger (2001) functions for different pipe properties are given 
in Table 5.  
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Table 4: MAEViz PGV-Induced Damage Functions for Buried Pipelines (Steelman et al., 2007) 
 
 
Material 
 
 
Researcher 
 
 
Backbone Fragility Curve 
 
 
Non - 
dimensional 
Coefficient (K) 
 
Source 
Earthquake
 
Required 
Mapping 
Data 
 
 
NOTES 
Cast-Iron 
Pipe  
865.0138.1 )/(050.0 DPGVRR =    Pipe material, diameter 
RR : Repairs / 
Km 
Ductile 
Iron 
Pipe 
O'Rourke, T and 
Jeon (1999) 
378.1468.0 )/(004.0 DPGVRR =   N/A 
 
Northridge 
Earthquake 
 
Pipe material, 
diameter PGV : cm/sec 
Asbestos 
Cement 
Pipe 
 96.8)(59.4)( +−= DLogRRLog   (1994) Pipe material, diameter D: cm 
Asbestos 
Cement 
Pipe 
 
01.11)(26.2)( −= PGVLogRRLog
 
  Pipe material PGV : cm / sec
Buried 
Pipeline 
O'Rourke, M and 
Ayala (1993) 
65.2)(00003.0 PGVKRR ⋅=  
 
1.0 - Cast – Iron, 
Asbestos, 
Cement, Concrete
0.3 - Steel, 
Ductile Iron, PVC
11 data 
points from 
4 U.S. and 2 
Mexican 
Earthquakes
Pipe material 
Pipe material 
RR Repairs / 
Km 
PGV: cm / sec
Buried 
Pipeline Eidinger (2001) PGVKRR ⋅⋅= 0187.0  
Depends on 
Composition Joint 
Type, Soil 
Condition and 
Diameter 
81 data 
points from 
18 
Earthquakes
Pipe material, 
diameter, joint 
type, soils (see 
Table 2) 
PGV: in / sec 
RR : Repairs / 
1000 ft 
 
Table 5: Coefficient K for Eidinger (2001) Relation 
Pipe Material Joint Type Soils Diameter K 
Cast Iron Cement All Small 1.0 
Cast Iron Cement Corrosive Small 1.4 
Cast Iron Cement Non-corrosive Small 0.7 
Cast Iron Rubber Gasket All Small 0.8 
Welded Steel Lap – Arc Welded All Small 0.6 
Welded Steel Lap – Arc Welded Corrosive Small 0.9 
Welded Steel Lap – Arc Welded Non-corrosive Small 0.3 
Welded Steel Lap – Arc Welded All Large 0.2 
Welded Steel Rubber Gasket All Small  0.7 
Welded Steel Screwed All Small 1.3 
Welded Steel Riveted All Small 1.3 
Asbestos Cement Rubber Gasket All Small 0.5 
Asbestos Cement Cement All Small 1.0 
Concrete w/Steel 
Cylinder 
Lap – Arc Welded All Large 0.7 
Concrete w/Steel 
Cylinder 
Rubber Gasket All Large 1.0 
Concrete w/Steel 
Cylinder 
Rubber Gasket All Large 0.8 
PVC Rubber Gasket All Small 0.5 
Ductile Iron Rubber Gasket All Small 0.5 
 
Liquefaction-induced PGD, especially lateral spreading, is one of the most common 
causes of lifeline damage from seismic activity (O’Rourke et. al., 2001). The damage 
algorithm for pipelines due to ground failure uses damage functions based on the study 
by Honegger and Eguchi (1992) as implemented in the HAZUS methodology (FEMA, 
2008). The damage function is formulated as: 
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56.0)()/( PGDonliquefactiPKkmrepairsRR ××=                               (1) 
 
Where K is the coefficient used in the O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) equation. K is equal to 
1 for brittle pipe materials such as cast iron, and 0.3 for ductile pipe materials such as 
steel or PVC. P(liquefaction) is the probability of liquefaction where the pipe segment is 
located, and PGD is expressed in inches.  
 
Damage functions for pipelines give pipeline damage in the number of repairs per 
kilometer of pipe segment. Estimated repairs consist of the combined numbers of pipe 
leaks and breaks. For damage caused by ground shaking (PGV-induced damage), 80% of 
the repairs are assumed to be leaks, whereas 20% are assumed to be pipe breaks. In the 
case of liquefaction damage (PGD-induced), amount of breaks are assumed to be 80%, 
and leaks to be 20% (FEMA, 2008). MAEViz generates fields for total leak, break, and 
repair rates for each segment in the data table and calculates the values. Number of 
repairs for each segment is obtained by multiplication of pipe lengths and repair rates for 
each segment. Total number of repairs for the network is obtained by the summation of 
these values.  
 
In order to model the pipeline failure with the interdependent network analysis tool, a 
probabilistic approach is followed assuming that the breaks constitute a Poisson process. 
The model proposed by Duenas-Osorio et al. (2005), and implemented by Kim et al. 
(2007) suggests that at least one break on a pipe segment is assumed to impair the 
segment, and the probability of at least one break occurring on a segment is calculated as:  
 
lengthBreakRate
rr eBPBP
×−−==−=> 1)0(1)0(                                   (2) 
 
Where Br is the number of breaks. 
 
Network Structures 
 
Damage estimations are given in terms of the probability of a structure being in a 
particular damage state through the implementation of fragility curves. Fragility 
information for electric power, water, and natural gas network structures is taken from 
the HAZUS methodology (FEMA, 2008). Four limit states are utilized to describe the 
degree of damage to structures: slight (S), moderate (M), extensive (E), and complete (C). 
The fragilities are defined by a lognormal distribution with median and dispersion (β) 
parameters for the calculation of limit states: 
 
[ ] ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −Φ==
β
(median)(a)aLSi|PGAP lnln                                   (3) 
 
Where a is the demand peak ground acceleration taken from hazard maps at the location 
of each facility, Φ represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and 
P[LSi|PGA=a] is the conditional probability of exceeding the ith limit state given the 
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hazard PGA=a. The range and severity of damage to network structures is defined by five 
damage states: None, slight, moderate, extensive, and complete.  
 
)()( CLSPCDSP >==                                                  (4) 
)()()( CLSPELSPEDSP >−>==                                         (5) 
)()()( ELSPMLSPMDSP >−>==                                        (6) 
)()()( MLSPSLSPSDSP >−>==                                        (7) 
)(1)( SDSPNDSP >−==                                                (8) 
 
Liquefaction damage (PGD-induced) estimations for buildings, which also utilize the 
lognormal cumulative distribution function, are used to calculate the probability of 
exceeding limit states for ground failure with a median value of ln(60) for permanent 
ground displacement. The dispersion, β, is taken as 1.2. The probability of ground failure 
caused by liquefaction is calculated as: 
 
[ ]onliquefactiPPGDLSiPGF ×⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −Φ×=
2.1
)60ln()ln()( α                               (9) 
 
Combined limit state probabilities resulting from ground shaking and ground failure are 
calculated by the following equations: 
 
)()4()4()()( CLSPLSPLSPCLSPCLSP GFGFCOMB >×−+>=>                  (10) 
)()3()3()()( ELSPLSPLSPELSPELSP GFGFCOMB >×−+>=>                  (11) 
)()2()2()()( MLSPLSPLSPMLSPMLSP GFGFCOMB >×−+>=>                (12) 
)()1()1()()( SLSPLSPLSPSLSPSLSP GFGFCOMB >×−+>=>                   (13) 
 
Damage probabilities for combined ground shaking and ground failure are calculated by 
combining the limit state probabilities as shown in equations 4 through 8 instead of limit 
state probabilities due to ground shaking (Steelman et al., 2007). Thus, probabilities of 
occurrence of each damage state due to combined ground shaking and ground failure 
become: 
 
)()( CLSPCDSP COMB >==                                             (14) 
)()()( CLSPELSPEDSP COMBCOMB >−>==                                (15) 
)()()( ELSPMLSPMDSP COMBCOMB >−>==                               (16) 
)()()( MLSPSLSPSDSP COMBCOMB >−>==                                (17) 
)(1)( SDSPNDSP COMB >−==                                          (18) 
 
As failure criteria in the interdependent network analysis tool, network components are 
expected to have at least extensive damage for losses of functionality (Kim et al., 2007). 
The probability of a structure to experiencing at least extensive damage is calculated in 
Equation 3, using the values from the fragility curves for the appropriate structural type 
given for the extensive damage limit state. Fragility curves assigned for various network 
components are given in Table 6.  
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Table 6: Fragility Relations for Network Components 
Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Network Facility 
Median / Dispersion (PGA) 
Power Network 
Small Power Plants ( < 100 MW ) 
(without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Small Power Plants ( < 100 MW ) 
(with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Medium Power Plants ( 100 - 500 
MW ) (without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Medium Power Plants ( 100 - 500 
MW ) (with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Large Power Plants ( > 500 MW ) 
(without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Large Power Plants ( > 500 MW ) 
(with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Low Voltage (115 KV) Substation 
(without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Low Voltage (115 KV) Substation 
(with Backup Power) 0.35 / 0.60 0.50 / 0.60 0.80 / 0.60 1.45 / 0.65 
Medium Voltage (230 KV) 
Substation (without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Medium Voltage (230 KV) 
Substation (with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
High Voltage (500 KV) Substation 
(without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
High Voltage (500 KV) Substation 
(with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Transformer - Anchored - 100V 0.75 / 0.70 0.75 / 0.70 0.75 / 0.70 0.75 / 0.70 
Transformer - Unanchored - 100V 0.50 / 0.70 0.50 / 0.70 0.50 / 0.70 0.50 / 0.70 
Transformer - Anchored - 165V 0.60 / 0.70 0.60 / 0.70 0.60 / 0.70 0.60 / 0.70 
Transformer - Unanchored - 165V 0.30 / 0.70  0.30 / 0.70  0.30 / 0.70  0.30 / 0.70  
Transformer - Unanchored - 500V 0.25 / 0.70  0.25 / 0.70  0.25 / 0.70  0.25 / 0.70  
Transformer - Anchored - 500V 0.40 / 0.70 0.40 / 0.70 0.40 / 0.70 0.40 / 0.70 
Default Facility 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Water Network 
Wells (without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Wells (with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Small Water Treatment Plant ( < 50 
MGD ) (without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Small Water Treatment Plant ( < 50 
MGD ) (with Backup Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Medium Water Treatment Plant ( 50-
200 MGD ) (without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Medium Water Treatment Plant ( 50-
200 MGD ) (with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Large Water Treatment Plant ( > 200 
MGD ) (without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Large Water Treatment Plant ( > 200 
MGD ) (with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
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Small Pumping Plant ( < 10 MGD ) 
(without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Small Pumping Plant ( < 10 MGD ) 
(with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Medium Pumping Plant ( 10 to 50 
MGD ) (without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Medium Pumping Plant ( 10 to 50 
MGD ) (with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Large Pumping Plant ( > 50 MGD ) 
(without Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Large Pumping Plant ( > 50 MGD ) 
(with Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Buried Concrete Tank (without 
Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Buried Concrete Tank (with Backup 
Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
On Ground Wood Tank (without 
Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
On Ground Wood Tank (with 
Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
On Ground Concrete Tank (without 
Backup Power) 0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
On Ground Concrete Tank  (with 
Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
On Ground Steel Tank (without 
Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
On Ground Steel Tank (with Backup 
Power) 
0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Above Ground Steel Tank (without 
Backup Power) 
0.15 / 0.60 0.30 / 0.60 0.60 / 0.60 1.25 / 0.65 
Above Ground Steel Tank  (with 
Backup Power) 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Default Facility 0.25 / 0.60 0.40 / 0.60 0.70 / 0.60 1.35 / 0.65 
Natural Gas Network 
Facilities With Unanchored 
Components 0.12 / 0.60 0.24 / 0.60 0.77 / 0.65 1.50 / 0.80 
Facilities With Anchored 
Components 0.15 / 0.75 0.34 / 0.65 0.77 / 0.65 1.50 / 0.80 
 
In estimating the liquefaction damage, the same fragility curves used for buildings are 
assigned to network components. The four limit states for ground shaking damage (slight, 
moderate, extensive, and complete) are simplified for ground failure to account for the 
combined extensive and complete damage states. A single fragility curve is utilized for 
all network components with a median of 60 inches and a standard deviation of 1.2. The 
HAZUS methodology suggests that structures either remain undamaged or experience 
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extensive damage due to ground failure; and slight or moderate damage are considered 
less likely and relatively small compared to ground shaking damage (FEMA, 2008). 
 
Interdependent Network Analysis 
 
The MAEViz Interdependent Network Analysis (INA) Tool is developed to model the 
frequently connected lifeline utility networks via a variety of mechanisms. To account for 
interdependency, a relationship must be defined to simulate how the failure of a 
component in a network is affected by the failures in another network. Kim (2007) gives 
an example of two interdependent networks to describe interdependent failure 
mechanisms (Figure 1). In the given example of systems, water generation node 1 (WG1) 
is dependent on power distribution nodes 1 (PD1) and 2 (PD2); and water generation 
node 2 (WG2) is dependent on power distribution node 2 (PD2). The α values in the tool 
account for the degree of dependency of each node in the water network to the nodes in 
the power network.  
 
 
Figure 1: Interdependent Networks (Kim, 2007) 
 
All dependencies in the analyzed networks have to be provided in a network 
interdependency table in the software along with their degrees of dependency. Since the 
analysis tool currently supports dependencies of water and natural gas networks to 
electric power systems, only those dependencies are considered in the analysis. A 
dependency checklist for various water and natural gas network components was 
prepared and sent to utility supply professionals in order to determine the dependent 
components along with their dependencies to electric power. Table 7 gives the 
dependencies of water and natural gas network components to electric power mainly 
according to professional opinions from Memphis Light, Gas and Water Co. (MLGW, 
Memphis, TN, personal communication, 2009a). It is shown that dependencies of natural 
gas network components on electric power are lower than the dependencies of water 
network components on electric power. In determining the dependency levels (α), a value 
between 0 and 1 is given for each defined dependency with 0 representing total 
independence and 1 representing total dependence. For example, a water well without a 
backup power generator is assigned with a dependency level of 1 since electric power is 
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crucial for operation; whereas a water well with a backup power generator will have a 
dependency level of 0.5.  
 
Table 7: Network Dependency Checklist for Water and Natural Gas Networks 
 
 
Kim (2007) attributed the failure of a component after an earthquake to two main 
reasons: failure due to earthquake damage, and nonfunctionality of a network component 
due to power outage. Power outage can be caused by earthquake damage to the 
distribution facility, or failure of the nodes and links in the power network feeding 
electric power to the distribution node. Furthermore, although being functional and not 
affected by interdependency, a network node can still fail by losing its connectivity to the 
network. This happens when a generation node has no surviving outgoing links, or when 
a distribution node has no surviving incoming links, thus being isolated from the network.  
 
In order to measure the functional loss of a system when some of the components are 
likely dysfunctional, two performance measures are defined to quantify those losses: 
connectivity loss (CL), and service flow reduction (SFR). These measures assess the 
network performance with metrics depending on the topological settings of the network, 
or with more detailed metrics depending on supply, demand, and flow patterns additional 
to the topological settings.  
 
Connectivity loss (CL) measures the ability of every distribution node to receive flow 
from generation nodes (Kim, 2007). It is calculated as:  
 
∑
=
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11                                                   (19) 
 
Where N is the number of distribution nodes, nGipre is the number of generation nodes 
able to feed flow to the ith distribution node in undisturbed state, and nGipost is the number 
of generation nodes able to supply power to the ith distribution node under seismic 
conditions. CL only requires the topological settings of the network before and after an 
earthquake. 
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Service flow reduction (SFR) determines the amount of flow that the system can provide 
compared to the demand before the disturbance (Kim, 2007). It is calculated as: 
 
∑
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Where N is the number of distribution nodes, Si is the actual flow at the ith distribution 
node under seismic conditions, and Di is the demand at the ith distribution node. Kim 
(2007) states that SFR provides a better estimate of the effects of a seismic event on 
lifeline utility networks since supply/demand, and flow patterns are considered in 
addition to the topological settings. 
 
Network Inventory 
 
The St. Louis utility network inventory analyzed in this study contains the natural gas 
pipelines and the electric power transmission network in the City of St. Louis, as well as 
St. Louis, St. Charles, and Jefferson Counties; and the water network for the City of St. 
Louis. Natural gas pipelines consist of approximately 250,000 segments and are a total of 
8,622 miles in length. Water network information is provided by City of St. Louis Water 
Division (Figure 2). The water pipelines are 1,485 miles in total length and consist of 
56,102 segments. There are two water treatment plants, two water reservoirs, six power 
plants, and 43 substations serving St. Louis networks.  
 
The information on electric power networks is obtained from Homeland Security 
Infrastructure Program’s (HSIP) 2008 datasets. The facilities and power transmission 
lines in the City of St. Louis, as well as St. Louis, St. Charles, and Jefferson Counties are 
extracted from the datasets for use in the INA tool (Figure 3). The power transmission 
network covering these counties consists of 6 power plants, 42 substations, and 3 electric 
taps. 
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Figure 2: St. Louis Water Network (Courtesy of St. Louis Water Division) 
 
 
Figure 3: St. Louis Electric Power Network 
 
The water network for the INA tool is built by the water mains having diameters equal to 
or larger than 12 inches (Figure 4). The two water treatment plants in the network are 
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modeled as generation nodes, while the distribution nodes are determined according to 5 
pressure zones specified by St. Louis Water Division. The demands are obtained from the 
2008 water usage statistics for these pressure zones. 
 
 
Figure 4: St. Louis Water Network, Topologically Modeled for the INA Tool 
 
The analysis inventory consists of the entire electric power, natural gas, and water 
systems of Shelby County, Tennessee, where the City of Memphis is located. The electric 
power network in Shelby County has 28 substations distributing electric power to the 
county through 3,666 transformer stations (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: Shelby County Power Network 
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Shelby County has 192 water wells, 17 water tanks, 39 water pumps, and 27 booster 
stations in the potable water network (Figure 6). The potable water pipelines are a total 
4,350 miles long, consisting of 202,294 pipe segments. Water pipelines are 
predominantly cast iron; while other pipe materials in the network include ductile iron, 
asbestos cement, PVC, and steel. 
 
 
Figure 6: Shelby County Water Network 
 
The natural gas network contains 3 gate stations, 120 pressure regulator stations, and 
6,773 miles of main and service pipelines (Figure 7). The natural gas mains consist of 
200,794 segments. The service lines, which are also analyzed, consist of 123,115 pipe 
segments. 
 
 
Figure 7: Shelby County Natural Gas Network 
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Electric power, water, and natural gas networks in Shelby County were also modeled 
topologically with the INA tool. The power distribution network was built by assigning 
substations as generation nodes and transformers as distribution nodes (Figure 8). 
Transformers clustered together were represented by a single distribution node with a 
total capacity obtained by summing the capacities of all transformers within the cluster. 
 
 
Figure 8: Shelby County Power Network, Topologically Modeled for the INA Tool 
 
The water network was built using pipe segments with diameters of 12 inches or larger 
(Figure 9). Water wells are modeled as generation nodes; pumping plants and water tanks 
are modeled as distribution nodes for the water network.  
 
 
Figure 9: Shelby County Water Network, Topologically Modeled for the INA Tool 
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The natural gas network was built using pipe segments with diameters of 6 inches or 
larger (Figure 10). Gate stations were modeled as generation nodes, and pressure 
regulator stations were modeled as distribution nodes.  
 
 
Figure 10: Shelby County Natural Gas Network, Topologically Modeled for the INA Tool 
 
The supply and demand values for both water and natural gas networks were obtained 
from the web site of the company where general information about the company 
networks is given (MLGW, 2009b). 
 
Analysis Results 
 
The expected damage caused by the New Madrid Seismic Zone scenario is estimated at 
165 repairs on the water network (Figure 11), and approximately 310 repairs on the 
natural gas network. In total, about 175 of these repairs are expected to be caused by pipe 
leaks, 305 by pipe breaks. Damage estimates for both water and natural gas pipelines are 
shown in Table 8. Expected damage due to the New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquake 
scenario is relatively low for the water facilities (Figure 12). All water facilities are 
expected to experience approximately 10% probability of at least moderate damage in St. 
Louis. 
 
Table 8: St. Louis, Missouri Pipeline Damage 
St. Louis Inventory Total pipe length (miles) 
Ground Shaking 
Induced Pipeline 
Repairs 
Liquefaction 
Induced Pipeline 
Repairs 
Total 
Leaks 
Total 
Breaks 
New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario (Mw=7.7) 
Water Pipelines 1485 27 138 49 116 
Natural Gas Pipelines 8622 102 211 124 189 
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Figure 11: NMSZ Scenario Damage to St. Louis Water Network 
 
 
New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario - Water Network Facility Damage States
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Figure 12: NMSZ Scenario Damage to St. Louis Water Network Facilities 
 
Power facilities of St. Louis are expected to experience relatively little damage from the 
New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquake scenario. Damage due to scenario event is higher 
in facilities in the City of St. Louis or south, along Mississippi River (Figure 13). The 
NMSZ scenario gives results for the power network with CL 2.5% and SFR less than 1%; 
CL for the water network is expected to be 7.7%, and SFR to be 39.2% for the scenario. 
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Figure 13: NMSZ Scenario Damage to St. Louis Power Network Facilities 
 
Shelby County lifeline utility systems inventory was analyzed for the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone scenario. The damage from the scenario earthquake is expected to require 
13,500 repairs in the water pipeline system (Figure 14), and a total of 9,000 repairs in the 
natural gas pipelines (Figure 15). Approximately 17,500 of the total repairs in the water 
and natural gas systems are due to liquefaction effects, whereas approximately 5,000 
repairs are pipe leaks (Table 9). 
 
Network facilities are expected to experience severe damage from the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone earthquake as well. All facilities in the power (Figure 16), natural gas 
(Figure 17), and water (Figure 18) networks are expected to have at least 50% probability 
of moderate damage or more because of the NMSZ scenario earthquake. Shelby County 
lifeline utility networks are expected to suffer severe damage and disruptions. Reduction 
in the natural gas network performance is quantified with CL of 9.2% and SFR of 75.8%. 
CL for the water network is expected to be 99%; SFR to be 96%.  
 
Table 9: Memphis, Tennessee Pipeline Damage 
Memphis Inventory Total pipe length (miles) 
Ground Shaking 
Induced Pipeline 
Repairs 
Liquefaction 
Induced Pipeline 
Repairs 
Total 
Leaks 
Total 
Breaks 
New Madrid Seismic Zone Scenario (Mw=7.7) 
Water Pipelines 4350 452 13097 2981 10568 
Natural Gas Pipelines 6773 435 8606 2069 6972 
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Figure 14: NMSZ Scenario Damage to Shelby County Water Pipelines 
 
 
Figure 15: NMSZ Scenario Damage to Shelby County Natural Gas Pipelines 
A10-19 
 
Figure 16: NMSZ Scenario Damage to Shelby County Electric Power Facilities 
 
 
Figure 17: NMSZ Scenario Damage to Shelby County Natural Gas Facilities 
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Figure 18: NMSZ Scenario Damage to Shelby County Water Facilities 
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Appendix 11 – Uncertainty Characterization Method 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Due to the random nature of seismic hazards and the lack of complete knowledge or data, 
various types of uncertainties are inherent in regional seismic loss estimation, such as: 
 
• Intrinsic randomness in seismic intensity (SI) measures such as spectral 
acceleration (Sa), peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), 
and permanent ground displacement (PGD), which is also referred to hazard 
characterization. 
• Uncertainty in predicting the seismic performance of structures (e.g. exceedance 
of prescribed limit-states) and the number of damaged items (ND) 
• Variations of damage-related measures (DM) such as damage factors, repair cost 
ratios, and reduced traffic capacities 
• Statistical uncertainties of parameters that appear in socio-economic loss models 
• Erroneous or outdated data in inventory databases 
• Existence of multiple competing models 
 
Therefore, deterministic regional seismic loss assessment may lead emergency managers 
to make decisions based on under- or overestimated loss due to unquantified risk. 
Currently, regional seismic loss assessment is often performed by use of computer 
software such as HAZUS and MAEviz, which consist of various computational modules 
connected by complex data flows. Therefore, in order to quantify the uncertainties in the 
estimated regional seismic losses, it is necessary to have a probabilistic framework that 
can propagate various uncertainties in inputs and models through such computational 
modules and data flows. As a preliminary effort toward the development and 
implementation of such a probabilistic regional loss assessment method, efficient 
computational procedures have been developed to propagate selected types of 
uncertainties. This document presents the computational procedures and the computer 
code developed for quantifying the uncertainties in HAZUS in an efficient manner. The 
results of this method’s applications to eight states in the Central US are also presented. 
 
Scope of Work 
 
The goals of this study are to develop computational procedures that enable efficient 
uncertainty quantification within HAZUS, and to test the feasibility of the approach. For 
the sake of demonstration, this study deals with three types of uncertainties only: (1) the 
randomness in the seismic intensity (SI), (2) the uncertainty in the number of damaged 
items (ND), and (3) the variations of damage measures (DM). Table 1 shows HAZUS 
regional seismic loss measures that are affected by the three types of uncertainties. Due to 
the lack of information, the application examples in this study rely on assumed statistical 
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parameters when real data are not readily available. Therefore, the quantified 
uncertainties of the final loss estimates shown in the examples may not necessarily 
represent the actual level of uncertainties. 
 
Table 1: Regional Seismic Loss Measures and Uncertainties Considered in This Study 
Uncertainty Type Regional Seismic Loss Measures 
Seismic Intensity 
(SI) 
Number of Damaged 
Items (ND) 
Damage Measures 
(DM) 
Physical Loss  
• Number of damaged building X X  
Direct Economic Loss  
• Structural X X X 
• Non-structural X X X 
• Contents X X X 
• Inventory X X X 
Social Loss  
• Displaced households X X X 
 
There have been previous research efforts to quantify the uncertainties in regional seismic 
loss assessment. For example, Grossi (2000) proposed a logic tree method to quantify the 
uncertainties and to assess the sensitivity of HAZUS. This approach considers the bounds 
on uncertain parameters to estimate the propagated uncertainties in impacts. Although the 
approach helps identify the effects of individual uncertainties through parameter 
sensitivity analysis, it is generally time-consuming due to numerous runs of HAZUS. An 
alternative approach to consider is Monte Carlo simulations using randomly generated 
samples. The implementation of this approach is straightforward, but it may also require 
a large number of HAZUS simulations for reliable estimates. For efficient uncertainty 
quantification, this study attempts to develop an analytical approach that does not require 
repeated HAZUS simulations. 
 
Methodology 
 
Uncertainty Representation 
 
In general, the variability of an uncertain quantity is represented by variance, standard 
deviation, or coefficient of variation (c.o.v.). For intuitive interpretation of the result, in 
this study, the uncertainty in the estimated losses is presented by a confidence interval, 
which is the interval around the expectation value (mean) for a given level of confidence. 
In this report, the seismic losses are assumed to follow log-normal distributions. 
Therefore, the interval with ‘confidence level’ ( α−1 )×100% is determined as:  
 
 
[ ]α /2 α /2Confidence Interval exp(λ β),  exp(λ β)k k= − ⋅ + ⋅  
2λ lnμ 0.5β= −  
2β ln[1 (σ / μ) ]= +  
(1) 
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where λ  and β denote the logarithmic mean and logarithmic standard deviation of the 
loss, respectively; kα/2 is the standard normal variate with the cumulative probability level, 
1-α/2, calculated by kα/2=Φ-1(1-α/2) in which Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution; and μ and σ denote the mean and the 
standard deviation of the loss, respectively.  
 
Uncertainty Quantification 
 
This subsection describes the methods used for propagating the three types of the 
uncertainties considered in this study. As a result, the means and standard deviations of 
the loss measures will be computed and then substituted into Equation (1) for the 
confidence intervals. 
 
Uncertainty in Seismic Intensity (SI) 
 
For a given earthquake scenario characterized by epicenter location and earthquake 
magnitude, HAZUS utilizes the spatial distribution of the corresponding seismic intensity 
measures (e.g. PGA, PGV, PGD, Sa) using attenuation models. These attenuated seismic 
intensity measures are subjected to both intrinsic randomness of physical parameters and 
uncertain errors in the mathematical models of ground motion attenuation relationships. 
According to Adachi and Ellingwood (2009), the c.o.v. of the variability caused by 
seismic attenuation models is typically 0.60 or more. In this study, the c.o.v.’s of the 
attenuated seismic intensity measures are assumed to be 0.60 for the numerical examples. 
 
Uncertain
(This Study)
Deterministic
(HAZUS)
SaaS  
Figure 1: Uncertainty in Seismic Intensity and Fragility Evaluation 
 
HAZUS does not consider uncertainty related to the fragility of a structure, i.e. the 
probability of limit state exceedance, is evaluated at the median value of the seismic 
intensity (shown as Sa) only, as illustrated in Figure 1: Uncertainty in Seismic Intensity 
and Fragility Evaluation. However, the uncertainty in the seismic intensity affects the 
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actual exceedance probabilities as shown in the figure. This effect is considered in this 
study as follows.    
 
According to the HAZUS Technical Manual (FEMA 2008a), the fragility is defined as 
the conditional probability of being in or exceeding a particular damage state, ds , given 
that a seismic intensity measure such as spectral acceleration, Sa, takes its median value, 
aS , i.e.: 
where, ,a dsS  is the median value of spectral acceleration at which the building reaches the 
threshold of the damage state, ds; and βds is the logarithmic standard deviation of the 
spectral acceleration of the damage state. Herein, ,a dsS  and βds are the parameters of a 
given fragility model. The uncertainty in the seismic intensity is incorporated by the total 
probability theorem (Ang and Tang 2006), that is: 
in which ( )
aS a
f s  is the probability density function (PDF) of the spectral acceleration. If 
the seismic intensity measure is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution, the 
numerical integration in Equation (3) can be avoided by using a closed-form expression: 
 2 2
,
1(exceeds ) ln
β β
a
a dsds Sa
SP ds
S
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= Φ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥+ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  
 
(4) 
where βSa is the logarithmic standard deviation of Sa; and aS  is the median of Sa that can 
be obtained in terms of the logarithmic mean of Sa, i.e. exp(λ )
aa S
S = . 
 
In this study, the HAZUS fragility calculations in Equation (2) are replaced with those in 
Equation (4) to account for the uncertainty in the seismic intensity. In order to illustrate 
the impact of this change, consider a fragility model with , 0.5a dsS =  and βds = 0.4. 
Suppose the spectral acceleration follows a lognormal distribution with βSa = 0.555 (c.o.v. 
0.6). Figure 2 shows the fragilities in Equations (2) and (4) for a range of aS . If the 
uncertainty is not considered, the exceedance probability is overestimated when 
,a a dsS S>  and underestimated otherwise. This noticeable impact needs to be considered 
during the seismic loss estimation. In this study, the confidence intervals are obtained 
with and without consideration of the uncertainty in seismic intensity to investigate the 
effects. 
 
,
1(exceeds | ) ln
β
a
a a
ds a ds
SP ds S S
S
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= = Φ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  
(2) 
 (exceeds ) (exceeds | ) ( )aa S a aP ds P ds S f s ds
+∞
−∞= ∫  
 
(3) 
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Eq.(2): HAZUS
Eq.(4): This Study
 
Figure 2: Effects of Uncertain Seismic Intensity on Fragility Evaluations 
 
Uncertainty in Number of Damaged Buildings (ND) 
 
The number of damaged buildings in a region is uncertain because of the uncertainty in 
damage states definition of the 36 building types. HAZUS computes the average number 
of the damaged buildings based on the fragility evaluations, and then substitutes them 
into various seismic loss models (see Table 1 for example loss measures) to provide 
deterministic loss estimates. In this study, the standard deviation of the number of 
damaged buildings is also computed to obtain the confidence intervals of the losses. 
 
Using the exceedance probabilities in Equations (2) or (4), one can obtain the probability 
that a building is in one of the prescribed damage states, ds, i.e. no damage (N), slight (S), 
moderate (M), extensive (E), and complete (C) damage states. These damage state 
probabilities are computed by use of the fragilities as follows: 
First, consider the same type of buildings located in a given census tract. HAZUS 
assumes that the buildings in a census tract are located at the same coordinate. Therefore, 
these buildings have the same damage state probabilities. Although the spatial correlation 
of the seismic intensity causes the damage of the buildings to be statistically dependent, 
this study assumes statistical independence due to the lack of information about spatial 
correlation and the census-tract based aggregation by HAZUS. Because of the assumed 
 
            (N) 1 (exceeds S)P P= −                        
            (S) (exceeds S) (exceeds M)P P P= −  
            (M) (exceeds M) (exceeds E)P P P= −  
            (E) (exceeds E) (exceeds C)P P P= −  
            (C) (exceeds C)P P=
(5) 
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independence and the equal probabilities of the damage states, the number of the 
buildings in a specified damaged state follows a binomial distribution (Ang and Tang 
2006). Thus, the mean and variance of the number of damaged buildings are computed by: 
Where NDBds,i,j denotes the number of the i-th type of buildings in the j-th census tract 
that are in the damage state ds  (i.e., one of N, S, M, E and C); and NBi,j and P(ds)i,j 
denote the total number of  the buildings and the probability of damage state ds  for the i-th type of the buildings in the j-th census tract, respectively. 
 
Next, assuming that the numbers of damaged buildings between different types, census 
tracts and damage states are also statistically independent, the mean and variance of the 
number of the damaged buildings over all the census tracts in a given region and all the 
types of buildings are computed as: 
 
   , ,μ μds ds i jNDB NDB
i j
= ∑∑  
   , ,
2 2σ σ
NDB NDBds ds i j
i j
=∑∑  
(7) 
 
Uncertainty in Damage Measures (DM) 
 
For a given damage state, damage related measures such as damage factor and repair cost 
ratio have a certain level of variability. As shown in Figure 3(a), however, HAZUS 
assigns a single repair cost ratio value to each of the prescribed damage states, i.e. None, 
Slight, Moderate, Extensive, and Complete to calculate the seismic losses, which neglects 
the variability in the repair cost. In an effort to account for this uncertainty in the seismic 
loss estimations by Mid-America Earthquake Center, Bai et al. (2009) proposed to 
assume that the repair cost ratio follows the beta distribution with its mean at the 
midpoint of the range and the standard deviation of one-fifth of the length of the range. 
 
0
a b c
(a) HAZUS repair and replacement cost ratios (a, b, c, d)
(a+b)/2 (b+c)/2 (c+d)/2
(b) (a)’s  ratio intervals determined by midpoints
denotes midpoint.
Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Slight
Moderate Extensive Complete
d
None
100a/2
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Figure 3: Probabilistic Model for HAZUS Repair and Replacement Cost Rations 
 
 
   , , , ,μ ( )ds i jNDB i j i jNB P ds= ×  
   , ,
2
, , ,σ ( ) 1 ( )NDBds i j i j i j i jNB P ds P ds⎡ ⎤= × × −⎣ ⎦  
(6) 
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Following this approach, this study assigns the beta distribution to each of the five 
damage states as shown in Figure 3(b). The standard deviations of various loss estimates 
using damage related measures are computed to obtain the confidence intervals. For 
example, the mean and variance of the direct economic loss in the structural components 
of the i-th type of the buildings, denoted by SELi, are calculated as: 
Where BRCi and μRCRi|ds denote the building replacement cost and the mean repair cost 
ratio for the damage state, ds, for the i-th type of the buildings, respectively; and σ2RCRi|ds  
is the variance of the repair cost ratio for the damage state, ds. Assuming statistical 
independence between the economical losses of the damaged buildings again, the mean 
and variance of the total economical losses in the region are computed by summing up 
the individual means and variances as in Equation (7). 
 
Development of Semi-Automated Tool 
 
For efficient applications of the procedures explained in the previous section, a semi-
automated computing tool was developed using Matlab®. Using the developed code, the 
following two tasks are performed:  
 
Import HAZUS data: HAZUS is an ArcGIS-based program with a standard MS 
Windows interface. The HAZUS user-interface is illustrated in Figure 4 (left) while the 
results database for a HAZUS analysis is shown in Figure 4 (right). The necessary data 
was manually extracted from ArcGIS and stored in data files. The newly created data 
files were imported into the computer code and uncertainty calculations were performed. 
Quantify uncertainties: The uncertainty analysis code quantifies the uncertainties in the 
seismic impacts based on the HAZUS data using the procedures discussed in the previous 
section. Figure 5 shows the input code and the confidence intervals determined within the 
uncertainty analysis code. 
 
After a single run of HAZUS, it requires less than 10 minutes to complete these 
calculations for each state in the eight-state study region using a personal computer with 
2.6GHz CPU and 2GB RAM memory. 
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   { }
2
2 2 2
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2 2 2 2
| |
σ ( ) μ μ
( ) σ μ μ
i ii
i i i
SEL i i SELRCR ds
ds
i i RCR ds RCR ds SEL
ds
BRC P ds
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⎡ ⎤= × ⋅ −⎣ ⎦
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Figure 4: HAZUS User-Interface (Left) and Model Results Database in ArcCatalog (Right)  
 
Figure 5: Input (Left) and Output (Right) Matlab® Code for Uncertainty Analysis 
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Application to the Central US 
 
Using the new uncertainty methodology, the uncertainties in regional loss estimates are 
quantified for the eight states in the Central US. Substituting the means and standard 
deviations (i.e. the square roots of the variances) computed by the aforementioned 
procedures into Equation (1), 90% confidence intervals (α 0.10= ) are computed for three 
types of HAZUS regional impacts: number of damaged buildings (five damage states: 
none, slight, moderate, extensive, complete), capital stock loss (four types), and number 
of displaced households. The results for the eight states are given in the following tables. 
In Table 2 thru Table 25, “SI” and “No SI” indicate the cases in which the uncertainty in 
the seismic intensity is considered and those in which not considered, respectively. “L/B” 
and “U/B” denote the lower and upper bounds of the confidence intervals, respectively. 
 As stated earlier, this study focuses on developing an efficient uncertainty 
quantification framework for HAZUS and testing its feasibility, rather than investigating 
the exact level of the uncertainties in the study region. More research efforts are required 
to quantify the uncertainties that have not been considered in this study and to obtain the 
realistic values for all parameters with assumed values in this study. It was observed that 
some of the deterministic loss estimation results in HAZUS do not match with the 
average values calculated externally based on the methodology outlined in the HAZUS 
Technical Manual. Various discrepancies between the HAZUS methodology outlined in 
the Technical Manual and HAZUS model outputs are currently under investigation by the 
HAZUS developers. 
 
Alabama 
 
Table 2: Number of Damaged Buildings 
No SI SI Damage 
State Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U 
None 1,704,917 1,704,612 1,705,223 1,704,814 1,704,508 1,705,120 
Slight 38,048 37,774 38,323 25,730 25,482 25,979 
Moderate 10,831 10,669 10,993 21,867 21,650 22,085 
Extensive 729 686 774 5,376 5,260 5,494 
Complete 3,822 3,722 3,923 560 522 600 
Total 1,758,347 1,757,463 1,759,237 1,758,347 1,757,422 1,759,279 
 
Table 3: Direct Economic Loss - Capital Stock Loss (in thousands of dollars) 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Structural 196,075 100,854 333,912 133,049 101,923 169,572 
Non-Str. 928,536 592,864 1,378,729 597,709 489,732 722,722 
Contents 552,814 408,220 726,036 404,150 347,262 466,580 
Inventory 17,672 9,241 29,779 13,399 9,857 17,653 
Total 1,695,097 1,111,179 2,468,456 1,148,307 948,773 1,376,527 
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Table 4: Number of Displaced Households 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Displaced HH 3,504 1,100 7,819 40 0 90 
 
Arkansas 
 
Table 5: Number of Damaged Buildings 
No SI SI Damage 
State Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
None 1,013,454 1,012,920 1,013,988 1,056,896 1,056,323 1,057,468 
Slight 149,672 149,127 150,218 97,429 96,960 97,900 
Moderate 68,446 68,074 68,818 88,685 88,251 89,121 
Extensive 23,089 22,862 23,317 43,097 42,785 43,411 
Complete 70,699 70,351 71,049 39,253 38,981 39,526 
Total 1,325,360 1,323,334 1,327,391 1,325,360 1,323,300 1,327,425 
 
Table 6: Direct Economic Loss - Capital Stock Loss (in thousands of dollars) 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Structural 2,747,869 2,326,131 3,214,819 1,924,215 1,624,070 2,257,121 
Non-Str. 9,674,394 8,442,820 11,015,166 6,551,656 5,721,300 7,455,072 
Contents 4,687,920 4,206,012 5,203,233 2,908,478 2,628,766 3,206,247 
Inventory 163,425 133,060 197,822 86,952 72,034 103,682 
Total 17,273,608 15,108,024 19,631,040 11,471,301 10,046,170 13,022,121 
 
Table 7: Number of Displaced Households 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Displaced HH 37,798 26,305 52,027 20,978 11,785 33,640 
 
Illinois 
 
Table 8: Number of Damaged Buildings 
No SI SI Damage 
State Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
None 3,548,303 3,547,830 3,548,777 3,557,095 3,556,618 3,557,572 
Slight 62,798 62,371 63,228 46,346 45,942 46,753 
Moderate 18,128 17,908 18,351 31,723 31,411 32,039 
Extensive 5,224 5,108 5,343 11,239 11,052 11,430 
Complete 21,366 21,116 21,619 9,416 9,278 9,557 
Total 3,655,820 3,654,335 3,657,316 3,655,820 3,654,301 3,657,351 
 
Table 9: Direct Economic Loss - Capital Stock Loss (in thousands of dollars) 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Structural 983,520 715,893 1,330,148 726,395 575,294 911,879 
Non-Str. 4,516,494 3,597,625 5,610,852 2,712,808 2,288,222 3,199,178 
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Contents 2,503,716 2,136,073 2,908,965 1,810,058 1,591,075 2,047,211 
Inventory 46,316 33,079 62,507 34,949 23,725 49,108 
Total 8,050,045 6,482,670 9,912,472 5,284,210 4,478,315 6,207,376 
 
Table 10: Number of Displaced Households 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Displaced HH 19,686 11,144 32,020 5,689 2,045 11,868 
 
Indiana 
 
Table 11: Number of Damaged Buildings 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
None 2,147,985 2,147,664 2,148,305 2,147,857 2,147,537 2,148,178 
Slight 40,096 39,807 40,387 29,415 29,148 29,683 
Moderate 6,419 6,295 6,544 18,474 18,271 18,680 
Extensive 767 724 812 4,851 4,740 4,963 
Complete 6,762 6,634 6,891 1,432 1,378 1,486 
Total 2,202,029 2,201,124 2,202,940 2,202,029 2,201,074 2,202,990 
 
Table 12: Direct Economic Loss - Capital Stock Loss (in thousands of dollars) 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Structural 366,867 213,242 576,109 213,533 148,609 293,916 
Non-Str. 1,918,063 1,363,772 2,610,769 1,039,256 868,961 1,235,508 
Contents 1,140,712 870,520 1,458,435 758,028 661,799 862,632 
Inventory 30,738 16,116 51,707 21,257 15,248 28,574 
Total 3,456,380 2,463,650 4,697,020 2,032,075 1,694,617 2,420,630 
 
Table 13: Number of Displaced Households 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Displaced HH 6,839 2,859 13,185 501 16 1,905 
 
Kentucky 
 
Table 14: Number of Damaged Buildings 
No SI SI Damage 
State Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
None 1,426,376 1,426,027 1,426,724 1,447,048 1,446,684 1,447,411 
Slight 57,067 56,715 57,423 40,111 39,796 40,429 
Moderate 27,592 27,374 27,812 27,731 27,480 27,984 
Extensive 10,497 10,350 10,644 14,794 14,616 14,973 
Complete 22,382 22,174 22,590 14,230 14,074 14,387 
Total 1,543,913 1,542,640 1,545,193 1,543,913 1,542,652 1,545,184 
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Table 15: Direct Economic Loss - Capital Stock Loss (in thousands of dollars) 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Structural 1,564,005 1,309,817 1,847,257 1,098,627 894,197 1,330,297 
Non-Str. 5,901,227 5,107,143 6,773,972 4,591,233 3,961,158 5,285,254 
Contents 3,046,435 2,754,434 3,358,235 2,149,174 1,929,635 2,384,945 
Inventory 98,203 85,013 112,694 62,146 50,952 74,873 
Total 10,609,869 9,256,408 12,092,157 7,901,179 6,835,942 9,075,368 
 
Table 16: Number of Displaced Households 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Displaced HH 19,678 11,184 31,379 14,256 7,152 24,663 
 
Mississippi 
 
Table 17: Number of Damaged Buildings 
No SI SI Damage 
State Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
None 943,748 943,391 944,104 945,839 945,479 946,200 
Slight 62,822 62,481 63,166 48,441 48,117 48,768 
Moderate 27,509 27,283 27,736 34,038 33,767 34,309 
Extensive 7,616 7,484 7,749 14,824 14,638 15,012 
Complete 22,317 22,093  22,542  20,868  20,684  21,053 
Total 1,064,011 1,062,731 1,065,296 1,064,011 1,062,731 1,065,342 
 
Table 18: Direct Economic Loss - Capital Stock Loss (in thousands of dollars) 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Structural 1,116,907 845,603 1,437,383 1,164,621 996,481 1,349,608 
Non-Str. 3,803,131 2,948,867 4,802,165 1,953,231 1,576,212 2,383,041 
Contents 1,779,599 1,465,427 2,133,159 785,866 655,525 931,441 
Inventory 54,610 42,041 69,316 22,424 17,330 28,372 
Total 6,754,247 5,301,938 8,442,023 3,926,142 3,245,547 4,692,462 
 
Table 19: Number of Displaced Households 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Displaced HH 21,066 12,343 32,899 3,385 700 8,971 
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Missouri 
 
Table 20: Number of Damaged Buildings 
No SI SI Damage 
State Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
None 1,926,490 1,925,908 1,927,073 1,944,164 1,943,557 1,944,771 
Slight 88,516 87,978 89,058 74,601 74,078 75,127 
Moderate 34,890 34,571 35,211 50,204 49,803 50,607 
Extensive 8,129 7,980 8,281 20,039 19,790 20,291 
Complete 43,818 43,478 44,162 12,836 12,659 13,016 
Total 2,101,844 2,099,915 2,103,784 2,101,844 2,099,888 2,103,812 
 
Table 21: Direct Economic Loss - Capital Stock Loss (in thousands of dollars) 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Structural 1,962,947 1,602,509 2,402,227 1,069,467 880,506 1,286,680 
Non-Str. 7,299,203 6,136,664 8,668,842 4,018,611 3,497,444 4,596,271 
Contents 3,639,147 3,195,093 4,141,954 2,176,614 1,968,615 2,399,459 
Inventory 105,794 84,901 132,335 58,871 48,852 70,513 
Total 13,007,091 11,019,166 15,345,358 7,323,563 6,395,418 8,352,923 
 
Table 22: Number of Displaced Households 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Displaced HH 37,816 24,857 55,187 12,061 5,627 21,789 
 
Tennessee 
 
Table 23: Number of Damaged Buildings 
No SI SI Damage 
State Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
None 1,604,401 1,603,874 1,604,928 1,649,022 1,648,461 1,649,584 
Slight 258,036 257,382 258,692 147,512 146,955 148,070 
Moderate 120,266 119,779 120,755 167,233 166,667 167,800 
Extensive 37,010 36,721 37,300 85,099 84,668 85,532 
Complete 106,914 106,459 107,371 77,762 77,366 78,159 
Total 2,126,628 2,124,215 2,129,046 2,126,628 2,124,117 2,129,144 
 
Table 24: Direct Economic Loss - Capital Stock Loss (in thousands of dollars) 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Structural 7,420,497 6,684,018 8,206,145 7,501,085 6,872,165 8,165,108 
Non-Str. 26,003,320 23,719,829 28,422,781 18,913,272 17,417,357 20,487,754 
Contents 12,319,514 11,487,022 13,189,054 7,032,448 6,550,207 7,536,480 
Inventory 388,471 350,043 429,457 180,643 159,528 203,439 
Total 46,131,803 42,240,912 50,247,436 33,627,448 30,999,256 36,392,782 
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Table 25: Number of Displaced Households 
No SI SI Type 
Mean L/B U/B Mean L/B U/B 
Displaced HH 103,925 80,851 130,762 71,566 50,859 96,910 
 
Conclusion & Discussion 
 
In this study, computational procedures were developed to quantify selected types of 
uncertainties in the seismic loss estimates completed with HAZUS. For efficient 
applications, a semi-automated computing tool was developed. In order to test the 
feasibility of the developed framework, the new methods were applied to seismic loss 
estimation for eight states in the Central US. In order to quantify the level of uncertainty 
in seismic loss estimates, further research should be conducted on the following topics: 
 
Effect of spatial correlation:  Despite the significant impact of the spatial correlation on 
the loss estimates of spatially distributed system or structures (Adachi and Ellingwood 
2009, Song and Ok 2009), this study did not consider the spatial correlation. 
Generalization: The developed framework for uncertainty quantification can be 
generalized to other types of infrastructure systems (e.g., lifeline networks) and hazard 
(e.g., flood, wind). 
Implementation into HAZUS: In this study, a semi-automated tool was developed for 
uncertainty quantification HAZUS results, but eventually, such a process should be 
implemented in HAZUS. This may give rise to some computations, GIS, or database 
issues, which will require further research efforts. 
Other types of uncertainties: This study does not cover other types of uncertainties such 
as statistical uncertainties of the parameters in loss-estimation models, erroneous or 
outdated data in inventory databases, and model errors. A sensitivity analysis is needed to 
identify relatively important uncertainties that must be considered during a regional 
seismic loss assessment. 
 
Decision makers, intuitively or from experience, understand that any loss estimate is 
subjected to uncertainties and thus includes the risk of under- or over-estimation. 
Therefore, it is important for loss assessment software to provide uncertainty 
quantifications for risk-informed decision making. However, there has not been a great 
deal of research efforts to systematically quantify the uncertainties in loss estimation 
software, namely HAZUS. This study demonstrates that it is possible to efficiently 
quantify the uncertainties without repeated runs of HAZUS. More research efforts are 
needed to quantifying actual level of the uncertainties and for further implementation in 
the HAZUS software. 
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Appendix 12 – Uncertainty Characterization Method 2 
 
Introduction 
 
The HAZUS (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008) impact estimation 
methodology does not consider uncertainty inherent in performing hazard analysis, 
collecting inventory data, and evaluating seismic response and capacity of the built 
environment. In general, it is mandatory to predict the impact of a natural hazard with the 
consideration of uncertainty. Seismic hazard especially includes large uncertainty in its 
magnitude, peak ground parameters, frequency content and duration of ground motion, 
among others. Moreover, seismic hazard in low and moderate seismicity regions includes 
significant uncertainty due to the relative lack of earthquake data (records) available for 
statistical analysis. Therefore, it is necessary to include various uncertainties in 
performing earthquake impact assessments for realistic predictions and better informed 
decision making. 
 
Uncertainty propagation can be systematically analyzed by probabilistic approaches. For 
an uncertainty analysis, the Monte Carlo simulation process is widely used since it gives 
reliable estimates without any approximation of the input distributions. In general, 
however, it requires large samples and significant computing time. Thus, several different 
approaches have been proposed as alternative methods for obtaining reliable results with 
reduced computational effort. This study discusses a simple approximate approach which 
can be implemented for estimating uncertainty propagation with HAZUS information. 
This report addresses the proposed probabilistic estimation procedure and shows 
earthquake impacts for eight states in the Central US using the proposed approach. 
 
Uncertainties in Earthquake Impact Assessment 
 
The limited scientific information for defining the hazard, low quality data used to define 
the exposed inventory, and limited engineering information available for estimating 
infrastructure damage result reinforce the need for error bounds when estimating 
expected impacts. In regions where earthquakes are low-probability, high-consequence 
events, decision-making should not be based solely on mean estimates of loss, as is the 
case with HAZUS deterministic scenarios, but should consider the error bounds or 
confidence limits in addition to calculating the mean value, because there is large 
uncertainty in the earthquake event (Grossi et al, 1999). 
 
Uncertainties are generally classified as either aleatory or epistemic (Kiureghian and 
Ditlevsen, 2009). Aleatory uncertainty is due to the natural variability and the inherent 
randomness of the physical system. The size, location, and time of future earthquakes, as 
well as the characteristics of the ensuing ground motions, are examples of aleatory 
uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty is due to a lack of knowledge or missing information. 
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The shape of the magnitude distribution for a given seismic source is an example of 
epistemic uncertainty. The important distinction between the two uncertainties is that 
aleatory uncertainty cannot be reduced, whereas epistemic uncertainty can be reduced by 
more knowledge or by more complete data. In some cases, aleatory uncertainty in one 
model may be epistemic uncertainty in another model, and what appears to be aleatory 
uncertainty at the present time may be cast into epistemic uncertainty at a later stage of 
development (Hanks and Cornell, 1994). It is mathematically advantageous to separate 
uncertainty into aleatory and epistemic types. Separating aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties avails of an understanding of how to control uncertainty leading to better 
informed decision-making (Vose, 2008). 
 
Earthquake impact estimation requires seismic hazard, structural response, damage 
fragility, inventory data, and cost data for repair and replacement. Uncertainties are 
included in all steps of the earthquake impact assessment procedure, from seismic hazard 
analysis to social and economic impact. Sources of uncertainty include: seismic source 
and path, soil condition, site response, response and capacity of structures and 
foundations, damage and loss assessment methodology, and inventory information. 
Regardless of the methodology employed, one of the most important aspects of 
constructing an earthquake impact model is to identify, quantify and incorporate into the 
estimates the uncertainties associated with each of the input parameters (Crowley et al, 
2005). The major uncertainties embedded in seismic hazard, inventory, fragility, and 
repair cost are summarized below briefly. 
 
Hazard 
 
The seismic hazard is, in part, defined as the level ground shaking; peak ground 
acceleration (PGA) or response spectral acceleration (Sa) that is expected to occur at any 
site as the result of a fault rupture. The hazard can be predicted by physically modeling 
the source and by studying the recurrence of seismic events at the source, the propagation 
pattern of seismic waves, and the geological features at the site. The seismic hazard 
analysis should be accompanied by a measure of uncertainty since large uncertainty in 
the hazard definition may have a major influence on earthquake damage or loss 
estimations. 
 
Uncertainty in seismic hazard originates from uncertainties in indentifying earthquake 
sources (size, source location, boundary definition, source seismicity, and mechanism), 
modeling the earthquake occurrence (source boundary, occurrence rate, maximum 
magnitude, and ground motion), estimating ground motion attenuation, and evaluating 
the effect of site soil amplification. This type of uncertainty is epistemic since it is 
reduced by gathering more data and improving theories on the physics of the earthquake 
process. The aleatory uncertainty in seismic hazard includes knowledge of future 
earthquakes and travel path since these parameters can not be quantified prior to a future 
event. 
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The shape of the hazard curve is determined by aleatory uncertainty and alternative 
hazard curves are given by the epistemic uncertainty. In general, the seismic hazard is 
modeled as a lognormal distribution (Reiter, 1991; US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2003). The lognormal standard deviations for the earthquake source, 
transmission path, and local site response are estimated in previous studies as 0.30 
(Newmark et al, 1973), 0.70 (Donovan, 1973), and 0.41 (Hays, 1980). For the New 
Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) in the Central US, the coefficient of variation (c.o.v.) 
representing the epistemic uncertainty of PGA and Sa at 0.3 and 1.0 seconds can exceed 
0.6, while c.o.v.’s for active seismicity locations in California are approximately 0.3 
(Cramer, 2001). The larger c.o.v.’s for the NMSZ reflect greater uncertainties in 
scientific knowledge about seismic sources, especially the location of future major 
earthquakes (c.o.v. ≥ 0.6), and ground motion attenuation relations (c.o.v. ≈ 0.3).  
 
Inventory  
 
Inventory is a core component of earthquake impact assessment and is required to 
calculate infrastructure damage, direct economic and social losses associated with 
building stocks and lifelines. Inventory data are collected from many different sources, 
including the population and housing census, business population reports, energy 
consumption reports, and financial information from taxes, all of which provide a 
generalized regional statistical profile of inventory characteristics. HAZUS has a baseline 
data that consists of a nationwide buildings and essential facilities, transportation 
systems, lifeline utility systems, and hazardous material facilities inventories. The 
primary data source for population demographics is the U.S. 2000 Census, while general 
buildings data is taken from Dun & Bradstreet, and the reports from the Department of 
Energy (DOE) regarding the housing characteristics and energy consumption. Census 
data as well as Dun & Bradstreet data were used to develop the general building stock 
inventory that includes square footage, replacement value, building count, and population 
demographics metadata. The DOE reports define regional variations in characteristics 
such as number and size of garages, type of foundation, and number of stories. Building 
data are grouped by predefined building classes with similar damage and loss 
characteristics. The primary parameters in classifying damage/loss characteristics include 
the structural parameters affecting structural capacity and response (i.e., basic structural 
system, building height, and seismic design criteria), non-structural elements affecting 
non-structural damage, and occupancy affecting casualties, business interruption losses 
and damage to contents. In order to estimate total building damage and economic losses, 
each classification requires damage and loss estimation models that represent the average 
characteristics of the total population of buildings within each class. 
 
Inventory includes epistemic uncertainties in its data sources and data standardization 
processes. Databases may include uncertainty due to incomplete or dated demographic, 
inventory, and economic parameters. Uncertainty contained in census information 
depends on the number of households that has been surveyed. For example, the margin of 
error for the number of one-unit detached homes in the American Community Survey 
(ACS) varied from 2.2% in Chicago, Illinois, to 7.4% in Champaign, Illinois. The margin 
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of error for mobile home counts in Chicago, Illinois, is nearly 70%. The margin of error 
for the number of housing units according to the construction year is more than 40% in 
Champaign, Illinois (US Census Bureau, 2008). The population at the county level may 
increase or decrease with time. For example, there was a population growth of as large as 
40% for nine years in San Benito County, California (California Governor’s Office of 
Emergency Services, 2004). The epistemic uncertainty embedded in inventory data can 
be represented by the standard deviations of a normal distribution. 
 
 Fragility 
 
A seismic fragility represents the performance of a structure or component subjected to 
earthquake ground motions, while fragility curves indicate the conditional probability of 
reaching or exceeding a limit state for a given seismic hazard level. Fragility curves can 
be obtained from empirical, judgmental, analytical, and hybrid approaches (Jeong and 
Elnashai, 2007). Empirical fragility curves (Shinozuka et al, 2000; Rossetto and Elnashai, 
2003; Straub and Kiureghian, 2008) are constructed based on statistics of observed 
damage from past earthquakes. Empirical data are the most realistic though they are 
highly specific to particular situations and often provide limited statistical data. Thus, the 
empirical approach is in general very limited. Judgment-based fragility assessment 
(Applied Technology Council, 1985; National Institute of Building Sciences, 1995) is 
reliant upon information from experts. This method is not affected by the quantity and 
quality of damage statistics, but its reliability is unquantifiable due to its dependence on 
the individual experience of the experts. Analytical fragility curves (Shinozuka et al, 
2000; Singhal and Kiremidjian, 1996; Ellingwood. 2001) require the structural response 
caused by various levels of ground shaking and the structural capacity defined by a 
damage state. This approach gives a more reliable estimate for different structures 
through elaborate modeling and comprehensive analyses. Analytical approaches usually 
adopt simplified models to reduce computation effort for modeling and simulating. 
Hybrid approaches (Barbat et al, 1996; Singhal and Kiremidjian, 1998; Kim and 
Shinozuka, 2004) attempt to compensate for the lack of observational data, subjectivity of 
judgmental data, and modeling deficiencies of analytical procedures by combining proper 
data from different sources. This method is effective for obtaining more reliable fragility 
curves when the available empirical data is limited.  
 
All methods for constructing fragility curves contain uncertainties in the assessment 
procedures and data used. They include measurement uncertainty related to the 
observations, inconsistency in the quality of the analysis, variability of the ground 
motions, uncertainty in the judgment of experts, statistical uncertainty inherent in  
parameter estimates, uncertainty due to simplification of models for the strength and 
stiffness of structural materials and components, uncertainties in seismic demand and 
capacity of structures due to variations of their geometry and material properties, and 
uncertainty in the definition of the limit state. 
 
Seismic fragility is typically modeled by lognormal distribution (Shinozuka et al, 2000; 
Kennedy and Ravindra, 1984). HAZUS provides baseline medians and standard 
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deviations for four damage states (slight, moderate, extensive, and complete). For 
instance, uncertainty (i.e., epistemic uncertainty) in the damage-state threshold of the 
structural system is given by 0.4 for all structural damage states and building types. 
Variability (i.e., aleatory uncertainty) in capacity properties of the model building types 
are given by 0.25 for buildings designed with seismic code and 0.30 for buildings 
designed without seismic provisions. 
 
Repair and Replacement Cost 
 
Direct economic losses for buildings include costs for repair and replacement of 
structural systems, non-structural components, and building contents. These losses 
depend on both model building type and building occupancy class defined in inventory 
databases. Replacement cost of the individual building is estimated as the product of 
average replacement cost of a building per unit area and total floor area of a building for 
each combination of model building type and occupancy class. The repair cost and 
contents value for different damage ratios are expressed as a percentage of structural and 
non-structural replacement cost for each occupancy class.  
 
Replacement cost is the amount needed to rebuild a building in the same location and 
with the same features and quality. The cost depends upon many variables such as size, 
shape, design features, materials, quality, heating, cooling, and geographic location of the 
building prior to the damage occurring. As a result, average replacement cost of a 
building is uncertain. Also, replacement cost includes uncertainties due to the variability 
in material and labor cost, the quality of construction, the productivity of the workers, etc. 
Moreover, the social and environmental impacts of earthquake damage and the 
simultaneous demand of materials and labor for post-earthquake reconstruction lead to 
extraordinary replacement costs. Estimates of replacement cost are dependent upon the 
year in which the cost data was developed, and thus appropriate inflation rates must be 
applied when obtaining estimates of future costs. 
 
In order to estimate repair cost of each building component, HAZUS suggests the repair 
cost ratios of structural to non-structural components as well as damage ratios for 
building contents at different levels of damage as a percentage of the replacement cost. 
The repair cost and damage ratios themselves carry epistemic uncertainty, which can be 
modeled by lognormal distribution (Touran and Wiser, 1992; Touran, 1993). The c.o.v. 
for total repair costs is assumed to be in the range of 0.15 to 0.20 (RS Means Corp., 
1997). 
 
A Framework for Probabilistic Estimation 
 
Direct economic loss estimation procedures for earthquake damage require seismic 
hazard information, inventory data, fragility curves, and repair cost. Inherently, each of 
the components must include uncertainty in its data or parameters as discussed 
previously. Thus, the inclusion of uncertainty in impact assessment seems to be of great 
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importance in order to obtain more realistic estimates. In order to solve an uncertainty 
propagation problem in seismic impact assessment, recent studies propose a probabilistic 
estimation procedure that combines inputs of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty in 
seismic ground motion, building response, damage to building elements, and element 
repair costs (Baker and Cornell, 2008; Ching et al, 2004). The proposed method may 
require a large amount of computation time because its framework involves large vectors 
of dependent random variables. Therefore, a more simple and cost-effective framework is 
necessary for large-scale estimation. This study proposes a simple framework for 
probabilistic estimation of several outputs from a HAZUS earthquake impact assessment 
based on logic trees. The important advantages of the proposed approach are its 
simplicity and applicability through the use of a powerful numerical method to combine 
random variables and via information and data given by the HAZUS Technical Manual. 
 
Simplified Framework 
 
The HAZUS framework for earthquake impact assessment was developed for use by 
state, regional, and local governments. Initially, earthquake ground shaking is determined 
for each location within a region of interest (i.e., PGA, peak ground velocity (PGV), and 
Sa response parameters). Subsequently, the damage probabilities of buildings or other 
infrastructure are determined from fragility curves, either provided in HAZUS software 
or by the user, for different damage states. Total replacement value is estimated by 
multiplying the average replacement cost per structure by the number of structures. 
Repair costs for different damage states are determined by using the repair cost ratios, 
which are offered as a percentage of replacement cost for different damage states and the 
total replacement value. Economic loss for each damage state is calculated by 
multiplying the damage probability times the repair cost for each damage state, and total 
economic loss is estimated by a summation of repair costs for all damage states. 
 
A proposed, simple framework for probabilistic assessment is developed based on the 
HAZUS methodology as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫ ∫ ∫= p q r s IMSFINRCR dsdrdqdpshrfqfpfC                            (1) 
 
where, RC  is the expected repair cost (i.e., direct economic loss), ( )pfRC  is the 
probability density function (PDF) of repair costs given by damage states, ( )qf IN  is the 
PDF of inventory data, ( )rfSF  is the PDF of mean seismic fragility given by damage 
states, and ( )shIM  is the PDF of the seismic intensity. 
 
Fragility Model 
 
Seismic fragility of a structure is defined as the conditional frequency of its failure for a 
given value of the seismic response parameter such as story drift, stress, moment, or 
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structural acceleration. Fragility analysis evaluates the ground acceleration capacity of a 
structure and determines when the seismic response of a given structure exceeds its 
capacity, resulting in damage or failure. There are many sources of variability that may 
affect the accurate estimation of ground acceleration capacity of a structure. They include 
randomness (aleatory uncertainty) and uncertainty (epistemic uncertainty) related to the 
structural design bases, structural configurations, material properties, and seismic 
response calculated at the design analysis stage. Therefore, the seismic fragility is 
generally represented by means of a family of fragility curves along with a probability 
value assigned to each curve to reflect the confidence level associated with the estimation 
of fragility (Bhargava et al, 2002). 
 
An entire set of fragility curves for a structure corresponding to a particular failure mode 
can be expressed in terms of the median ground acceleration capacity and two random 
variables representing the inherent randomness and uncertainty about the median value. 
The frequency of damage, damagef , during an earthquake with PGA, a , at the confidence 
level, Q , is derived as follows (Kennedy and Ravindra, 1984): 
 
( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ Φ+Φ=
−
R
Um
damage
QAaQaf β
β 1)ln(,                                  (2)       
  
where mA  is the median (50
th percentile) ground acceleration capacity, Rβ  and Uβ  are the 
logarithmic standard deviations of the inherent randomness and the uncertainty in the 
median ground acceleration capacity, respectively. Φ is the standard Gaussian 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) and 1−Φ is the inverse standard Gaussian CDF. 
 
For the case where knowledge is perfect and complete, i.e., 0=Uβ , only the random 
variability is utilized to obtain the conditional frequency of damage. The median 
conditional frequency of damage, medianf , for a given PGA level, a , is given by (Kennedy 
and Ravindra, 1984): 
 
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡Φ=
R
m
median
Aaaf β
)ln( .                                                (3)     
    
The mean conditional frequency of damage, meanf , for a given PGA level, a  , is obtained 
by using the composite variability, Cβ , as (Kaplan et al, 1989): 
 
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡Φ=
C
m
mean
Aaaf β
)ln(                                               (4) 
where 22 URC βββ += . 
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Damage State Probability 
 
The limit state of a structure exposed to an earthquake is a condition in which the 
resistance is less than demand imposed by the seismic hazard. According to the total 
probability theorem, the limit state (LS) probability, LSP , can be expressed in terms of 
discrete random variables, as follows: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]xXPxXDRPxXPxXPP
xx
LS ==<==== ∑∑ ∞
=
∞
= 00
||LS                 (5) 
 
in which R is the resistance and D is the demand imposed by seismic hazard, X. The 
conditional probability [ ]xXP =|LS  is the probability of reaching or exceeding the 
damage state at a given hazard level, xX = . The term [ ]xXP =  is the marginal hazard 
probability. For continuous random variables, Eq. (5) can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( )∫
∞
=
0
dxxhxFPLS                                                   (6) 
 
where ( )xF  is the fragility function in the form of  CDF and ( )xh  is the seismic hazard 
function in the form of a PDF. 
 
The probabilities of reaching or exceeding different damage states defined in HAZUS, 
i.e., slight (S), moderate (M), extensive (E), and complete (C) damage states, are 
calculated as follows: 
[ ] ( ) ( )∫∞=
0
slightPGA|S daahaFP  
[ ] ( ) ( )∫∞=
0
moderatePGA|M daahaFP  
[ ] ( ) ( )∫∞=
0
extensivePGA|E daahaFP  
[ ] ( ) ( )∫∞=
0
completePGA|C daahaFP  
(7) 
where ),( ),( ),( extensivemoderateslight aFaFaF  and )(complete aF  are the CDFs of  fragility functions 
for slight, moderate, extensive, and complete damage states in terms of the PGA, a, and 
h(a) is the hazard curve.  
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Finally, discrete damage probabilities for different damage states can be calculated as 
follows: 
Probability of no damage:            ( ) [ ]PGA|S1NONE PP −=  
Probability of slight damage:       ( ) [ ] [ ]PGA|MPGA|SSLIGHT PPP −=  
Probability of moderate damage: ( ) [ ] [ ]PGA|EPGA|MMODERATE PPP −=  
Probability of extensive damage: ( ) [ ] [ ]PGA|CPGA|EEXTENSIVE PPP −=  
Probability of complete damage: ( ) [ ]PGA|CCOMPLETE PP =  
(8) 
 
Liquefaction Model 
 
Post-earthquake reconnaissance reports describe tilted or settled buildings without any 
signs of structural damage or distress due to ground shaking, though they also describe 
damaged buildings subjected to strong ground shaking before the pore water pressure has 
built up sufficiently for initiation of liquefaction. Numerous buildings collapse as a result 
of both ground shaking and liquefaction as well. Unfortunately, however, when a 
building is damaged due to strong ground shaking and then followed by liquefaction, it is 
impossible to determine the extent of liquefaction-induced deformations. Therefore, 
building damage caused by both ground shaking and liquefaction still remains a complex 
and controversial issue (Bird et al, 2006). 
 
When combining damage due to liquefaction and ground shaking, two potential scenarios 
are taken into account: the two damage types do not interact and the two damage types do 
interact. This study assumes that the two damages do not interact. The final damage 
distribution is estimated as follows (Bird et al, 2006): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )Shaking|DS1onLiquefacti|DSDS PLPPLPP ⋅−+⋅=                (9) 
 
Where, DS stands for the damage state and P(L) is the probability of liquefaction. If the 
occurrence of liquefaction is negligible, then damage will be due to ground shaking only, 
and if the occurrence of liquefaction is certain, then damage will be due to liquefaction 
only. The HAZUS Technical Manual presents the conditional liquefaction probability 
relationships for five susceptibility categories as listed in Table 1 and plotted in Figure 1. 
 
Table 1: Conditional Probability Relationship for Liquefaction Susceptibility Categories 
Susceptibility 
Category 
Liquefaction Probability, 
P[L|PGA= a] 
Very High 0 ≤ 9.09 a – 0.82 ≤ 1.0 
High 0 ≤ 7.67 a – 0.92 ≤ 1.0 
Moderate 0 ≤ 6.67 a – 1.0 ≤ 1.0 
Low 0 ≤ 5.57 a – 1.18 ≤ 1.0 
Very Low 0 ≤ 4.16 a – 1.08 ≤ 1.0 
None 0 
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Figure 1: Conditional Liquefaction Probability Relationships for Liquefaction Susceptibility 
Categories 
Fragility curves for liquefaction can be developed through use of the liquefaction 
potential index (Shinozuka and Kishimoto, 1989). The degree of liquefaction severity is 
classified in accordance with the liquefaction potential index PL values as follows: 
 
onliquefacti major15
onliquefacti moderate;155
onliquefactiminor ;50
onliquefacti no or little;0
L
L
L
L
P
P
P
P
<
≤<
≤<
=
                                      (10) 
 
The liquefaction potential index is defined by the following expression: 
 
∑
=
××=
n
i
iiiL HWGP
1
                                                    (11) 
 
where Gi is the severity function of liquefaction, Wi is the weighting function, Hi is the 
thickness of i-th soil layer in meters, and n is the number of soil layers at which standard 
penetration test (SPT) is conducted. The severity function of liquefaction Gi and the 
weighting function Wi are given by Eqs. (12) and (13), respectively. 
 
1for 0
10for 1
>=
≤≤−=
i
ii
Li
LLi
FG
FFG
                                                 (12) 
 
ii Z.W 5010 −=                                                            (13) 
 
where 
iL
F  is the safety factor for liquefaction at the i-th layer and Zi is the depth from 
surface at the i-th layer measured in meters with 0 ≤ Zi ≤20 m. 
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Let P(ml) denote the probability of an earthquake with magnitude ranging in the interval 
associated with the subscript, l. Then, the probability of various degrees of liquefaction 
severity conditional only to PGA, a , are given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )∑
∑
∑
∑
=
=
=
=
<=<
≤<=≤<
≤<=≤<
===
NL
l
llLL
NL
l
llLL
NL
l
llLL
NL
l
llLL
mPamPPaPP
mPamPPaPP
mPamPPaPP
mPamPPaPP
1
1
1
1
,|15|15
,|155|155
,|50|50
,|0|0
                     (14) 
 
Thus, a fragility curve associated with liquefaction event, Eminor, with a degree of severity 
that are termed “at least minor” is obtained by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )aPPaPPaPPaEF LLLr |15|155|50|minor <+≤<+≤<=               (15) 
 
Similarly, the fragility curves associated with “at least moderate” and “major” severity 
can be expressed respectively as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )aPPaPPaEF LLr |15|155|moderate <+≤<=                          (16) 
 ( ) ( )aPPaEF Lr |15|major <=                                        (17) 
 
Methodology for Uncertainty Propagation 
 
For an analysis of uncertainty propagation, various approximation approaches (Morgan 
and Henrion, 1990) are commonly used because analytical methods can give results in 
only a very few cases and they often provide rough results by approximating the given 
distributions as a normal or a lognormal. In practice, three different approximation 
methods have been adopted for uncertainty propagation, i.e., Monte Carlo method, the 
method of moments, and discrete probability distribution. The Monte Carlo method is 
generally used for uncertainty analyses because it gives relatively reliable results without 
any approximation to the input distributions. However, this approach requires an 
extremely large number of samples and abundant computing time to obtain acceptable 
accuracy in its approximations. The first order method of moments is very useful when a 
model is simple and the uncertainties are small relative to nonlinearity. By neglecting 
higher order terms in the expansion of function, it carries relatively large errors when a 
model is complex and includes large uncertainties. When higher order approximations are 
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used, these rapidly become algebraically complicated as the complexity of the model 
increases. Discrete probability distributions simplify continuous distributions and allow 
for a sizeable reduction in computing time through the process of condensation. Thus, 
approximation approaches using discrete probability distributions are more powerful for 
complex logic trees. This paper proposes a simple approximation approach using discrete 
probability distributions. 
 
One of the important issues in discrete probability distributions is to find the optimal way 
to convert a continuous distribution into a discrete distribution. In the quantile arithmetic 
method (Dempster, 1969; Abdelhai, 1986), continuous PDFs are approximated by 
equivalent discrete PDFs with equal probability intervals. This method provides the best 
estimate at the 50th percentile, while it gives considerably large error at lower values than 
the 20th percentile and higher values than the 80th percentile. The reason is that it does not 
define both the start and end points of the distributions. In order to reduce errors near the 
tail region, a large number of quantiles is used and thus much computing time is required 
for a complex logic tree. 
 
The proposed method uses two different values of probability interval for converting a 
continuous PDF into a discrete PDF. By reflecting a rapid slope change near the 20th and 
80th percentiles of a CDF curve, a half of probability interval at the 50th percentile is 
given as a probability interval near the tails of a PDF curve. This modification 
significantly reduces a computation error near the tails of a PDF curve. 
 
Considering the approximation of the PDF, f(x), of an absolutely continuous random 
variable, X, by a discrete distribution with number of quantiles, N, the discrete PDF, g(xi), 
is represented by:  
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L
                       (18) 
 
where α is a parameter of the arithmetic which satisfies the condition of 210 << α  and 
N is an arbitrary number of quantiles given by .10≥N  For convenience, α is given by 
( )31 −= Nα , and N is adopted as an odd number. The corresponding CDF is calculated 
by: ( ) ( )∑
≤
=
xx
ii
i
xgxG                                                      (19) 
and 
( ) 1
1
=∑
=
N
i
ixg .                                                        (20) 
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An arithmetic function can be defined on the space, S, of all independent random 
variables of the form, X. The space, S, may be considered as a suitable subset of the 
space of essentially bounded random variables on the probability space generated by 
Lebesgue measure restricted to the unit interval (Dempster, 1969).  
 
Let X, Y ∈  S and let ∗ denote any one of the four arithmetic operations. Then the result 
of performing the binary operation, ∗, on X and Y is a random variable, Z, having an N2-
point distribution (Abdelhai, 1986): 
 ( ) ( )
( )ji
ji
yxP
yxfzf
===
∗=
YX ,
                                          (21) 
 
on the sample space S{ }Njiyx ji ,,3,2,1,: L=∗ . Since X and Y are independent, Eq. (21) 
becomes: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
.
YXY,X
ji
jiji
pp
yPxPyxP
⋅=
=⋅====
                              (22) 
 
This can be rewritten as: 
 
( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ =∗=⋅=
=
otherwise0
,,2,1,,where, if Nkjiyxzppq
zg
jikjik
k
L
                 (23) 
 
where 
( )⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
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⎪
⎨
⎧
=⋅−−
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−=
=
=
=
, for71
521
176 for
1234
5432 for2
 and 
mji,N
N-,,m,mji,
m,,,ji,
N-,N-,N-,N-ji,
,,,ji,
pp ji
α
α
α
L
L                      (24) 
 ( )Nxxx ,,, 21 L  and ( )Nyyy ,,, 21 L  are the defining quantile points of X and Y, 
respectively. 
 
A rule to generate the N quantile points, Nwww ,,, 21 L , defining the operation X∗Y ∈S  is 
the following: 
(i) Order the N2 numbers zk in order of increasing magnitude as 2,,, 21 Nzzz L , with 
associated probabilities 2,,, 21 Nqqq L ; 
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Earthquake Impact Assessment 
 
Direct earthquake losses for the eight states are estimated by the proposed probabilistic 
approach to reflect the uncertainty included in seismic hazard, building damage fragility, 
inventory database, and cost data for repair and replacement. The input information used 
for the estimation and the results are summarized below. 
 
Hazard 
 
For seismic hazard input, the peak ground acceleration map of the New Madrid Seismic 
Zone (NMSZ) is used. Figure 2 shows a part of the PGA map around fault area. Mean 
PGA value for a county is estimated by considering PGA values within the county 
boundary and their corresponding areas. Liquefaction susceptibility is estimated by using 
liquefaction susceptibility map. The liquefaction susceptibility of a county is also 
represented by the mean susceptibility level. It is assumed that standard deviations about 
the mean PGA value are 0.414 for aleatory and 0.25 for epistemic, respectively (Wang, 
2007; Campbell, 2003).  
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Figure 2: Peak Ground Acceleration Map of the New Madrid Seismic Zone 
 
Inventory 
 
The eight states include more than fifteen building types (structural system types) as 
listed in Table 2. For simplicity, this demonstration considers three structural types of 
buildings only, i.e. wood for light frame (W1), low-rise unreinforced masonry bearing 
walls (URML), and manufactured housing/mobile home (MH), because these three types 
comprise more than 96% of all general buildings. The coefficient of variation (c.o.v.) of 
the inventory data is assumed 0.05 for the entire eight-state region. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Building Structure Types for the Eight States (%) 
Building type* Alabama Arkansas Illinois Indiana Kentucky Mississippi Missouri Tennessee
W1 
URML 
MH 
W2 
S3 
S1L 
S2L 
S4L 
S5L 
RM1L 
RM2L 
C1L 
C2L 
PC1 
PC2L 
72.61 
4.74 
20.42 
0.34 
0.17 
0.35 
0.32 
0.00 
0.28 
0.23 
0.18 
0.15 
0.10 
0.06 
0.02 
71.01 
11.77 
15.37 
0.49 
0.26 
0.07 
0.13 
0.14 
0.17 
0.11 
0.00 
0.03 
0.18 
0.21 
0.01 
71.17 
21.42 
4.01 
0.67 
0.36 
0.09 
0.16 
0.20 
0.24 
0.22 
0.00 
0.03 
1.08 
0.28 
0.02 
71.51 
18.92 
7.28 
0.60 
0.34 
0.09 
0.16 
0.18 
0.22 
0.14 
0.00 
0.03 
0.22 
0.36 
0.02 
70.41 
10.84 
16.77 
0.53 
0.28 
0.07 
0.13 
0.16 
0.19 
0.11 
0.00 
0.03 
0.19 
0.23 
0.01 
74.35 
6.01 
17.69 
0.50 
0.07 
0.13 
0.28 
0.15 
0.18 
0.10 
0.00 
0.03 
0.19 
0.23 
0.02 
67.14 
21.98 
8.81 
0.56 
0.28 
0.09 
0.15 
0.15 
0.19 
0.14 
0.00 
0.03 
0.20 
0.23 
0.01 
78.62 
10.38 
8.58 
0.67 
0.09 
0.17 
0.35 
0.19 
0.23 
0.15 
0.00 
0.03 
0.23 
0.27 
0.02 
W1+URML+MH 97.77 98.15 96.60 97.71 98.02 98.05 97.93 97.58 
*Building type: 
W1: Wood for Light Frame, URML: Low-rise Unreinforced Masonry, MH: Manufactured Housing, W2: Wood for 
Commercial and Industrial Buildings, S3: Steel Light Frame, S1L: Low-rise Steel Moment Frame, S2L: Low-rise Steel 
Braced Frame, S4L: Low-rise Steel Frame with Cast-in-Place Concrete Shear Walls, S5L: Low-Rise Steel Frame with 
Unreinforced Masonry Infill Walls, RM1L: Low-rise Reinforced Masonry Bearing Walls with Wood or Metal Deck 
Diaphragms, RM2L: Low-rise Reinforced Masonry Bearing Walls with Precast Concrete Diaphragms, C1L: Low-Rise 
Concrete Moment Frame, C2L: Low-Rise Concrete Shear Walls, PC1: Precast Concrete Tilt-Up Walls, PC2L: Low-Rise 
Precast Concrete Frames with Concrete Shear Walls 
 
Fragility 
 
Structural fragility parameters for buildings are derived by modifying the HAZUS values 
corresponding to soil class D. Fragility curve parameters for liquefaction can be 
estimated by using soil profiles. This estimation used the liquefaction fragility parameter 
values at two sites in Memphis, Tennessee (Shinozuka and Kishimoto, 1989). Table 3 
and Table 4 list the fragility parameters for the structural damage states of buildings and 
the severity of liquefaction. Standard deviations about the structural damage state are 
assumed to be 0.4 for aleatory and 0.5 for epistemic, respectively. 
 
Table 3: Structural Fragility Curve Parameters for Low-Code Seismic Design Level 
Structural Damage State 
Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Building Type 
Median 
PGA (g) Log(sd)
Median 
PGA (g) Log(sd)
Median 
PGA (g) Log(sd) 
 Median 
PGA (g) Log(sd)
W1 
URML 
MH 
0.21 
0.15 
0.12 
0.64 
0.64 
0.64 
0.36 
0.21 
0.19 
0.64 
0.64 
0.64 
0.64 
0.34 
0.33 
0.64 
0.64 
0.64 
 1.00 
0.48 
0.63 
0.64 
0.64 
0.64 
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Table 4: Fragility Curve Parameters for Liquefaction 
Liquefaction Severity 
Minor Moderate Extensive  Major Susceptibility 
Category Mean 
PGA (g) c.o.v. 
Mean  
PGA (g) c.o.v.
Mean  
PGA (g) c.o.v.
 Mean  
PGA (g) c.o.v. 
Very High 
or High 0.03 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.08 0.20 
 0.12 0.20 
Others 0.05 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.20  0.30 0.20 
 
Repair and Replacement Cost 
 
Replacement costs for building occupancy classes are delineated in the HAZUS 
methodology as following: 
 
Single-Family Residential Valuation (RES1): 
mim
i m
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i j
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i j
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                   (25) 
where, 
1RESV  is the total estimated valuation for single-family residences (RES1) 
1RESA  is the total single-family residential floor area (square feet) 
i the Means construction class  
(1 = Economy, 2 = Average, 3 = Custom, and 4 = Luxury) 
iw  is the weighting factor for the Means construction class 
j the number of stories class 
(1 = 1-story, 2 = 2-story, 3 = 3-story, and 4 = split level) 
jw  is the weighting factor for the number of stories class 
jiC ,  is the single-family cost per square foot for the given Means construction class and number of stories class 
l the basement status (1 = yes, 2 = no) 
lw  is the weighting factor for basement 
ljiC ,,  the additional cost, per square foot of the main structure, for a finished basement for the given Means construction class and number of stories class 
1RESCNT  the count of RES1 structures 
m the garage combinations for single-family residences 
(1 = 1-car, 2 = 2-car, 3 = 3-car, 4 = carport, and 5 = none) 
mw  is the weighting factor for the garage type 
miC ,  the additional replacement cost for a given garage type and the Means construction class 
 
Manufactured Housing (RES2): 
222 * RESRESRES CAV =                                                    (26) 
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where, 
2RESV  is the total estimated valuation for manufactured housing (RES2) 
2RESA  is the total manufactured housing floor area (square feet) 
2RESC  is the manufactured housing cost per square foot 
 
Multi-Family Residential (RES3): 
 
333 * RESRESRES CAV =                                                    (27) 
where, 
3RESV  is the total estimated valuation for multi-family residences (RES3) 
3RESA  is the total multi-family residential floor area (square feet) 
3RESC  is the multi-family cost per square foot 
 
HAZUS repair cost ratios for the structural damage of buildings are given in Table 5. 
Additionally, the coefficient of variation (c.o.v.) of the repair cost is assumed 0.2 for all 
damage states. 
Table 5: Structural Repair Cost Ratios (in % of Replacement Cost) 
Structural Damage State Occupancy Class 
Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 
Single Family Dwelling (RES1) 
Mobile Home (RES2) 
Multi Family Dwelling (RES3) 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
2.3 
2.4 
1.4 
11.7 
7.3 
6.9 
23.4 
24.4 
13.8 
 
Uncertainty Quantification of Earthquake Impact Results 
 
An earthquake impact assessment is performed for the ‘impacted counties’ in the eight-
state study region. For a demonstration of the proposed framework, only structural 
damage is considered. Input information used for the estimation and the results are listed 
in the following, by state: 
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Alabama 
 
Input 
 
Table 6: Seismic Hazard and Liquefaction Susceptibility for the State of Alabama 
County Mean PGA (g) Liquefaction Susceptibility Category 
Autauga 
Baldwin 
Bibb 
Bullock 
Choctaw 
Clarke 
Dallas 
Elmore 
Escambia 
Etowah 
Fayette 
Geneva 
Hale 
Lamar 
Lowndes 
Macon 
Marengo 
Mobile 
Pickens 
Russell 
Tuscaloosa 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
Very low 
Moderate 
None 
Low 
Moderate 
Low 
Moderate 
Very low 
Low 
None 
Low 
Low 
Moderate 
Low 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Low 
Low 
Low 
 
Table 7: Number of Buildings by Occupancy Class for the State of Alabama 
W1 URML MH  County 
RES1 RES3 Total RES1 RES3 Total RES2  
Total 
Autauga 
Baldwin 
Bibb 
Bullock 
Choctaw 
Clarke 
Dallas 
Elmore 
Escambia 
Etowah 
Fayette 
Geneva 
Hale 
Lamar 
Lowndes 
Macon 
Marengo 
Mobile 
Pickens 
Russell 
Tuscaloosa 
11,618 
44,212 
4,759 
2,665 
4,623 
7,695 
12,993 
18,185 
10,609 
33,191 
5,532 
7,925 
4,267 
4,720 
3,196 
6,564 
6,019 
114,313 
5,874 
12,995 
41,496 
94 
846 
50 
63 
35 
82 
526 
166 
174 
616 
94 
118 
64 
151 
64 
253 
153 
2,947 
119 
612 
1,490 
11,711 
45,058 
4,808 
2,727 
4,658 
7,777 
13,520 
18,351 
10,783 
33,807 
5,625 
8,043 
4,332 
4,871 
3,260 
6,817 
6,172 
117,259 
5,993 
13,607 
42,986 
611 
2,327 
250 
140 
243 
405 
684 
957 
558 
1,747 
291 
417 
225 
248 
168 
345 
317 
6,016 
309 
684 
2,184 
33 
296 
17 
22 
12 
29 
184 
58 
61 
216 
33 
41 
23 
53 
22 
89 
54 
1,031 
42 
214 
521 
644 
2,623 
268 
162 
256 
434 
868 
1,015 
619 
1,963 
324 
458 
247 
301 
191 
434 
370 
7,048 
351 
898 
2,705 
4,594 
13,034 
2,830 
1,535 
2,672 
3,611 
4,051 
5,095 
4,061 
5,979 
1,829 
3,145 
2,753 
1,760 
2,082 
1,784 
2,805 
15,213 
2,588 
4,327 
10,160 
 
16,949 
60,716 
7,906 
4,425 
7,586 
11,822 
18,439 
24,461 
15,463 
41,749 
7,778 
11,646 
7,332 
6,932 
5,532 
9,034 
9,348 
139,520 
8,932 
18,832 
55,851 
Total 363,448 8,718 372,166 19,129 3,051 22,180 95,908  490,254 
*Occupancy class: RES1: Single Family Dwelling, RES2: Mobile Home, RES3: Multi Family Dwelling 
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Results 
Table 8: Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Alabama 
Damage State 
Statistic 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Moderate to 
Complete 
Damage 
Total No. 
Damaged 
Buildings 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
461,441 
6,768 
20,798 
240 
6,653 
68 
1,195 
13 
165 
1 
8,014 
69 
28,812 
249 
HAZUS* 484,462 4,222 1,327 82 3,464 4,875 9,097 
* HAZUS results represent damage of building for residential occupancy classes of RES1 through RES6. 
 
Table 9: Building Damage for Impacted Counties in the State of Alabama (90% CI) 
County None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total Damage
Autauga [14,855 , 16,807] [749 , 837] [253 , 285] [47 , 54] [6 , 7] [1,072 , 1,166]
Baldwin [53,411 , 60,662] [2,497 , 2,788] [811 , 906] [147 , 166] [20 , 22] [3,526 , 3,832]
Bibb [6,891 , 7,742] [386 , 434] [138 , 156] [27 , 31] [3 , 4] [564 , 615] 
Bullock [3,862 , 4,336] [214 , 240] [76 , 86] [15 , 17] [2 , 2] [312 , 340] 
Choctaw [6,612 , 7,436] [368 , 414] [131 , 148] [26 , 29] [3 , 3] [537 , 586] 
Clarke [10,341 , 11,662] [544 , 610] [188 , 213] [36 , 41] [4 , 5] [786 , 856] 
Dallas [16,239 , 18,377] [766 , 853] [251 , 280] [46 , 52] [6 , 7] [1,084 , 1,176]
Elmore [21,510 , 24,483] [996 , 1,113] [321 , 359] [58 , 65] [8 , 9] [1,403 , 1,526]
Escambia [13,565 , 15,342] [677 , 756] [228 , 256] [43 , 48] [5 , 6] [967 , 1,051] 
Etowah [36,847 , 42,178] [1,549 , 1,735] [471 , 523] [80 , 90] [12 , 13] [2,140 , 2,333]
Fayette [6,836 , 7,749] [329 , 367] [108 , 121] [20 , 23] [3 , 3] [467 , 507] 
Geneva [10,211 , 11,544] [514 , 575] [174 , 196] [33 , 37] [4 , 5] [736 , 801] 
Hale [6,383 , 7,162] [365 , 411] [132 , 150] [26 , 30] [3 , 3] [535 , 584] 
Lamar [6,090 , 6,879] [300 , 335] [101 , 113] [19 , 21] [2 , 3] [429 , 466] 
Lowndes [4,817 , 5,401] [276 , 310] [99 , 113] [20 , 23] [2 , 3] [404 , 442] 
Macon [7,965 , 9,037] [364 , 406] [117 , 130] [21 , 24] [3 , 3] [512 , 556] 
Marengo [8,187 , 9,218] [428 , 479] [148 , 167] [28 , 32] [4 , 4] [618 , 672] 
Mobile [123,370 , 141,635] [4,908 , 5,516] [1,440 , 1,594] [236 , 261] [38 , 42] [6,704 , 7,331]
Pickens [7,825 , 8,824] [404 , 452] [139 , 156] [26 , 30] [3 , 4] [582 , 633] 
Russell [16,583 , 18,733] [793 , 883] [262 , 293] [48 , 54] [7 , 7] [1,126 , 1,222]
Tuscaloosa [49,267 , 56,007] [2,200 , 2,454] [698 , 776] [124 , 139] [18 , 20] [3,081 , 3,347]
 
Table 10: Building Damage by Occupancy Class for the State of Alabama 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Occupancy Class 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Single Family 
Multi Family 
Mobile Home 
367,547 
11,186 
82,708 
6,667 
181 
1,152 
 
11,801 
409 
8,588 
207 
6 
120 
2,797 
141 
3,716 
44 
2 
52 
351 
24 
820 
5 
1 
12 
 
80 
8 
76 
1 
0 
1 
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Table 11: Building Damage by Structural Type for the State of Alabama 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Building Type 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Wood 358,452 6,661  11,131 207 2,308 43 242 4  35 1 
Unreinforced 
Masonry 20,281 336  1,078 18 630 10 134 2  53 1 
Mobile Home 82,708 1,152  8,588 120 3,716 52 820 12  76 1 
 
Table 12: Direct Economic Losses Due to Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Alabama 
Direct Economic Losses ($ millions) 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
90% Confidence Interval  37.62 61.31 
HAZUS* 123.72 
* HAZUS result includes direct loss for all buildings. 
 
Arkansas 
 
Input 
 
Table 13: Seismic Hazard and Liquefaction Susceptibility for the State of Arkansas 
County Mean PGA (g) Liquefaction Susceptibility Category 
Arkansas 
Clay 
Craighead 
Crittenden 
Cross 
Greene 
Independence 
Jackson 
Lawrence 
Lee 
Mississippi 
Monroe 
Phillips 
Poinsett 
Prairie 
Randolph 
Saint Francis 
White 
Woodruff 
0.14 
0.34 
0.47 
0.44 
0.43 
0.34 
0.05 
0.30 
0.30 
0.26 
0.74 
0.16 
0.16 
0.56 
0.15 
0.27 
0.30 
0.19 
0.26 
None 
Very high 
Very high 
Very high 
Very high 
Very high 
Low 
Very high 
High 
Very high 
Very high 
None 
Moderate 
Very high 
Very low 
Moderate 
Very high 
Low 
Very high 
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Table 14: Number of Buildings by Occupancy Class for the State of Arkansas 
W1 URML MH  County 
RES1 RES3 Total RES1 RES3 Total RES2  
Total 
Arkansas 
Clay 
Craighead 
Crittenden 
Cross 
Greene 
Independence 
Jackson 
Lawrence 
Lee 
Mississippi 
Monroe 
Phillips 
Poinsett 
Prairie 
Randolph 
Saint Francis 
White 
Woodruff 
6,404 
6,008 
21,683 
12,061 
4,706 
10,459 
9,498 
5,384 
5,685 
2,978 
13,367 
3,021 
6,937 
7,025 
2,928 
5,647 
6,677 
15,926 
2,587 
1,349 
1,937 
4,403 
2,848 
1,080 
2,110 
2,362 
1,346 
1,651 
552 
3,740 
1,217 
1,805 
1,480 
1,508 
1,172 
1,582 
4,003 
1,025 
7,753 
7,945 
26,086 
14,909 
5,786 
12,569 
11,860 
6,730 
7,336 
3,530 
17,106 
4,238 
8,741 
8,505 
4,435 
6,819 
8,259 
19,929 
3,612 
 
957 
898 
3,240 
1,802 
703 
1,563 
1,419 
805 
850 
445 
1,997 
451 
1,036 
1,050 
437 
844 
998 
2,380 
387 
423 
607 
1,380 
892 
338 
661 
740 
422 
517 
173 
1,172 
381 
565 
464 
472 
367 
496 
1,254 
321 
1,380 
1,505 
4,620 
2,694 
1,042 
2,224 
2,159 
1,226 
1,367 
618 
3,169 
833 
1,602 
1,513 
910 
1,211 
1,493 
3,634 
708 
 
1,804 
1,518 
4,167 
2,652 
2,095 
2,621 
3,309 
1,221 
1,392 
877 
3,408 
1,142 
1,443 
1,917 
1,305 
1,398 
2,185 
6,398 
872 
 
10,937 
10,968 
34,873 
20,255 
8,922 
17,414 
17,328 
9,177 
10,095 
5,025 
23,683 
6,213 
11,786 
11,935 
6,650 
9,428 
11,937 
29,961 
5,192 
Total 148,981 37,166 186,148  22,262 11,645 33,907  41,724  261,779 
*Occupancy class: RES1: Single Family Dwelling, RES2: Mobile Home, RES3: Multi Family Dwelling 
 
Results 
 
Table 15: Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Arkansas 
Damage State 
Statistic 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Moderate to 
Complete 
Damage 
Total No. 
Damaged 
Buildings 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
77,043 
816 
40,695 
376 
43,937 
398 
28,736 
260 
71,370 
713 
144,044 
857 
184,739 
936 
HAZUS* 87,896 59,529 41,110 16,663 57,885 115,657 175,187 
* HAZUS results represent damage of building for residential occupancy classes of RES1 through RES6. 
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Table 16: Building Damage for Impacted Counties in the State of Arkansas (90% CI) 
County None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total Damage 
Arkansas [6,496 , 7,258] 
[1,968 , 
2,182] 
[1,257 , 
1,376] [451 , 494] [188 , 204] [3,935 , 4,184] 
Clay [1,825 , 2,042] 
[1,722 , 
1,924] 
[1,986 , 
2,195] 
[1,273 , 
1,392] [3,617 , 3,960] [8,802 , 9,267] 
Craighead [3,303 , 3,739] 
[4,441 , 
5,027] 
[6,413 , 
7,195] 
[4,828 , 
5,349] 
[14,001 , 
15,450] 
[30,440 , 
32,264] 
Crittenden [2,161 , 2,438] 
[2,711 , 
3,057] 
[3,747 , 
4,185] 
[2,740 , 
3,023] [7,831 , 8,616] 
[17,454 , 
18,457] 
Cross [920 , 1,033] [1,150 , 1,288] 
[1,626 , 
1,803] 
[1,292 , 
1,422] [3,488 , 3,821] [7,735 , 8,157] 
Greene [2,874 , 3,240] 
[2,722 , 
3,063] 
[3,146 , 
3,499] 
[2,036 , 
2,239] [5,715 , 6,296] 
[13,964 , 
14,751] 
Independence [15,434 , 17,068] [721 , 791] [251 , 275] [47 , 52] [9 , 9] [1,040 , 1,114] 
Jackson [1,854 , 2,082] 
[1,512 , 
1,695] 
[1,592 , 
1,764] [964 , 1,057] [2,779 , 3,058] [7,017 , 7,403] 
Lawrence [2,165 , 2,424] 
[1,767 , 
1,975] 
[1,865 , 
2,060] 
[1,118 , 
1,223] [2,669 , 2,925] [7,602 , 7,999] 
Lee [1,206 , 1,356] [842 , 942] [821 , 908] [500 , 548] [1,393 , 1,534] [3,644 , 3,844] 
Mississippi [789 , 890] [1,695 , 1,914] 
[3,487 , 
3,911] 
[3,612 , 
4,006] 
[12,901 , 
14,163] 
[22,142 , 
23,547] 
Monroe [3,308 , 3,655] 
[1,228 , 
1,350] [871 , 948] [348 , 380] [162 , 175] [2,656 , 2,804] 
Phillips [6,381 , 7,130] 
[2,311 , 
2,568] 
[1,584 , 
1,735] [599 , 652] [294 , 318] [4,879 , 5,182] 
Poinsett [760 , 860] [1,236 , 1,398] 
[2,064 , 
2,314] 
[1,806 , 
1,999] [5,445 , 5,989] 
[10,801 , 
11,451] 
Prairie [3,718 , 4,088] 
[1,269 , 
1,388] [872 , 947] [338 , 370] [249 , 161] [2,675 , 2,820] 
Randolph [2,665 , 2,997] 
[1,962 , 
2,200] 
[2,035 , 
2,253] 
[1,218 , 
1,337] [1,047 , 1,141] [6,419 , 6,775] 
Saint Francis [2,338 , 2,621] 
[1,935 , 
2,162] 
[2,085 , 
2,303] 
[1,323 , 
1,451] [3,651 , 4,008] [9,212 , 9,705] 
White [13,401 , 14,924] 
[6,378 , 
7,062] 
[5,113 , 
5,603] 
[2,339 , 
2,568] [1,215 , 1,319] 
[15,359 , 
16,237] 
Woodruff [1,252 , 1,391] [871 , 964] [852 , 933] [518 , 564] [1,453 , 1,585] [3,777 , 3,964] 
 
Table 17: Building Damage by Occupancy Class for the State of Arkansas 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Occupancy Class 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Single Family 
Multi Family 
Mobile Home 
53,231 
15,343 
8,468 
771 
201 
179 
 
27,871 
7,588 
5,236 
356 
87 
85 
28,548 
7,947 
7,442 
372 
89 
109 
16,291 
4,609 
7,837 
229 
56 
108 
 
45,301 
13,328 
12,741 
661 
170 
205 
 
Table 18: Building Damage by Structural Type for the State of Arkansas 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Building Type 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Wood 60,685 790  32,216 365 31,225 379 17,161 233  44,864 661 
Unreinforced 
Masonry 7,890 102  3,243 33 5,270 53 3,739 39  13,765 172 
Mobile Home 8,468 179  5,236 85 7,442 109 7,837 108  12,741 205 
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Table 19: Direct Economic Losses Due to Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Arkansas 
Direct Economic Losses ($ millions) 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
90% Confidence Interval  3,096.86 6,239.14 
HAZUS* 2,359.75 
* HAZUS result includes direct loss for all buildings. 
 
Illinois 
 
Input 
 
Table 20: Seismic Hazard and Liquefaction Susceptibility for the State of Illinois 
County Mean PGA (g) Liquefaction Susceptibility Category 
Alexander 
Bond 
Clinton 
Fayette 
Franklin 
Gallatin 
Hamilton 
Hardin 
Jackson 
Jefferson 
Johnson 
Lawrence 
Madison 
Marion 
Massac 
Monroe 
Perry 
Pope 
Pulaski 
Randolph 
Saint Clair 
Saline 
Union 
Washington 
Wayne 
White 
Williamson 
0.50 
0.08 
0.11 
0.05 
0.23 
0.24 
0.16 
0.30 
0.28 
0.15 
0.47 
0.05 
0.06 
0.08 
0.61 
0.12 
0.17 
0.33 
0.80 
0.15 
0.12 
0.29 
0.42 
0.15 
0.12 
0.15 
0.30 
High 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
None 
Very low 
Very low 
None 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Moderate 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Moderate 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
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Table 21: Number of Buildings by Occupancy Class for the State of Illinois 
W1 URML MH  County 
RES1 RES3 Total RES1 RES3 Total RES2  
Total 
Alexander 
Bond 
Clinton 
Fayette 
Franklin 
Gallatin 
Hamilton 
Hardin 
Jackson 
Jefferson 
Johnson 
Lawrence 
Madison 
Marion 
Massac 
Monroe 
Perry 
Pope 
Pulaski 
Randolph 
Saint Clair 
Saline 
Union 
Washington 
Wayne 
White 
Williamson 
2,446 
3,868 
8,209 
5,196 
11,251 
1,682 
2,386 
1,405 
11,307 
9,292 
2,669 
4,089 
66,016 
10,374 
3,935 
6,951 
5,494 
1,260 
1,780 
7,809 
59,265 
7,496 
4,374 
4,172 
4,362 
4,391 
15,772 
86 
95 
249 
82 
329 
48 
48 
46 
956 
247 
33 
89 
3,298 
306 
91 
221 
190 
36 
59 
229 
3,167 
130 
135 
41 
53 
119 
821 
2,533 
3,964 
8,458 
5,278 
11,580 
1,730 
2,434 
1,451 
12,263 
9,538 
2,702 
4,179 
69,314 
10,680 
4,026 
7,171 
5,684 
1,296 
1,839 
8,038 
62,431 
7,626 
4,509 
4,213 
4,415 
4,509 
16,592 
 699 
1,105 
2,345 
1,485 
3,215 
480 
682 
402 
3,231 
2,655 
763 
1,168 
18,862
2,964 
1,124 
1,986 
1,570 
360 
509 
2,231 
16,933
2,142 
1,250 
1,192 
1,246 
1,254 
4,506 
27 
30 
77 
25 
102 
15 
15 
14 
296 
76 
10 
28 
1,022 
95 
28 
68 
59 
11 
18 
71 
982 
40 
42 
13 
17 
37 
254 
726 
1,135 
2,423 
1,510 
3,316 
495 
697 
416 
3,527 
2,731 
773 
1,196 
19,884 
3,059 
1,153 
2,054 
1,629 
371 
527 
2,302 
17,914 
2,182 
1,292 
1,205 
1,263 
1,291 
4,761 
 765 
1,163 
1,777 
1,762 
1,959 
702 
687 
469 
4,625 
2,936 
1,355 
1,024 
4,136 
2,778 
1,338 
395 
1,352 
494 
768 
1,973 
7,657 
1,709 
1,371 
658 
1,816 
1,118 
3,315 
 4,023 
6,262 
12,658 
8,550 
16,855 
2,927 
3,818 
2,336 
20,415 
15,206 
4,830 
6,399 
93,334 
16,517 
6,517 
9,621 
8,664 
2,161 
3,134 
12,313 
88,002 
11,517 
7,172 
6,076 
7,494 
6,918 
24,668 
Total 267,252 11,201 278,453  76,358 3,472 79,830  50,102  408,385 
*Occupancy class: RES1: Single Family Dwelling, RES2: Mobile Home, RES3: Multi Family Dwelling 
 
Results 
 
Table 22: Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Illinois 
Damage State 
Statistic 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Moderate to 
Complete 
Damage 
Total No. 
Damaged 
Buildings 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
259,680 
4,095 
58,969 
643 
45,883 
410 
22,668 
187 
21,188 
180 
89,739 
485 
148,708 
805 
HAZUS* 323,594 50,253 15,615 4,817 18,880 39,303 89,561 
* HAZUS results represent damage of building for residential occupancy classes of RES1 through RES6. 
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Table 23: Building Damage for Impacted Counties in the State of Illinois (90% CI) 
County None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total Damage
Alexander [324 , 370] [467 , 533] [742 , 836] [633 , 702] [1,635 , 1,804] [3,568 , 3,784]
Bond [4,907 , 5,502] [610 , 675] [295 , 324] [77 , 85] [22 , 25] [1,021 , 1,092]
Clinton [8,668 , 9,774] [1,793 , 1,999] [1,024 , 1,126] [317 , 348] [125 , 139] [3,320 , 3,552]
Fayette [7,541 , 8,427] [370 , 408] [137 , 151] [26 , 29] [5 , 6] [546 , 587] 
Franklin [6,233 , 7,091] [3,640 , 4,127] [3,274 , 3,651] 
[1,580 , 
1,740] 
[1,130 , 
1,248] 
[9,871 , 
10,517] 
Gallatin [963 , 1,087] [622 , 698] [611 , 676] [340 , 375] [230 , 253] [1,848 , 1,956]
Hamilton [1,985 , 2,242] [739 , 828] [544 , 600] [222 , 244] [111 , 123] [1,651 , 1,758]
Hardin [578 , 655] [478 , 540] [535 , 595] [332 , 366] [282 , 310] [1,671 , 1,768]
Jackson [5,503 , 6,192] [4,244 , 4,756] [4,588 , 5,072] 
[2,788 , 
3,068] 
[2,205 , 
2,413] 
[14,174 , 
14,960] 
Jefferson [8,306 , 9,357] [2,846 , 3,178] [2,025 , 2,230] [800 , 880] [376 , 415] [6,174 , 6,574]
Johnson [511 , 581] [703 , 798] [1,105 , 1,237] [978 , 1,084] 
[1,269 , 
1,394] [4,168 , 4,400]
Lawrence [5,658 , 6,343] [261 , 288] [95 , 104] [18 , 20] [4 , 4] [383 , 411] 
Madison [80,609 , 91,203] [4,776 , 5,329]
[1,798 , 
1,985] [348 , 385] [110 , 125] [7,136 , 7,720]
Marion [12,985 , 14,573] [1,588 , 1,757] [761 , 835] [196 , 216] [59 , 65] [2,645 , 2,831]
Massac [375 , 429] [663 , 759] [1,230 , 1,391] 
[1,236 , 
1,376] 
[2,652 , 
2,922] [5,935 , 6,293]
Monroe [6,436 , 7,324] [1,424 , 1,610] [805 , 896] [237 , 262] [116 , 131] [2,636 , 2,845]
Perry [4,314 , 4,875] [1,724 , 1,934] [1,301 , 1,437] [539 , 592] [291 , 321] [3,942 , 4,199]
Pope [450 , 511] [419 , 474] [507 , 565] [345 , 380] [321 , 352] [1,635 , 1,727]
Pulaski [88 , 101] [204 , 234] [466 , 529] [567 , 632] [1,641 , 1,807] [2,944 , 3,136]
Randolph [6,807 , 7,686] [2,289 , 2,562] [1,600 , 1,764] [615 , 675] [299 , 331] [4,904 , 5,229]
Saint Clair [58,218 , 65,828] 
[13,318 , 
14,931] 
[7,767 , 
8,569] 
[2,414 , 
2,647] 
[1,095 , 
1,222] 
[25,070 , 
26,891] 
Saline [3,079 , 3,509] [2,412 , 2,741] [2,579 , 2,885] 
[1,494 , 
1,650] 
[1,278 , 
1,407] [7,977 , 8,469]
Union [1,000 , 1,140] [1,200 , 1,365] [1,689 , 1,895] 
[1,297 , 
1,436] 
[1,583 , 
1,738] [5,934 , 6,270]
Washington [3,418 , 3,883] [1,115 , 1,257] [757 , 839] [277 , 304] [143 , 159] [2,342 , 2,509]
Wayne [4,733 , 5,309] [1,208 , 1,341] [767 , 845] [272 , 301] [101 , 112] [2,394 , 2,552]
White [3,823 , 4,317] [1,286 , 1,440] [900 , 992] [346 , 380 [168 , 186] [2,758 , 2,940]
Williamson [6,337 , 7,201] [5,143 , 5,833] [5,592 , 6,248] 
[3,267 , 
3,603] 
[2,911 , 
3,201] 
[17,374 , 
18,424] 
 
Table 24: Building Damage by Occupancy Class for the State of Illinois 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Occupancy Class 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Single Family 
Multi Family 
Mobile Home 
229,898 
9,934 
19,848 
4,078 
205 
308 
 
48,432 
2,044 
8,493 
630 
33 
118 
35,170 
1,482 
9,231 
391 
21 
123 
14,702 
609 
7,357 
157 
9 
100 
 
15,407 
607 
5,174 
162 
7 
77 
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Table 25: Building Damage by Structural Type for the State of Illinois 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Building Type 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Wood 193,710 3,960  41,059 612 25,897 357 9,936 138  7,853 120 
Unreinforced 
Masonry 46,122 998  9,417 156 10,755 160 5,376 75  8,161 110 
Mobile Home 19,848 308  8,493 118 9,231 123 7,357 100  5,174 77 
 
Table 26: Direct Economic Losses Due to Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Illinois 
Direct Economic Losses ($ millions) 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
90% Confidence Interval  1,053.12 1,957.62 
HAZUS* 868.47 
* HAZUS result includes direct loss for all buildings. 
 
Indiana 
 
Input 
Table 27: Seismic Hazard and Liquefaction Susceptibility for the State of Indiana 
County Mean PGA (g) Liquefaction Susceptibility Category 
Crawford 
Dubois 
Gibson 
Harrison 
Knox 
Lawrence 
Martin 
Orange 
Perry 
Pike 
Posey 
Spencer 
Vanderburgh 
Warrick 
0.05 
0.05 
0.14 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.15 
0.10 
0.15 
0.13 
Very low 
Very low 
Moderate 
Very low 
Moderate 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Low 
Moderate 
Low 
Moderate 
Low 
 
Table 28: Number of Buildings by Occupancy Class for the State of Indiana 
W1  URML  MH  County 
RES1 RES3 Total  RES1 RES3 Total  RES2  
Total 
Crawford 
Dubois 
Gibson 
Harrison 
Knox 
Lawrence 
Martin 
Orange 
Perry 
Pike 
Posey 
Spencer 
Vanderburgh 
Warrick 
2,761 
9,710 
8,694 
8,419 
10,639 
12,434 
2,602 
4,586 
4,937 
3,257 
7,254 
5,324 
43,258 
13,415 
24 
452 
179 
163 
512 
316 
65 
91 
119 
53 
121 
116 
2,371 
284 
2,785 
10,161 
8,872 
8,582 
11,151 
12,750 
2,667 
4,676 
5,055 
3,309 
7,374 
5,440 
45,629 
13,699 
 
690 
2,427 
2,173 
2,105 
2,660 
3,109 
650 
1,146 
1,234 
814 
1,813 
1,331 
10,815 
3,354 
7 
140 
55 
50 
159 
98 
20 
28 
37 
16 
37 
36 
735 
88 
698 
2,567 
2,229 
2,155 
2,818 
3,206 
671 
1,175 
1,271 
830 
1,851 
1,367 
11,550 
3,442 
 
1,445 
1,004 
1,802 
2,305 
1,173 
2,937 
1,168 
1,950 
1,207 
1,234 
1,170 
1,052 
2,368 
1,773 
 
4,927 
13,732 
12,903 
13,042 
15,142 
18,894 
4,505 
7,801 
7,533 
5,374 
10,395 
7,858 
59,547 
18,913 
Total 137,289 4,862 142,150  34,322 1,507 35,829  22,588  200,568 
*Occupancy class: RES1: Single Family Dwelling, RES2: Mobile Home, RES3: Multi Family Dwelling 
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 Results 
 
Table 29: Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Indiana 
Damage State 
Statistic 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Moderate to 
Complete 
Damage 
Total No. 
Damaged 
Buildings 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
155,454 
1,966 
24,199 
475 
14,130 
261 
4,526 
78 
2,262 
47 
20,918 
277 
45,117 
550 
HAZUS* 168,902 25,254 3,768 484 2,770 7,025 32,277 
* HAZUS results represent damage of building for residential occupancy classes of RES1 through RES6. 
 
Table 30: Building Damage for Impacted Counties in the State of Indiana 
County None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total Damage
Crawford [4,319 , 4,813] [234 , 259] [88 , 98] [17 , 19] [3 , 3] [347 , 375] 
Dubois [12,207 , 13,795] [492 , 545] [167 , 183] [29 , 32] [7 , 8] [704 , 760] 
Gibson [7,598 , 8,614] [2,278 , 2,559] [1,486 , 1,641] [532 , 584] [244 , 270] [4,634 , 4,960]
Harrison [11,521 , 12,927] [540 , 596] [194 , 214] [36 , 40] [7 , 8] [788 , 847] 
Knox [13,460 , 15,199] [546 , 605] [186 , 204] [33 , 36] [8 , 9] [782 , 844] 
Lawrence [16,713 , 18,778] [761 , 840] [271 , 297] [50 , 55] [11 , 12] [1,107 , 1,190]
Martin [3,962 , 4,416] [206 , 228] [77 , 85] [15 , 17] [3 , 3] [305 , 328] 
Orange [6,862 , 7,657] [353 , 390] [131 , 145] [25 , 28] [5 , 5] [521 , 561] 
Perry [6,663 , 7,482] [305 , 337] [109 , 120] [20 , 22] [4 , 5] [444 , 478] 
Pike [4,734 , 5,289] [237 , 262] [87 , 97] [17 , 19] [3 , 3] [349 , 376] 
Posey [5,864 , 6,671] [1,915 , 2,162] [1,283 , 1,423] [467 , 513] [233 , 259] [3,983 , 4,272]
Spencer [5,671 , 6,413] [993 , 1,109] [525 , 577] [151 , 165] [54 , 60] [1,753 , 1,881]
Vanderburgh [34,525 , 39,330] 
[10,803 , 
12,258] [6,913 , 7,716] [2,305 , 2,545]
[1,276 , 
1,423] 
[21,776 , 
23,463] 
Warrick [11,895 , 13,529] [3,094 , 3,490] [1,872 , 2,074] [610 , 670] [281 , 313] [5,977 , 6,427]
 
Table 31: Building Damage by Occupancy Class for the State of Indiana 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Occupancy Class 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Single Family 
Multi Family 
Mobile Home 
134,631 
4,803 
16,020 
1,950 
90 
235 
 
20,276 
828 
3,095 
472 
24 
48 
11,419 
495 
2,216 
257 
14 
40 
3,367 
153 
1,006 
75 
4 
22 
 
1,917 
93 
252 
46 
3 
6 
 
Table 32: Building Damage by Structural Type for the State of Indiana 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Building Type 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Wood 114,558 1,911  17,116 463 7,928 235 1,919 60  635 20 
Unreinforced 
Masonry 24,877 394  3,988 95 3,986 106 1,601 46  1,375 42 
Mobile Home 16,020 235  3,095 48 2,216 40 1,006 22  252 6 
 
A12-29 
Table 33: Direct Economic Losses Due to Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Indiana 
Direct Economic Losses ($ millions) 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
90% Confidence Interval  191.99 259.85 
HAZUS* 158.86 
* HAZUS result includes direct loss for all buildings. 
 
Kentucky 
 
Input 
Table 34: Seismic Hazard and Liquefaction Susceptibility for the State of Kentucky 
County Mean PGA (g) Liquefaction Susceptibility Category 
Ballard 
Caldwell 
Calloway 
Carlisle 
Crittenden 
Daviess 
Fulton 
Graves 
Henderson 
Hickman 
Hopkins 
Livingston 
Lyon 
McCracken 
Marshall 
Muhlenberg 
Trigg 
Union 
Webster 
0.86 
0.30 
0.28 
0.63 
0.30 
0.15 
0.55 
0.37 
0.15 
0.53 
0.17 
0.31 
0.30 
0.62 
0.32 
0.15 
0.28 
0.22 
0.19 
Moderate 
Very low 
Low 
Low 
Very low 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Low 
Moderate 
Low 
Very low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Moderate 
Very low 
Low 
Moderate 
Low 
 
Table 35: Number of Buildings by Occupancy Class for the State of Kentucky 
W1  URML  MH  County 
RES1 RES3 Total  RES1 RES3 Total  RES2  
Total 
Ballard 
Caldwell 
Calloway 
Carlisle 
Crittenden 
Daviess 
Fulton 
Graves 
Henderson 
Hickman 
Hopkins 
Livingston 
Lyon 
McCracken 
Marshall 
Muhlenberg 
Trigg 
Union 
Webster 
2,512 
4,235 
9,173 
1,683 
2,701 
25,004 
2,497 
10,928 
11,486 
1,617 
13,223 
2,863 
2,447 
18,750 
9,629 
8,583 
4,384 
3,922 
4,110 
32 
98 
550 
13 
52 
1,199 
155 
290 
680 
25 
392 
11 
65 
892 
149 
133 
71 
95 
45 
2,543 
4,333 
9,723 
1,695 
2,752 
26,204 
2,652 
11,218 
12,166 
1,641 
13,614 
2,873 
2,513 
19,642 
9,777 
8,715 
4,455 
4,017 
4,155 
 342 
577 
1,251 
229 
368 
3,410 
341 
1,490 
1,566 
220 
1,803 
390 
334 
2,557 
1,313 
1,170 
598 
535 
561 
10 
31 
172 
4 
16 
376 
48 
91 
213 
8 
123 
3 
20 
279 
47 
42 
22 
30 
14 
352 
608 
1,423 
233 
384 
3,785 
389 
1,581 
1,779 
228 
1,926 
394 
354 
2,836 
1,360 
1,212 
620 
565 
575 
 758 
862 
2,933 
493 
1,081 
2,567 
184 
2,522 
2,348 
451 
3,372 
1,382 
1,076 
3,406 
2,882 
3,050 
1,387 
1,173 
1,214 
 3,653 
5,803 
14,079 
2,422 
4,218 
32,556 
3,225 
15,321 
16,293 
2,321 
18,912 
4,649 
3,943 
25,884 
14,019 
12,977 
6,462 
5,755 
5,944 
Total 139,746 4,944 144,690  19,056 1,549 20,605  33,141  198,436 
*Occupancy class: RES1: Single Family Dwelling, RES2: Mobile Home, RES3: Multi Family Dwelling 
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Results 
 
Table 36: Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Kentucky 
Damage State 
Statistic 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Moderate to 
Complete 
Damage 
Total No. 
Damaged 
Buildings 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
72,624 
1,095 
38,481 
438 
37,735 
394 
23,357 
254 
26,241 
348 
87,334 
584 
125,815 
729 
HAZUS* 103,857 36,798 25,532 9,809 23,018 58,359 95,159 
* HAZUS results represent damage of building for residential occupancy classes of RES1 through RES6. 
 
Table 37: Building Damage for Impacted Counties in the State of Kentucky (90% CI) 
County None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total Damage 
Ballard [93 , 107] [233 , 270] [545 , 627] [658 , 744] [1,906 , 2,124] [3,428 , 3,679]
Caldwell [1,530 , 1,759] [1,256 , 1,439] [1,312 , 1,482] [752 , 837] [590 , 650] [4,023 , 4,294]
Calloway [3,889 , 4,429] [3,006 , 3,406] [3,119 , 3,485] 
[1,855 , 
2,053] [1,390 , 1,525] [9,623 , 10,216]
Carlisle [144 , 166] [266 , 308] [491 , 561] [484 , 544] [890 , 989] [2,196 , 2,338]
Crittenden [1,038 , 1,185] [880 , 999] [969 , 1,085] [617 , 686] [465 , 512] [3,013 , 3,199]
Daviess [18,881 , 21,627] [6,014 , 6,848]
[3,723 , 
4,167] 
[1,252 , 
1,380] [581 , 639] 
[11,825 , 
12,779] 
Fulton [278 , 320] [438 , 506] [701 , 804] [568 , 645] [1,033 , 1,157] [2,830 , 3,022]
Graves [2,761 , 3,177] [2,902 , 3,330] [3,594 , 4,073] 
[2,487 , 
2,776] [2,632 , 2,911] 
[11,973 , 
12,730] 
Henderson [9,232 , 10,500] [3,055 , 3,445]
[1,983 , 
2,200] [722 , 795] [313 , 342] [6,201 , 6,654]
Hickman [205 , 236] [318 , 366] [513 , 585] [452 , 507] [693 , 768] [2,037 , 2,164]
Hopkins [9,519 , 10,851] [3,834 , 4,333]
[2,757 , 
3,066] 
[1,127 , 
1,245] [522 , 572] [8,427 , 9,029]
Livingston [1,034 , 1,180] [925 , 1,049] [1,074 , 1,202] [741 , 825] [603 , 666] [3,438 , 3,646]
Lyon [940 , 1,071] [804 , 910] [903 , 1,008] [597 , 662] [471 , 519] [2,852 , 3,022]
McCracken [1,696 , 1,956] [3,059 , 3,531] [5,450 , 6,241] 
[5,000 , 
5,644] 
[9,083 , 
10,109] 
[23,297 , 
24,819] 
Marshall [2,930 , 3,362] [2,668 , 3,048] [3,143 , 3,540] 
[2,201 , 
2,449] [2,231 , 2,469] 
[10,550 , 
11,198] 
Muhlenberg [7,091 , 8,051] [2,474 , 2,779] [1,697 , 1,882] [673 , 748] [267 , 294] [5,224 , 5,590]
Trigg [1,776 , 2,034] [1,376 , 1,567] [1,430 , 1,604] [855 , 949] [635 , 698] [4,416 , 4,698]
Union [2,103 , 2,400] [1,233 , 1,397] [1,117 , 1,247] [590 , 653] [367 , 403] [3,392 , 3,615]
Webster [2,660 , 3,037] [1,262 , 1,428] [990 , 1,104] [446 , 494] [222 , 244] [2,991 , 3,199]
 
Table 38: Building Damage by Occupancy Class for the State of Kentucky 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Occupancy Class 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Single Family 
Multi Family 
Mobile Home 
63,459 
2,604 
6,561 
1,088 
49 
113 
 
31,895 
1,216 
5,371 
430 
18 
78 
29,085 
1,154 
7,496 
381 
16 
100 
15,372 
628 
7,357 
233 
10 
100 
 
18,992 
893 
6,357 
329 
17 
110 
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Table 39: Building Damage by Structural Type for the State of Kentucky 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Building Type 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Wood 60,116 1,084  30,472 429 26,302 377 13,455 231  14,349 316 
Unreinforced 
Masonry 5,947 109  2,639 40 3,938 53 2,545 34  5,536 95 
Mobile Home 6,561 113  5,371 78 7,496 100 7,357 100  6,357  110 
 
Table 40: Direct Economic Losses Due to Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Kentucky 
Direct Economic Losses ($ millions) 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
90% Confidence Interval  1,199.00 2,001.76 
HAZUS* 1,501.98 
* HAZUS result includes direct loss for all buildings. 
 
Mississippi 
 
Input 
 
Table 41: Seismic Hazard and Liquefaction Susceptibility for the State of Mississippi 
County Mean PGA (g) Liquefaction Susceptibility Category 
Alcorn 
Benton 
Bolivar 
Coahoma 
Desoto 
Lafayette 
Marshall 
Panola 
Pontotoc 
Prentiss 
Quitman 
Sunflower 
Tallahatchie 
Tate 
Tippah 
Tishomingo 
Tunica 
Union 
Yalobusha 
0.15 
0.15 
0.07 
0.15 
0.30 
0.15 
0.23 
0.15 
0.12 
0.15 
0.15 
0.05 
0.11 
0.27 
0.15 
0.15 
0.23 
0.14 
0.14 
None 
Moderate 
None 
None 
Moderate 
None 
Moderate 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Moderate 
Moderate 
None 
Very high 
None 
None 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A12-32 
Table 42: Number of Buildings by Occupancy Class for the State of Mississippi 
W1 URML MH  County 
RES1 RES3 Total RES1 RES3 Total RES2  
Total 
Alcorn 
Benton 
Bolivar 
Coahoma 
Desoto 
Lafayette 
Marshall 
Panola 
Pontotoc 
Prentiss 
Quitman 
Sunflower 
Tallahatchie 
Tate 
Tippah 
Tishomingo 
Tunica 
Union 
Yalobusha 
11,060 
2,563 
9,941 
7,856 
30,990 
9,102 
8,498 
7,957 
7,382 
7,509 
2,819 
7,871 
3,829 
6,304 
6,340 
6,939 
1,953 
7,489 
3,927 
274 
11 
415 
357 
508 
595 
98 
170 
135 
175 
58 
190 
48 
174 
81 
125 
94 
183 
92 
11,334 
2,575 
10,355 
8,213 
31,498 
9,697 
8,596 
8,127 
7,517 
7,683 
2,877 
8,060 
3,877 
6,478 
6,421 
7,064 
2,047 
7,672 
4,020 
 
706 
164 
635 
501 
1,978 
581 
542 
508 
471 
479 
180 
502 
244 
402 
405 
443 
125 
478 
251 
86 
4 
130 
112 
159 
186 
31 
53 
42 
55 
18 
59 
15 
55 
25 
39 
29 
57 
29 
792 
167 
764 
613 
2,137 
767 
573 
561 
513 
534 
198 
562 
259 
457 
430 
482 
154 
535 
280 
 
2,377 
687 
1,783 
941 
2,932 
3,009 
3,561 
4,315 
2,323 
1,639 
602 
648 
1,362 
2,019 
1,650 
1,587 
817 
1,942 
1,661 
 
14,503 
3,429 
12,903 
9,767 
36,567 
13,473 
12,730 
13,003 
10,353 
9,857 
3,677 
9,270 
5,498 
8,954 
8,501 
9,133 
3,018 
10,149 
5,960 
Total 150,328 3,781 154,108  9,595 1,185 10,780  35,855  200,743 
*Occupancy class: RES1: Single Family Dwelling, RES2: Mobile Home, RES3: Multi Family Dwelling 
 
Results 
 
Table 43: Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Mississippi 
Damage State 
Statistic 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Moderate to 
Complete 
Damage 
Total No. 
Damaged 
Buildings 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
110,836 
1,168 
38,075 
474 
28,793 
409 
13,658 
213 
9,385 
184 
51,835 
497 
89,910 
686 
HAZUS* 116,496 42,819 19,404 5,951 16,572 41,927 84,747 
* HAZUS results represent damage of building for residential occupancy classes of RES1 through RES6. 
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Table 44: Building Damage for Impacted Counties for the State of Mississippi (90% CI) 
County None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total Damage
Alcorn [8,225 , 9,441] [2,742 , 3,117] [1,728 , 1,934] [626 , 695] [237 , 260] [5,453 , 5,887]
Benton [1,916 , 2,199] [653 , 741] [421 , 471] [159 , 177] [58 , 64] [1,320 , 1,423]
Bolivar [10,683 , 12,198] [937 , 1,051] [354 , 392] [76 , 84] [16 , 17] [1,403 , 1,524]
Coahoma [5,686 , 6,544] [1,823 , 2,083] [1,093 , 1,230] [364 , 403] [147 , 161] [3,503 , 3,801]
Desoto [9,288 , 10,800] [7,629 , 8,853] [7,923 , 9,111] [4,709 , 5,349]
[4,446 , 
5,026] 
[25,568 , 
27,479] 
Lafayette [7,476 , 8,489] [2,581 , 2,901] [1,704 , 1,893] [659 , 733] [243 , 267] [5,300 , 5,680]
Marshall [4,267 , 4,880] [2,727 , 3,092] [2,586 , 2,898] [1,483 , 1,656] [887 , 984] [7,897 , 8,416]
Panola [6,895 , 7,804] [2,535 , 2,841] [1,786 , 1,993] [755 , 850] [259 , 288] [5,462 , 5,845]
Pontotoc [6,696 , 7,636] [1,657 , 1,865] [942 , 1,049] [314 , 351] [93 , 102] [3,068 , 3,305]
Prentiss [5,585 , 6,410] [1,865 , 2,119] [1,177 , 1,317] [428 , 475] [161 , 177] [3,712 , 4,006]
Quitman [2,086 , 2,394] [695 , 790] [438 , 490] [159 , 176] [60 , 66] [1,382 , 1,492]
Sunflower [8,210 , 9,461] [306 , 346] [86 , 96] [13 , 15] [3 , 3] [414 , 455] 
Tallahatchie [3,715 , 4,226] [815 , 915] [445 , 496] [143 , 160] [38 , 42] [1,471 , 1,584]
Tate [2,459 , 2,822] [1,865 , 2,126] [1,935 , 2,178] [1,211 , 1,350] [930 , 1,032] [6,115 , 6,512]
Tippah [4,763 , 5,463] [1,616 , 1,834] [1,040 , 1,163] [389 , 433] [143 , 158] [3,261 , 3,515]
Tishomingo [5,160 , 5,922] [1,730 , 1,965] [1,097 , 1,228] [402 , 447] [150 , 165] [3,456 , 3,729]
Tunica [812 , 924] [508 , 574] [466 , 520] [300 , 333] [755 , 843] [2,087 , 2,214]
Union [5,996 , 6,861] [1,835 , 2,077] [1,127 , 1,258] [402 , 448] [140 , 154] [3,582 , 3,860]
Yalobusha [3,409 , 3,871] [1,101 , 1,237] [718 , 800] [278 , 312] [92 , 102] [2,239 , 2,401]
 
Table 45: Building Damage by Occupancy Class for the State of Mississippi 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Occupancy Class 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Single Family 
Multi Family 
Mobile Home 
94,502 
2,989 
13,345 
1,154 
35 
176 
 
29,953 
854 
7,268 
464 
10 
95 
20,490 
622 
7,680 
395 
8 
105 
8,253 
255 
5,149 
199 
4 
77 
 
6,725 
247 
2,412 
179 
4 
44 
 
Table 46: Building Damage by Structural Type for the State of Mississippi 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Building Type 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Wood 92,486 1,154  29,297 464 19,211 394 7,491 198  5,627 176 
Unreinforced 
Masonry 5,004 57  1,510 19 1,902 27 1,018 19  1,345 31 
Mobile Home 13,345 176  7,268 95 7,680 105 5,149 77  2,412 44 
 
Table 47: Direct Economic Losses Due to Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Mississippi 
Direct Economic Losses ($ millions) 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
90% Confidence Interval  526.83 1,281.85 
HAZUS* 878.10 
* HAZUS result includes direct loss for all buildings. 
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Missouri 
 
Input 
Table 48: Seismic Hazard and Liquefaction Susceptibility for the State of Missouri 
County Mean PGA (g) Liquefaction Susceptibility Category 
Bollinger 
Butler 
Cape Girardeau 
Carter 
Dunklin 
Iron 
Jefferson 
Madison 
Mississippi 
New Madrid 
Oregon 
Pemiscot 
Perry 
Reynolds 
Ripley 
St. Charles 
St. Francois 
St. Louis 
Ste. Genevieve 
Scott 
Stoddard 
Wayne 
City of St. Louis 
0.28 
0.30 
0.32 
0.17 
0.51 
0.11 
0.05 
0.15 
0.63 
0.61 
0.13 
0.68 
0.23 
0.14 
0.19 
0.05 
0.14 
0.05 
0.15 
0.50 
0.47 
0.23 
0.08 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
Very high 
Very low 
Very low 
Very low 
Very high 
Very high 
Low 
Very high 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Moderate 
None 
Low 
None 
High 
High 
Low 
Moderate 
 
Table 49: Number of Buildings by Occupancy Class for the State of Missouri 
W1 URML  MH  County 
RES1 RES3 Total RES1 RES3 Total  RES2  
Total 
Bollinger 
Butler 
Cape Girardeau 
Carter 
Dunklin 
Iron 
Jefferson 
Madison 
Mississippi 
New Madrid 
Oregon 
Pemiscot 
Perry 
Reynolds 
Ripley 
St. Charles 
St. Francois 
St. Louis 
Ste. Genevieve 
Scott 
Stoddard 
Wayne 
City of St. Louis 
3,109 
10,581 
15,654 
1,623 
8,873 
2,739 
42,813 
3,246 
3,602 
4,723 
2,847 
5,008 
4,662 
2,180 
3,414 
64,419 
13,065 
247,090 
4,530 
9,847 
8,054 
3,693 
58,534 
27 
404 
935 
23 
310 
66 
1,029 
77 
162 
262 
45 
221 
118 
28 
40 
1,708 
455 
9,692 
60 
354 
247 
45 
18,955
3,136 
10,986 
16,589 
1,646 
9,183 
2,805 
43,842 
3,322 
3,764 
4,985 
2,892 
5,228 
4,780 
2,207 
3,454 
66,127 
13,520 
256,781
4,590 
10,201 
8,300 
3,738 
77,489 
 982 
3,342 
4,944 
513 
2,802 
865 
13,520 
1,025 
1,137 
1,492 
899 
1,581 
1,472 
688 
1,078 
20,343 
4,126 
78,028 
1,431 
3,109 
2,543 
1,166 
18,485 
8 
127 
293 
7 
97 
21 
322 
24 
51 
82 
14 
69 
37 
9 
12 
535 
142 
3,037 
19 
111 
77 
14 
5,939 
990 
3,468 
5,236 
520 
2,899 
886 
13,842 
1,049 
1,188 
1,574 
913 
1,650 
1,509 
697 
1,091 
20,878 
4,268 
81,065 
1,449 
3,220 
2,621 
1,180 
24,424 
 1,191 
2,541 
2,497 
754 
1,693 
984 
12,656 
957 
492 
1,304 
1,032 
1,016 
989 
702 
1,631 
5,325 
3,488 
1,007 
1,289 
2,219 
1,575 
2,367 
255 
 5,317 
16,995 
24,322 
2,920 
13,775 
4,675 
70,340 
5,328 
5,444 
7,863 
4,837 
7,895 
7,278 
3,606 
6,175 
92,330 
21,276 
338,853
7,329 
15,640 
12,496 
7,285 
102,168
Total 524,307 35,258 559,565  165,570 11,048 176,618  47,964  784,147
*Occupancy class: RES1: Single Family Dwelling, RES2: Mobile Home, RES3: Multi Family Dwelling 
 
A12-35 
Results 
 
Table 50: Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Missouri 
Damage State 
Statistic 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Moderate to 
Complete 
Damage 
Total No. 
Damaged 
Buildings 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
618,117 
13,356 
57,881 
612 
43,068 
373 
22,921 
199 
42,164 
433 
108,153 
605 
166,034 
861 
HAZUS* 640,381 69,176 30,259 7,624 39,044 76,930 146,110 
* HAZUS results represent damage of building for residential occupancy classes of RES1 through RES6. 
 
Table 51: Building Damage for Impacted Counties in the State of Missouri (90% CI) 
County None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total Damage
Bollinger [1,398 , 1,583] [1,080 , 1,218] [1,189 , 1,321] [740 , 816] [614 , 676] [3,720 , 3,934]
Butler [3,469 , 3,939] [2,826 , 3,202] [3,124 , 3,485] [1,947 , 2,147] 
[4,677 , 
5,175] 
[12,917 , 
13,665] 
Cape 
Girardeau [5,591 , 6,355] [4,857 , 5,516] [5,557 , 6,223]
[3,398 , 
3,756] 
[3,517 , 
3,876] 
[17,817 , 
18,882] 
Carter [1,387 , 1,557] [585 , 652] [470 , 517] [213 , 235] [107 , 117] [1,405 , 1,490]
Dunklin [1,044 , 1,194] [1,512 , 1,732] [2,396 , 2,712] [1955 , 2,180] [6,081 , 6,746] 
[12,256 , 
12,057] 
Iron [3,138 , 3,514] [686 , 760] [411 , 452] [135 , 149] [50 , 55] [1,306 , 1,392]
Jefferson [62,147 , 69,451] [2,967 , 3,268] [1,100 , 1,211] [209 , 232] [45 , 50] [4,380 , 4,702]
Madison [2,916 , 3,284] [993 , 1,108] [709 , 780] [278 , 306] [135 , 150] [2,160 , 2,299]
Mississippi [264 , 303] [474 , 545] [869 , 990] [788 , 886] [2,732 , 3,037] [4,985 , 5,336]
New Madrid [388 , 443] [681 , 778] [1,246 , 1,407] [1,183 , 1,317] 
[3,937 , 
4,346] [7,212 , 7,683]
Oregon [2,914 , 3,271] [824 , 915] [548 , 602] [201 , 222] [84 , 93] [1,690 , 1,799]
Pemiscot [309 , 354] [602 , 691] [1,182 , 1,344] [1,166 , 1,306] 
[4,190 , 
4,645] [7,308 , 7,818]
Perry [2,637 , 2,993] [1,555 , 1,757] [1,432 , 1,593] [715 , 787] [517 , 570] [4,326 , 4,599]
Reynolds [2,071 , 2,331] [644 , 719] [444 , 489] [169 , 186] [76 , 85] [1,362 , 1,451]
Ripley [2,618 , 2,941] [1,280 , 1,428] [1,104 , 1,218] [540 , 597] [297 , 327] [3,297 , 3,494]
St. Charles [82,034 , 92,716] [3,288 , 3,652] [1,149 , 1,270] [203 , 226] [57 , 65] [4,762 , 5,247]
St. Francois [12,356 , 13,909] [3,773 , 4,209] [2,560 , 2,816] [949 , 1,043] [445 , 493] [7,886 , 8,402]
St. Louis [301,874 , 342,770] 
[11,029 , 
12,396] [3,712 , 4,156] [624 , 706] [205 , 236] 
[15,812 , 
17,252] 
Ste. 
Genevieve [4,013 , 4,526] [1,363 , 1,524] [972 , 1,071] [381 , 418] [186 , 206] [2,963 , 3,156]
Scott [1,296 , 1,481] [1,846 , 2,111] [2,901 , 3,277] [2,377 , 2,645] 
[6,336 , 
7,010] 
[13,822 , 
14,681] 
Stoddard [1,188 , 1,358] [1,581 , 1,809] [2,363 , 2,670] [1,836 , 2,043] 
[4,812 , 
5,332] 
[10,883 , 
11,562] 
Wayne [2,387 , 2,678] [1,521 , 1,696] [1,529 , 1,690] [892 , 991] [565 , 662] [4,621 , 4,884]
City of St. 
Louis 
[83,271 , 
92,571] [8,599 , 9,511] [3,760 , 4,121] [833 , 916] [356 , 398] 
[13,755 , 
14,739] 
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Table 52: Building Damage by Occupancy Class for the State of Missouri 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Occupancy Class 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Single Family 
Multi Family 
Mobile Home 
557,228 
38,358 
22,531 
13,305 
1,002 
601 
 
48,133 
3,625 
6,124 
599 
88 
88 
34,367
2,096 
6,606 
361 
37 
83 
16,296 
811 
5,814 
184 
11 
76 
 
33,854 
1,421 
6,890 
418 
16 
111 
 
Table 53: Building Damage by Structural Type for the State of Missouri 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Building Type 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Wood 461,902 12,784  39,644 561 24,959 323 11,546 170  21,518 365 
Unreinforced 
Masonry 133,684 3,819  12,113 230 11,504 165 5,561 71  13,756 206 
Mobile Home 22,531 601  6,124 88 6,606 83 5,814 76  6,890 111 
 
Table 54: Direct Economic Losses Due to Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Missouri 
Direct Economic Losses ($ millions) 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
90% Confidence Interval  1,699.67 3,488.51 
HAZUS* 1,801.92 
* HAZUS result includes direct loss for all buildings. 
 
Tennessee 
 
Input 
 
Table 55: Seismic Hazard and Liquefaction Susceptibility for the State of Tennessee 
County Mean PGA (g) Liquefaction Susceptibility Category 
Benton 
Carroll 
Chester 
Crockett 
Dyer 
Fayette 
Gibson 
Hardeman 
Hardin 
Haywood 
Henderson 
Henry 
Lake 
Lauderdale 
Madison 
McNairy 
Obion 
Shelby 
Tipton 
Weakley 
0.29 
0.30 
0.30 
0.52 
0.85 
0.29 
0.49 
0.25 
0.15 
0.36 
0.30 
0.28 
0.89 
0.52 
0.30 
0.23 
0.70 
0.38 
0.45 
0.35 
Very low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
High 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Very high 
Moderate 
Low 
Low 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Low 
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Table 56: Number of Buildings by Occupancy Class for the State of Tennessee 
W1 URML MH  County 
RES1 RES3 Total RES1 RES3 Total RES2  
Total 
Benton 
Carroll 
Chester 
Crockett 
Dyer 
Fayette 
Gibson 
Hardeman 
Hardin 
Haywood 
Henderson 
Henry 
Lake 
Lauderdale 
Madison 
McNairy 
Obion 
Shelby 
Tipton 
Weakley 
5,132 
8,750 
3,892 
4,459 
11,057 
7,769 
14,853 
6,914 
8,638 
5,433 
6,841 
9,433 
1,693 
6,858 
24,738 
7,735 
9,406 
230,702 
13,350 
9,356 
50 
201 
99 
83 
515 
95 
518 
147 
146 
264 
162 
236 
112 
295 
1,451 
98 
425 
10,877 
237 
474 
5,181 
8,951 
3,991 
4,541 
11,572 
7,864 
15,370 
7,061 
8,784 
5,697 
7,003 
9,668 
1,805 
7,153 
26,190 
7,832 
9,831 
241,578 
13,587 
9,830 
 
570 
972 
432 
495 
1,229 
863 
1,650 
768 
960 
604 
760 
1,048 
188 
762 
2,749 
859 
1,045 
25,634 
1,483 
1,040 
16 
63 
31 
26 
161 
30 
162 
46 
46 
83 
51 
74 
35 
92 
455 
31 
133 
3,408 
74 
149 
586 
1,035 
463 
521 
1,390 
893 
1,812 
814 
1,006 
686 
811 
1,122 
223 
854 
3,203 
890 
1,178 
29,041
1,558 
1,188 
 
2,493 
2,551 
1,306 
784 
1,350 
1,913 
2,141 
2,315 
2,481 
805 
3,134 
3,947 
241 
1,532 
2,509 
2,093 
2,128 
4,140 
2,916 
2,337 
 
8,260 
12,537 
5,760 
5,846 
14,312 
10,670 
19,324 
10,190 
12,271 
7,189 
10,948 
14,737 
2,269 
9,539 
31,902 
10,815 
13,137 
274,759 
18,060 
13,356 
Total 397,006 16,483 413,489  44,112 5,165 49,276  43,116  505,881 
*Occupancy class: RES1: Single Family Dwelling, RES2: Mobile Home, RES3: Multi Family Dwelling 
 
Results 
 
Table 57: Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Tennessee 
Damage State 
Statistic 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Moderate to 
Complete 
Damage 
Total No. 
Damaged 
Buildings 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
106,942 
2,488 
101,151 
2,600 
119,465 
2,964 
78,082 
1,784 
100,247 
2,088 
297,794 
4,041 
398,945 
4,805 
HAZUS* 79,351 191,196 103,227 32,191 101,343 236,766 427,959 
* HAZUS results represent damage of building for residential occupancy classes of RES1 through RES6. 
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Table 58: Building Damage for Impacted Counties in the State of Tennessee (90% CI) 
County None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total Damage 
Benton [2,087 , 2,382] [1,729 , 1,960] [1,886 , 2,110] [1,216 , 1,356] [853 , 942] [5,845 , 6,207] 
Carroll [3,148 , 3,612] [2,637 , 3,012] [2,839 , 3,197] [1,754 , 1,951] [1,390 , 1,533] [8,871 , 9,443] 
Chester [1,425 , 1,632] [1,202 , 1,369] [1,309 , 1,471] [827 , 919] [650 , 716] [4,102 , 4,361] 
Crockett [569 , 659] [859 , 994] [1,333 , 1,529] [1,093 , 1,235] [1,618 , 1,806] [5,066 , 5,401] 
Dyer [375 , 434] [925 , 1,073] [2,077 , 2,399] [2,254 , 2,577] [7,758 , 8,752] [13,355 , 14,460] 
Fayette [2,864 , 3,296] [2,290 , 2,623] [2,374 , 2,682] [1,399 , 1,558] [1,072 , 1,183] [7,343 , 7,837] 
Gibson [2,160 , 2,499] [3,051 , 3,529] [4,498 , 5,158] [3,482 , 3,936] [4,883 , 5,453] [16,448 , 17,541] 
Hardeman [3,281 , 3,753] [2,230 , 2,533] [2,131 , 2,386] [1,181 , 1,311] [749 , 825] [6,461 , 6,885] 
Hardin [6,813 , 7,769] [2,329 , 2,628] [1,546 , 1,719] [592 , 657] [233 , 256] [4,804 , 5,156] 
Haywood [1,421 , 1,636] [1,432 , 1,647] [1,689 , 1,921] [1,083 , 1,214] [1,107 , 1,228] [5,479 , 5,842] 
Henderson [2,602 , 2,969] [2,237 , 2,536] [2,508 , 2,807] [1,669 , 1,857] [1,288 , 1,422] [7,921 , 8,404] 
Henry [3,942 , 4,499] [3,111 , 3,527] [3,293 , 3,684] [2,053 , 2,284] [1,466 , 2,617] [10,200 , 10,835] 
Lake [49 , 56] [126 , 145] [294 , 338] [332 , 378] [1,327 , 1,492] [2,128 , 2,305] 
Lauderdale [862 , 994] [1,307 , 1,505] [2,061 , 2,351] [1,772 , 1,991] [2,951 , 3,284] [8,345 , 8,877] 
Madison [8,655 , 9,965] [6,997 , 8,044] [7,093 , 8,066] [3,853 , 4,320] [3,231 , 3,581] [21,820 , 23,364] 
McNairy [3,953 , 4,534] [2,391 , 2,724] [2,109 , 2,366] [1,064 , 1,181] [624 , 686] [6,352 , 6,793] 
Obion [602 , 695] [1,234 , 1,426] [2,426 , 2,781] [2,479 , 2,800] [5,592 , 6,240] [12,075 , 12,903] 
Shelby [49,696 , 57,594] 
[52,391 , 
60,785] 
[62,780 , 
72,386] 
[39,747 , 
45,516] 
[50,965 , 
57,652] 
[213,361 , 
228,871] 
Tipton [2,179 , 2,519] [2,841 , 3,279] [4,045 , 4,618] [3,222 , 3,621] [4,631 , 5,164] [15,220 , 16,201] 
Weakley [2,657 , 3,047] [2,634 , 3,011] [3,129 , 3,533] [2,096 , 2,333] [2,031 , 2,241] [10,185 , 10,823] 
 
Table 59: Building Damage by Occupancy Class for the State of Tennessee 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Occupancy Class 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Single Family 
Multi Family 
Mobile Home 
97,714 
4,208 
5,020 
2,484 
117 
76 
 
91,321
4,084 
5,746 
2,596
123 
76 
104,621
5,052 
9,792 
2,958
143 
125 
63,471
3,258 
11,354
1,776 
88 
142 
 
83,994 
5,049 
11,205 
2,079 
118 
147 
 
Table 60: Building Damage by Structural Type for the State of Tennessee 
Damage State 
None  Slight Moderate Extensive  Complete Building Type 
Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Wood 95,504 2,483  90,441 2,596 99,857 2,949 58,683 1,763  69,009 2,010 
Unreinforced 
Masonry 6,418 151  4,964 129 9,816 267 8,046 227  20,033 546 
Mobile Home 5,020 76  5,746 76 9,792 125 11,354 142  11,205 147 
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Table 61: Direct Economic Losses Due to Structural Damage of Buildings for the State of Tennessee 
Direct Economic Losses ($ millions) 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
90% Confidence Interval  4,766.44 7,170.25 
HAZUS* 7,251.58 
* HAZUS result includes direct loss for all buildings. 
 
Summary of Results 
 
Table 62 and Table 63 summarize estimates of structurally damaged buildings and their 
ratios to total number of buildings for the eight states, respectively. Table 64 shows the 
lower and upper bounds for the 90% confidence interval of direct economic loss due to 
structural damage. It is shown that the proposed framework gives consistent and 
reasonable estimates when compared to the HAZUS results. For high-hazard states, such 
as Arkansas, Missouri, and Tennessee, the differences between the probabilistic estimates 
and the HAZUS results are not significant. This indicates that both approaches can give 
fairly reasonable estimates in a high-seismicity area. 
 
Table 62: Summary of Structural Damage of Buildings for the Eight States 
Damage State 
State Statistics 
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Moderate to 
Complete 
Damage 
Total No. 
Damaged 
Buildings 
Mean 
St. Dev. 
461,441 
6,768 
20,798 
240 
6,653 
68 
1,195 
13 
165 
1 
8,014 
69 
28,812 
249 Alabama 
HAZUS* 484,462 4,222 1,327 82 3,464 4,875 9,097 
Mean 
St. Dev. 
77,043 
816 
40,695 
376 
43,937 
398 
28,736 
260 
71,370 
713 
144,044 
857 
184,739 
936 Arkansas 
HAZUS* 87,896 59,529 41,110 16,663 57,885 115,657 175,187 
Mean 
St. Dev. 
259,680 
4,095 
58,969 
643 
45,883 
410 
22,668 
187 
21,188 
180 
89,739 
485 
148,708 
805 Illinois 
HAZUS* 323,594 50,253 15,615 4,817 18,880 39,303 89,561 
Mean 
St. Dev. 
155,454 
1,966 
24,199 
475 
14,130 
261 
4,526 
78 
2,262 
47 
20,918 
277 
45,117 
550 Indiana 
HAZUS* 168,902 25,254 3,768 484 2,770 7,025 32,277 
Mean 
St. Dev. 
72,624 
1,095 
38,481 
438 
37,735 
394 
23,357 
254 
26,241 
348 
87,334 
584 
125,815 
729 Kentucky 
HAZUS* 103,857 36,798 25,532 9,809 23,018 58,359 95,159 
Mean 
St. Dev. 
110,836 
1,168 
38,075 
474 
28,793 
409 
13,658 
213 
9,385 
184 
51,835 
497 
89,910 
686 Mississippi 
HAZUS* 116,496 42,819 19,404 5,951 16,572 41,927 84,747 
Mean 
St. Dev. 
618,117 
13,356 
57,881 
612 
43,068 
373 
22,921 
199 
42,164 
433 
108,153 
605 
166,034 
861 Missouri 
HAZUS* 640,381 69,176 30,259 7,624 39,044 76,930 146,110 
Mean 
St. Dev. 
106,942 
2,488 
101,151 
2,600 
119,465 
2,964 
78,082 
1,784 
100,247 
2,088 
297,794 
4,041 
398,945 
4,805 Tennessee 
HAZUS* 79,351 191,196 103,227 32,191 101,343 236,766 427,959 
* HAZUS results represent damage of building for residential occupancy classes of RES1 through RES6. 
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Table 63: Summary of Percentage of Building Damage for the Eight States 
Mean HAZUS 
State Moderate to 
Complete 
Damaged 
Building 
Moderate to 
Complete 
Damaged 
Building 
Alabama 1.6 5.9 1.0 1.8 
Arkansas 55.0 70.6 44.0 66.6 
Illinois 22.0 36.4 9.5 21.7 
Indiana 10.4 22.5 3.5 16.0 
Kentucky 44.0 63.4 29.3 47.8 
Mississippi 25.8 44.8 20.8 42.1 
Missouri 13.8 21.2 9.8 18.6 
Tennessee 58.9 78.9 46.7 84.4 
 
Table 64: Summary of Direct Economic Losses due to Structural Damage of Buildings for the Eight 
States (90% CI) 
Direct Economic Losses ($ millions) 
State Lower Bound Upper Bound HAZUS* 
Alabama 37.62 61.31 123.72 
Arkansas 3,096.86 6,239.14 2,359.75 
Illinois 1,053.12 1,957.62 868.47 
Indiana 191.99 259.85 158.86 
Kentucky 1,199.00 2,001.76 1,501.98 
Mississippi 526.83 1,281.85 878.10 
Missouri 1,699.67 3,488.51 1,801.92 
Tennessee 4,766.44 7,170.25 7,251.58 
* HAZUS results represent direct loss for all buildings. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
Earthquake impact assessment contains various sources of uncertainty. The uncertainties 
should be considered in impact assessment procedures so that decision-making includes 
allowances for the potential variation of impact results and also so that future efforts are 
focused on reducing this variation. In order to consider the effect of uncertainty, this 
study proposes a simple probabilistic framework which adopts a modified quantile 
arithmetic method. It is demonstrated that the proposed procedure for probabilistic loss 
estimation gives consistent and reasonable estimates.  
 
A simplified framework for uncertainty propagation analysis has a simple procedure and 
requires little information input. Also, it is quite convenient to use in practice because it 
directly utilizes standard outputs from loss assessment tools HAZUS. In addition, it 
requires much less computational effort than Monte Carlo simulation by adopting 
approximation of uncertainty propagation. Thus, the proposed procedure will be a 
powerful tool used to obtain reliable estimates for a complex system. 
 
A reliable estimation will be accomplished by using objectively acceptable uncertainty 
included in the earthquake loss estimation procedures. Since reliability of the information 
and data used in the assessment depends upon the uncertainty in the definitions various 
components from seismic sources to the estimation of economic loss, more efforts to 
understand the physical phenomena of the seismic hazard and fragility and to collect the 
reliable and sufficient inventory data should be undertaken for better decision-making. 
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Appendix 13 – Comparison with Previous Study 
 
The earthquake impact assessment modeling discussed in this report built upon work 
completed in a previous Central US earthquake impact assessment study by the same 
research team. A report published by the Mid-America Earthquake (MAE) Center in 
2008, Impact of Earthquakes on the Central USA (Elnashai et al., 2008), details HAZUS 
models and impact assessment results for a variety of seismic events in the New Madrid 
Seismic Zone (NMSZ), Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (WVSZ), and East Tennessee 
Seismic Zone (ETSZ). Though the previous study was the most comprehensive of its 
kind at the time it was published this new study presents results which are based on 
further improvement to the model components discussed in the 2008 MAE Center report. 
This appendix compares results from the current NMSZ impact assessment with results 
from the previous MAE Center NMSZ impact assessments detailed in Elnashai et al. 
(2008). Only the results of HAZUS models for NMSZ scenarios are considered. 
Scenarios for WVSZ and ETSZ events were not completed in both studies and thus no 
comparisons are made. Furthermore, various additional models discussed in this report, 
such as network and flood risk models, threshold value damage estimations, and 
uncertainty analyses were not included in the previous MAE Center study and thus no 
comparisons are available. Differences between the results of each study are presented as 
well as likely explanations for these differences.  
 
General Building Damage 
 
Estimates of damage to general buildings do not show a consistent trend of more or less 
damage in one particular study. For example, total building damage in Alabama is greater 
in the 2009 study than the 2008 study, due, in part, to more damaged wood structures. 
Similar trends are evident in Arkansas, as over 50,000 more buildings are damaged in the 
2009 study than the 2008 study. Conversely, fewer total buildings are damaged in the 
2009 study than the 2008 study for the State of Kentucky. Roughly 14,000 fewer wood 
structures are damaged and nearly 1,000 fewer damaged unreinforced masonry buildings 
(URMs). In other states, such as Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri, damage estimates are 
very similar in both the 2008 and 2009 studies.  
 
There are numerous factors that contribute to these differences including improvements 
to the hazard, inventory, and fragility characterizations employed in each study. The 2009 
study employs a new scenario event (see Appendix 1) that was designed to be nationally 
catastrophic. In 2008, the worst case scenario for each state was used, meaning the 
rupture source was moved closer to each state, thus increasing the shaking intensity in 
certain parts of each state. The slightly lower levels of shaking near the rupture zone may 
lead to less damage. Conversely, new liquefaction characterizations for the entire eight-
state study region were used in the 2009 study, though only limited liquefaction data was 
used in the 2008 study. A full set of liquefaction data likely increases damage estimates.  
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The 2008 study utilized the MR2 version of HAZUS while the MR3 version was used in 
the 2009 study. The new MR3 version has more current building data and higher building 
counts than the MR2 version. The addition of more building inventory may lead to more 
damage, depending up on where the new inventory is located.  
 
Lastly, building fragility relationships were updated for all building types in HAZUS (see 
Appendix 3). New fragility relationships alter the distribution of building damage among 
the four damage states (slight, moderate, extensive, and complete) (Gencturk et al., 2008). 
By adjusting the dispersion measures associated with each fragility buildings that were 
classified as ‘moderately’ damaged, for example, in the 2008 study may be classified as 
‘slightly’ damaged in the 2009 study. Since damage counts include only moderate, 
extensive, and complete damage the resulting building damage estimates would be lower 
in the 2009 study than the 2008 study. Conversely, the adjustment of dispersion values 
may lead to more cases of damage, particularly complete damage, as is the case with 
certain structure types. Overall, it is difficult to determine one single factor that causes 
the difference in building damage estimates. Instead, there are multiple factors that 
contribute to the variations shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Building Damage Comparison1 
Wood Structures URM Structures Total Buildings  State 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Alabama 100 3,000 500 400 6,300 15,400 
Arkansas 57,900 68,800 20,700 29,100 111,600 162,200 
Illinois 16,700 17,700 12,700 10,100 46,300 44,500 
Indiana 200 4,800 2,900 2,600 16,600 14,200 
Kentucky 50,100 36,100 10,300 9,400 81,600 68,400 
Mississippi 10,600 19,900 5,800 5,000 46,700 57,400 
Missouri 33,600 40,200 27,300 26,800 84,600 86,800 
Tennessee 166,400 163,600 48,100 48,900 258,000 264,200 
 
Essential Facilities Damage 
 
Variations in essential facilities damage are similar to those shown in building damage 
estimates (see Table 2). Certain states, such as Illinois, Indiana, Arkansas, and 
Mississippi, show substantially more damaged facilities in the 2009 study than the 2008 
study. Conversely, Tennessee and Missouri experience fewer damaged facilities in the 
2009 study. As previously mentioned, it is difficult to identify only one cause for these 
differences.  
 
New characterizations of hazard, inventory, and fragility factor into the new damage 
estimations in the 2009 study. The adjustment of rupture location and new liquefaction 
susceptibility data affect the level of ground shaking and ground deformation at each 
individual facility. In the case of Tennessee, intense shaking was likely closer to 
Memphis in the 2008 leading to more damaged facilities. Since liquefaction data was 
                                                 
1 All damaged buildings are those in the ‘moderate’, ‘extensive’, and ‘complete’ damage states, as reported 
by the HAZUS model. Those buildings classified as ‘slightly’ damaged are not included in the damage 
estimates shown as damage is not severe.  
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available in the Memphis area for both studies, the adjustments to liquefaction may not 
have been as critical in this portion of the study region.  
 
Extensive inventory improvements were completed in the 2009 study. Numerous new 
essential facilities were added to state inventories though these new facilities were not 
evenly distributed throughout the eight states. Certain states saw larger numbers of new 
facilities than others. For example, Illinois’ inventory was fairly comprehensive in the 
2008 study. The inventory in Indiana was greatly improved in the 2009 study, however, 
with many new facilities.  
 
Finally, new fragility relationships are employed in the damage assessment of essential 
facilities damage. The building fragilities employed in the building damage estimates are 
also used in the essential facilities damage calculations as they share the same building 
types. Improvements to these fragility relationships alter the damage state probabilities 
for essential facilities in the 2009 study, leading to more cases of damage in certain 
circumstances and fewer occurrences of damage in other situations.  
 
Table 2: Essential Facilities Damage Comparison2 
Hospitals Schools Police Stations Fire Stations State 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas 18 24 188 219 94 107 151 216 
Illinois 3 15 83 333 21 100 38 158 
Indiana 0 5 0 6 0 2 0 4 
Kentucky 6 9 98 99 23 22 77 71 
Mississippi 11 15 110 140 30 42 81 104 
Missouri 8 7 185 136 61 53 116 69 
Tennessee 43 12 602 608 124 51 256 242 
 
Transportation Lifeline Damage 
 
There are fewer factors affecting damage estimations for transportation lifelines than 
building damage and essential facilities. Extensive hazard and inventory improvements 
were made in the 2009 study, though fragilities were largely unchanged, with the 
exception of bridge fragilities, which were updated. Estimates of bridge damage are far 
greater for some states in the 2009 study, namely Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee, 
though far less in others such as Illinois, Missouri, and Mississippi. Other transportation 
facilities show lesser variations between the two studies. Kentucky damage estimates are 
generally less in the 2009 study, while most facility types in Arkansas incur more damage. 
Estimates in Tennessee are largely unchanged between the 2008 and 2009 studies, as 
shown in Table 3. 
 
                                                 
2 For tables in this section the following method is used to determine the number of facilities in a damage 
category.  HAZUS assigns each facility a probability of reaching a specific damage level (at least moderate, 
complete, etc.).  In order to provide quantities of facilities at various damage levels, all those facilities that 
experience a damage probability of 50% or greater for a given damage level are counted as 
‘damaged.’  Therefore, the facilities that are not 50% likely to incur damage at a specific damage level are 
deemed ‘undamaged.’ 
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The aforementioned improvements to the scenario event and resulting ground shaking 
distribution, as well as liquefaction susceptibility data affect the damage estimations in 
the 2009 study. Extensive inventory improvements to all transportation facilities are also 
a major factor as certain facility types have greater inventories in the 2009 study. This is 
particularly relevant to bridges since the National Bridge Inventory (NBI) from 2008 was 
added to the regional inventory in the 2009 study. There are multiple factors that 
contribute to variations in damage estimates, and as with previously discussed 
infrastructure damage, it is impossible to attribute variations to only a single factor.  
 
Table 3: Transportation Lifeline Damage Comparison3 
Highway Bridges Railway Bridges Ports Airports State 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas 688 1,082 4 11 17 12 36 37 
Illinois 264 157 6 11 20 17 30 16 
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 197 262 3 3 86 61 19 13 
Mississippi 73 6 0 0 1 0 5 0 
Missouri 1,363 1,004 2 2 49 51 33 28 
Tennessee 878 1,035 4 2 81 82 50 45 
 
Utility Lifeline Damage 
 
Estimates of utility facility damage show more cases of damage in the 2009 study than 
the 2008 study, generally. Waste water, electric power, and communication facilities 
damage estimates are greater in each of the eight states while oil facilities damage is 
greater in seven of the eight states. Variations in damage estimates are far more straight-
forward with utility facilities than with the aforementioned infrastructure types. Though 
all hazard improvements previously discussed apply to utility facility damage estimations, 
the improvements to the inventory overshadow the hazard improvements. In many states, 
hundreds or thousands of facilities have been added to the 2009 inventory and many of 
these new facilities are located in areas of intense shaking. This leads to far more cases of 
damage and the larger damage estimates shown in Table 4. Utility fragility relationships 
are unchanged between the 2008 and 2009 studies. 
 
Utility pipeline damage estimate are largely influenced by ground shaking and ground 
deformation, thus the adjustments to the scenario event and liquefaction susceptibility 
data are major factors in damage estimate variations. Several states require fewer repairs 
in the 2008 study than the 2009 study, specifically Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, and 
Kentucky. Conversely, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee require more 
repairs in the 2009 study, though some variations are larger than others (see Table 5). 
Several hundred additional repairs are needed in Indiana, while each pipe type requires 
up to 8,100 more repairs in the 2009 study. These larger estimates are due, in part, to the 
improvements in liquefaction susceptibility. In states like Tennessee, liquefaction data 
was not available for the entire state in the 2008 study, though a comprehensive state 
liquefaction map was used in the 2009 study.  
                                                 
3 Please reference footnote 2. 
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Table 4: Utility Facility Damage Comparison4 
Waste Water Oil Electric Power Communication State 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas 66 349 2 14 8 147 59 633 
Illinois 461 616 3 755 59 75 1,450 1,715 
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 523 650 6 175 132 202 1,044 1,373 
Mississippi 102 145 1 4 24 36 290 467 
Missouri 88 519 8 7 96 117 1,573 1,536 
Tennessee 375 453 32 43 63 96 3,468 4,024 
 
Table 5: Local Utility Pipeline Damage Comparison 
Potable Water Waste Water Natural Gas State 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Alabama 902 752 714 595 762 636 
Arkansas 49,440 47,181 39,103 37,316 41,800 39,889 
Illinois 10,849 9,768 8,612 7,725 9,206 8,167 
Indiana 1,481 1,807 1,172 1,429 1,253 1,528 
Kentucky 15,087 11,406 11,933 9,022 12,755 9,644 
Mississippi 5,685 10,735 4,497 8,490 4,807 9,076 
Missouri 35,461 36,581 28,047 28,933 29,981 30,928 
Tennessee 31,244 39,309 24,711 31,089 26,415 33,234 
 
Table 6: Utility Service Outage Comparison at Day 1 
Electric Power Outages Potable Water Outages State 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Alabama 0 230,000 0 0 
Arkansas 95,300 330,000 175,600 193,000 
Illinois 69,600 235,000 70,800 95,000 
Indiana 0 222,000 44,100 15,000 
Kentucky 77,300 329,000 108,600 76,000 
Mississippi 32,600 233,000 41,800 80,000 
Missouri 100,100 310,000 146,400 124,000 
Tennessee 426,600 709,000 446,900 507,000 
 
Utility service outage estimates are vastly different in the 2008 and 2009 studies, 
particularly electric power outages. Every state in the study region shows far greater 
electric power outages in the 2009 study. This substantial increase is due, in large part, to 
the improvement of regional inventory. Additional electric power facilities were added to 
many states which affects the determination of electric outages. Also, previous inventory 
improvements were adjusted to reflect the appropriate facility types. These improvements 
also affected the power outages model leading to numerous additional outages. Estimates 
of potable water outages are greater in the 2009 study for many states. Only Indiana, 
Kentucky, and Missouri report fewer outages in the 2009 study, while estimates in 
Alabama are unchanged (see Table 6). The adjustments to hazard lead to variation in 
pipeline damage which feeds the water outage model. It is likely that pipeline damage 
estimates decreased in areas of intense shaking leading to fewer water outages. It is 
relevant to note that pipeline damage estimates may be reduced in areas of intense 
shaking and increase in areas of less intense shaking since liquefaction susceptibility 
information was available for these outlying areas in the 2009 study and was not 
available in the 2008 study. Though state totals may increase or decrease in the 2009 
                                                 
4 Please reference footnote 2. 
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study, variations throughout each state are not discussed explicitly and affect the outages 
estimated in the model.  
 
Induced Damage, Casualties, Direct Economic Loss 
 
Debris estimates are greater in the 2009 study for all states. The newer version of 
HAZUS used in the 2009 study, MR3 version, has a more substantial building inventory 
than the MR2 version used in the 2008 study. All forms of building damage and bridge 
damage are included in the debris calculation and greater inventory generates greater 
damage, especially when slight damage is considered, as it is in the estimations shown in 
Table 7. Some states show small increases, such as Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and 
Tennessee, while other states show significant increases (Alabama, Arkansas, and 
Indiana). Greater estimates of truckloads5  are also required to remove the increased 
estimates of debris reported in the 2009 study. 
 
Table 7: Debris Generation Comparison 
Total Debris (Tons) Truckloads State 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Alabama 112,000 559,000 4,480 22,360 
Arkansas 7,000,000 9,391,000 280,000 375,640 
Illinois 2,570,000 2,762,000 102,800 110,480 
Indiana 282,000 1,049,000 11,280 41,960 
Kentucky 4,000,000 4,818,000 160,000 192,720 
Mississippi 2,000,000 3,408,000 80,000 136,320 
Missouri 6,000,000 6,450,000 240,000 258,000 
Tennessee 20,000,000 21,619,000 800,000 864,760 
 
Table 8: Casualties Comparison 
Fatalities Total Casualties State 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Alabama 2 28 88 949 
Arkansas 574 641 13,977 15,305 
Illinois 276 271 6,250 6,284 
Indiana 3 80 145 1,976 
Kentucky 593 287 9,740 6,840 
Mississippi 208 183 3,977 6,056 
Missouri 760 687 15,639 14,125 
Tennessee 4,088 1,319 63,038 34,230 
 
Casualty estimates are also related to building damage and thus many states that show 
less building damage in the 2009 study also show fewer fatalities and total casualties, 
though this is not a direct correlation, so this is not applicable in every case. In addition, 
the 2008 studies reported the greatest casualty estimate of the three times of day modeled. 
The 2009 study reported only the 2:00AM casualty estimate since that was the time of 
day chosen for the scenario event. Generally, fatality estimates are less in the 2009 study, 
which may be due to fewer completely damaged buildings. Table 8 shows, however, that 
total casualties increase in several states. Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Mississippi, and 
Illinois to a lesser degree, show greater total casualty estimates in the 2009 study. All 
other states show far fewer total casualties, particularly Tennessee where nearly 30,000 
                                                 
5 Truckload estimates assume a 25-ton truck. 
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fewer casualties occur. It should also be noted that a social impact model such as the 
casualty model, is highly uncertain due to the uncertainties in all models and input 
components that are used within the casualty model itself. Improving the model 
components and inputs that feed the casualty model reduce the level of uncertainty, 
though not completely. 
 
Direct economic losses are divided into losses by infrastructure group: buildings, 
transportation lifelines, and utility lifelines. A comparison of building losses shows that 
building losses are greater in the 2009 study than the 2008 study. While this is due, in 
part, to some increases in building damage, the increase in building value is also relevant. 
The MR2 version of HAZUS used building valuation data from 2005. The MR3 version 
used in the 2009 study was updated to more current building valuations. Similar amounts 
of damage in both studies would result in more economic loss in the 2009 study than the 
2008 study. The largest differences, in terms of total dollars or percentage increases, in 
building-related economic loss occur in Alabama, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, and 
Tennessee.  
 
Table 9: Direct Economic Loss Comparison ($ millions) 
Building Transportation Utility Total State 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
Alabama $404 $1,758 $96 $274 $569 $11,626 $1,068 $13,658 
Arkansas $12,597 $18,167 $2,155 $2,347 $4,127 $18,515 $18,879 $39,029 
Illinois $5,451 $8,105 $1,883 $1,303 $26,779 $34,764 $34,114 $44,172 
Indiana $613 $3,472 $158 $464 $648 $8,355 $1,419 $12,291 
Kentucky $9,443 $11,369 $1,291 $1,131 $35,292 $40,261 $46,026 $52,761 
Mississippi $3,770 $7,305 $280 $660 $5,442 $8,759 $9,492 $16,724 
Missouri $11,811 $13,512 $1,773 $1,789 $25,138 $33,700 $38,722 $49,001 
Tennessee $40,316 $49,392 $1,746 $2,898 $14,576 $16,121 $56,639 $68,411 
 
Transportation lifeline losses are also greater in all eight states. Improvements to 
inventory and greater damage estimations are main factors in those increases. Utility 
lifeline losses show substantial increases in all eight states as well. Alabama, for example, 
shows $11 billion more utility loss in the 2009 study than the 2008 study, which is 
extremely large, considering the 2008 study estimated on $570 million in utility losses. 
Improvements to the inventory and the addition of liquefaction data are largely 
responsible for this change. Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri also show 
significant increases in utility loss. Overall, direct economic losses are far greater in the 
2009 study, as is detailed by the total losses shown in Table 9. Losses in Arkansas more 
than doubled in the 2009 study. Tennessee shows a $12 billion increase while both 
Illinois and Missouri report at least $10 billion in new economic losses. Though total 
economic losses in all states should not be added in the 2008 study, due to the different 
scenario events employed for each state, rough estimates indicated total regional losses 
up to $200 billion. The 2009 study reports nearly $300 billion in total direct economic 
losses for the eight-state region. This is a substantial increase that is directly related to the 
improvements made to the model components discussed previously.  
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